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ABSTRACT 
Collaborative water governance (CWG) is a form of decision-making for water that involves 
multiple actors with diverse interests working together to solve common problems (e.g., 
pollution, scarcity, flooding). CWG has emerged as an increasingly popular model of governance 
in Western countries and is promoted as a way to enhance the resilience and effectiveness of 
decisions and actions for water resources. Vital to CWG is the governance attribute legitimacy, 
which helps collaborations function and produce results effectively.  
Legitimacy is about the justifiability or acceptance of governance systems, organizations, 
decisions, and mechanisms. Traditionally, in the context of governance, the state’s legitimacy, 
which is largely a product of democratic values, has been the primary focus of legitimacy studies. 
However, the increased use of collaborative governance that involves non-state actors from 
various societal sectors (e.g., Indigenous peoples, civil society, industry, agriculture) in decision-
making has brought to light questions about the nature of legitimacy within CWG. In particular, 
there are outstanding questions about what types of legitimacy matter for CWG, how legitimacy 
evolves as a collaboration develops, and how legitimacy perceptions differ by societal sector.  
The purpose of this research is to provide conceptual clarity about the multi-faceted and 
dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy. This was done through a multi-case study approach 
analyzing five watershed-based collaborative governance initiatives in British Columbia, Canada. 
These cases include the Cowichan Watershed Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere Ambassadors 
(LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB), 
and the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process (SLIPP)/Shuswap Watershed Council (SWC). 
The objectives of this research include the following: (1) to synthesise existing legitimacy 
typologies and build a robust conceptual framework of legitimacy types that can be used for the 
integrated assessment of legitimacy within CWG; (2) to examine how legitimacy evolves as a 
collaborative body develops; (3) to determine variations in the composition of legitimacy 
judgements by societal sector (e.g., government, agriculture, industry, environment) towards 
CWG bodies; and (4) to provide insight into ways collaborative practitioners can influence 
legitimacy to enhance the effectiveness and stability of CWG according to various perspectives.  
The key findings of this research confirm the hybrid, pluralistic, and dynamic nature of 
legitimacy as a governance attribute. Legitimacy within CWG is sourced from a combination of 
practice-, results-, institutional-, social-, and individual-based types that exist across 18 different 
typologies. No one legitimacy typology encapsulates all legitimacy types. Therefore, the 
synthesis of typologies in a comparable and mutually reinforcing manner is necessary for an 
accurate assessment of legitimacy. This is particularly true for multi-sector collaborative 
governance as findings indicate that empirically the range of actors involved in or impacted by 
collaborative bodies draw on multiple sources that relate to legitimacy types identified across all 
18 typologies. Moreover, these legitimacy types, in different combinations, matter more or less at 
different stages of a CWG body’s development and within the legitimacy judgements of 
individuals from different societal sectors.  
As CWG bodies develop through stages of establishment, growth, maturity, decline and 
then either dissolution or renewal, legitimacy is also established, extended, maintained, defended, 
and either lost or re-extended. Findings of this research indicate that the sources that most directly 
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influence these legitimacy changes vary at each development stage of a collaboration. In each of 
the five cases, the most dominant legitimacy sources shifted from at first being focused on a sense 
of need to collaborate, to process management and the production of results, to the development 
of a sense of permanence, and then to the defence of the relevance and usefulness of a 
collaboration under the guidance of a leader. In addition to identifying how legitimacy shifts as a 
CWG body develops organizationally, research findings also categorized what sources and types 
of legitimacy are more prevalent in the judgements about a collaboration by actors from different 
societal sectors. Legitimacy judgements of actors connected to the different cases varied 
according to whether they represented government, First Nations, agriculture, environmental civil 
society, industry, local property owner associations, or local businesses sectors. For example, 
government actors commonly viewed a collaboration’s legitimacy positively when other 
government actors either participated in or supported a collaboration. Meanwhile, agriculture 
representatives positively judged a CWG body when it helped address water issues that impact 
farmers such as the protection of water allocation licences and agriculture-environmental 
sustainability. 
From these findings, this research makes both a conceptual and practical contribution to 
knowledge. Conceptually, the research first builds clarity around the meaning and nature of 
legitimacy in CWG contexts. Conceptual frameworks concerning the relevancy of multiple 
legitimacy typologies, the stage-based dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy, and the composition 
of different legitimacy judgements by societal sector may act as assessment tools to more 
critically and accurately examine legitimacy. Likewise, methodologically, the research also 
provides insight regarding the importance of cross-disciplinarily for the study of CWG 
legitimacy. The multiple fields (e.g., political science, sociology, law, psychology) that all study 
legitimacy through different lenses provide necessary insight to comprehensively understand the 
topic. Finally, the research also contributes conceptual knowledge about the considerations 
necessary to influence or strategically manage legitimacy.  
Practically, the research also makes a contribution by highlighting ways those engaged in 
CWG can influence or manage legitimacy. These recommendations include the following: (1) 
clarify how legitimacy is locally interpreted, (2) strategically assess legitimacy as a collective 
within a collaborative body, (3) be aware of different discourses and assertions surrounding a 
CWG body at different times and contexts, (4) pay cautious attention to areas of illegitimacy, (5) 
patiently deal with challenges of collaboration, and (6) accept that collaborative governance may 
not be able to establish and maintain legitimacy in all contexts. These recommendations may help 
build understanding about how to influence legitimacy so that decisions about whether or not and 
when collaboration should, should not, or should no longer be used, are contextually appropriate.  
Legitimacy is needed to ensure multi-sector collaborative governance bodies can effectively 
address water issues. If collaborative bodies are found to be illegitimate or are continuously being 
delegitimized then not only may resources be wasted as collaborative processes risk inefficiency 
or dissolution, but also water resource sustainability may be hindered. Conceptual understanding 
of the applicable theories, perspectives and the dynamics of legitimacy for collaborative 
governance can help determine whether or not specific collaborative water governance bodies can 
foster and maintain the popular support needed for their existence. Although findings specifically 
address CWG in British Columbia, they are also relevant in other contexts of collaborative 
governance for water and for the collaborative governance of other environmental resources.  
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1.1 Research Context 
Scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers increasingly recognize that addressing water-related 
issues at all levels of decision-making requires attention to governance-related concerns. 
Governance broadly concerns the norms, structures, and organizational practices used to make 
decisions and take action. One crucial concern for governance is legitimacy. Legitimacy in the 
context of governance is about both the justification and acceptance of the existence and authority 
of a governance system, organization, actor, event, or decision (Bernstein 2005). A lack of 
legitimacy can cause opposition, resistance or a lack of commitment to the processes and results 
of governance and is therefore a critical concern when considering how to address various water 
challenges (Pahl-Wostl, et al. 2013). For example, if legitimacy is not established or is lost, then 
the governance process may break down and the decisions and actions of the body could be 
disregarded or opposed. Understanding the many different facets of legitimacy – such as its 
various sources and when and why they are used and by whom – can help clarify when strategic 
changes are needed for the effectiveness of a governance body (Tost, 2011). Given the pressing 
need for governance for many water issues, ensuring governance bodies have legitimacy so that 
they can proceed and be effective with their work, is essential for water resource sustainability. 
The issue of legitimacy for water governance is also part of a broader political concern in 
Western countries. Questions of governance legitimacy relate to the changing role of the state due 
to declining public trust in both liberal democratic practices and the ideals of the welfare state 
along with increasing demand for participatory approaches to decision-making (Mulgan 2003; 
Kröger 2007). Traditionally, political authority has rested with governments, whose legitimacy is 
gained and sustained from constitutions and, in representative democracies, through electoral 
processes that signal the will of the people (Rosanvallon 2011). However, different models of 
governance that are based on collaboration, partnerships, and networks among diverse state and 
non-state actors are being promoted and used in many political systems (Kooiman 2003). As a 
result, governments increasingly are sharing some of their responsibilities (and sometimes their 
authority) with a range of non-state actors. For water governance, the sharing of responsibility is 
particularly common through the use of collaborative governance, which in its most basic form is 
an approach to governing that involves multiple actors all working towards a common goal 
(Gunningham, 2009).  
This sharing of power between governments and non-state actors has led to changes in 
legitimacy dynamics and sources, which has raised questions about how legitimacy is achieved in 
collaborative settings (Bäckstrand et al., 2010a; Baird et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2006; Hogl et 
al., 2012; Van Buuren et al., 2012). Within the broader environmental context, researchers (e.g., 
Wallington, et al. 2008; Connelly 2011) have found that collaborative environmental governance 
(CEG) legitimacy is increasingly variable, hybrid, and dynamic, and is derived from participatory 
and deliberative processes as well as from their socially-just outputs. For instance, governance 
attributes such as trust, accountability, and the perceived improvement of social welfare are 
thought to play a role in the achievement of governance legitimacy in its various forms 
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(Bäckstrand et al., 2010b; Sabatier, Focht, et al., 2005a). Findings from such studies also suggest 
that governance legitimacy can be determined in multiple ways based on the type of governance 
and the context, and is increasingly conditional and susceptible to change (Krell-Laluhová and 
Scheneider 2004; Connelly 2011). However, there are still outstanding questions, particularly in 
the context of water governance, regarding the nature of legitimacy. These questions include the 
following: 
• What typologies of legitimacy are relevant to the study of collaborative water governance 
(CWG)? 
• What sources support and hinder the achievement of CWG legitimacy? 
• How does CWG legitimacy evolve over time? 
• How do legitimacy judgements differ among sectors of society? 
The rationale for these questions stems from a cross-examination of different bodies of literature 
that revealed three knowledge gaps that exist in understanding CWG legitimacy. The first gap 
concerns the presence of multiple and varying legitimacy typologies in the broader theoretical 
legitimacy literature. For example, Scharpf (1999) highlights input and output legitimacy types; 
Beetham (1991) suggests rules, expressed consent, justifiability of rules legitimacy types; and 
Weber (1964) suggests traditional, rational-legality, and charismatic legitimacy types. These 
various types suggest that legitimacy may be achieved through a number of different sources. 
However, in the CWG literature, scholars (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; 
Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2012) have predominately only examined 
legitimacy using one typology. This suggests that potentially relevant typologies exist that have 
yet to be applied to CWG contexts. The application of these typologies may reveal the importance 
of little known legitimacy sources. 
The second gap concerns the question of whether predominant legitimacy sources and their 
related types change throughout the development of a CWG organization. Legitimacy is known to 
be a dynamic attribute that is established, extended, maintained, defended, and lost (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004). Likewise, collaborative governance bodies, similar to 
other organizational forms, are known to progress through stages of development as they evolve 
over time (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Mandell & Keast, 2008). For example, Mandell and Keast 
(2008) suggest stages of development for interorganizational networks, which include first the 
building of relationships, second the maintenance of relationships and collaborative process, and 
third the achievement of collective tasks. However, the collaborative governance literature has 
not yet examined changes to governance attributes, such as legitimacy, as collaborative bodies 
develop (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). This is particularly true for CWG, where the dynamic 
nature of legitimacy has not yet been studied in the context of collaborative organizational 
development. Knowing which legitimacy source and types are more or less relevant at different 
points in a collaboration’s development can help tailor management approaches to ensure the 
effectiveness of CWG.  
The third gap concerns the composition of legitimacy sources and types within individual 
legitimacy judgements by sector. In this context, societal sector is defined as the different 
subdivisions of a community or society based on identifiable socio-economic, political, or 
cultural boundaries. CWG is a multi-sector endeavor typically made up of people representing 
various public, private, and non-government societal sectors. Common sectors include 
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government, First Nations, agriculture, industry, local business associations, and environmental 
organizations. As a result, the underlying values and interests connected to various sectors may 
influence the judgements different actors hold toward CWG (Bell & Park, 2006). These 
judgements form by drawing on various legitimacy sources and are essential to determining the 
acceptance or support of an entity (Black, 2008). However, individual legitimacy judgements are 
generally understudied (Black, 2008; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Finch et al., 2014; Tost, 
2011). In the context of CWG, the presence of actors from different sectors raises questions not 
only about how individuals judge legitimacy, but also how individuals from different sectors 
judge legitimacy. Similar to understanding how predominant legitimacy sources vary over the 
course of development, understanding how legitimacy sources make-up the legitimacy judgement 
of different sectors at a given point of time can also help collaborative bodies strategically 
manage their legitimacy. 
Collectively, these are vital gaps because legitimacy ensures governance order, 
effectiveness, and stability (Beetham, 1991). Uncertainty about the ability of collaborative 
governance systems to address environmental problems like water and to achieve results that are 
democratic as well as socially and environmentally sustainable (McClosky 2000; Holley, et al. 
2012) makes the development of legitimacy knowledge especially important in determining 
whether CWG is a suitable governance model in certain situations. Addressing these gaps is 
particularly important for water resource decision-making as the collaborative governance model 
is increasingly used as a way to include the array of actors concerned with or affected by water 
issues in the decision-making process (Ryan and Bidwell 2007). Knowledge about CWG 
legitimacy can help determine whether or not and how CWG can be an effective democratic 
process capable of delivering social and ecological outcomes. To establish a foundation for this 
research, this chapter frames the research’s problem context and interpretation of key variables 
using a theoretical and empirical literature review, and outlines the purpose, objectives, 
overarching methodology and structure of the dissertation.  
1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
Stemming from the aforementioned knowledge gaps, the overarching purpose of this research is 
to provide conceptual clarity about the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy. 
Four interrelated objectives are pursued to accomplish this purpose: 
1) To synthesise existing legitimacy typologies and build a robust conceptual framework of 
legitimacy types that can be used for the integrated assessment of CWG legitimacy; 
2) To examine how CWG legitimacy evolves as a collaborative body develops; 
3) To determine variations in the composition of CWG legitimacy judgements by sector; and 
4) To provide insight into ways collaborative practitioners can influence legitimacy to enhance 
the effectiveness and stability of CWG according to various perspectives. 
These objectives are motivated by two goals: to provide conceptual insight on the empirical 
sources and types of legitimacy common within judgements towards CWG bodies and to identify 
how these sources and types change through the development of a collaborative body and based 
on different societal sector-based perspectives. The research is motivated by both practical and 
theoretical concerns. Practically, the increasing use of collaborative governance to address water 
issues in Canada requires critical assessment to ensure these collaborative governance bodies can 
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achieve their goals. Theoretically, the traditional state-centric and process-based framework of 
legitimacy is no longer valid in all governance contexts, and thus as one alternative model, a 
comprehensive understanding of CWG legitimacy is necessary. 
The significant and original contribution of this research emerges from (1) integrating 
understandings and ideas of legitimacy into CWG discussions; (2) empirically testing how and 
whether legitimacy can be developed and sustained in the context of CWG; and (3) critically 
challenging the context in which collaborative governance is an appropriate tool for making 
decisions about water resources. Collaborative governance is analyzed not as an assumed “best” 
governance model, but as one that can either generate socially and ecologically desirable 
decisions or lead to stalemate and undermine the policy-making process. Ultimately, this research 
is predicated on the assumption that legitimacy is required for governance bodies to be influential 
in addressing water issues but a comprehensive understanding of CWG legitimacy does not fully 
exist. Based on this assumption, the research tests and challenges insights and ideas of legitimacy 
in the context of CWG using five watershed-based cases within the province of British Columbia 
as an empirical setting for analysis.  
1.3 Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy: Conceptual Review 
1.3.1 Governance and Collaboration 
This research is embedded within the field of governance. Although conceptually governance is 
used in a variety of ways with a diversity of meanings (Peters & Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; 
Stoker, 1998), in general it is about the process through which decisions are made and actions are 
taken. Central within many definitions is the idea that governance tries to capture the changing 
nature of the state (Blatter, 2007; Treib et al., 2007) and is concerned ultimately with creating 
conditions for ordered rule and collective action (Bell & Park, 2006; Kitthananan, 2006; Stoker, 
1998). In creating such conditions, multiple models of governance are being discussed and 
practiced, many of which, like collaborative governance, focus on including non-state actors in 
decision-making processes (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Such inclusion is grounded in the evolved 
belief of governance academics and practitioners that the participation of private actors in public 
decision-making will help address complex societal problems more effectively (Innes & Booher, 
2000; Koontz et al., 2004).  
Collaborative governance is a model of governance that is predicated on the value of non-
state actor inclusion using a deliberative form of decision-making. Broadly, it can be defined as 
“the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage 
people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, 
and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” 
(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). In this sense, collaborative governance is about the co-labour 
of actors from multiple sectors to make decisions that are of public concern. The emergence of 
collaborative governance as a desired model of governing is connected in part to the general 
belief that the state has abdicated some of its responsibilities on the premise of efficiency through 
devolved or outsourced productivity as well as the belief that the involvement of non-state actors 
in the policy or decision-making process may be more effective (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011). As a 
result, collaborative governance is used within multiple fields such as planning (e.g., Harris, 
2002; Innes & Booher, 2010), business (e.g., Gray, 1985; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Trist, 1983), 
public administration (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bingham et al., 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006) and 
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environmental management (e.g., Ali-Khan & Mulvihill, 2008; Koontz, 2006; Margerum, 2008). 
As a result of its use in these different fields, various theoretical foundations of collaborative 
governance exist. For example, collaborative planning is largely guided by multiple 
communication theories related to alternative dispute resolution, deliberative democracy and 
consensus building (Harris, 2002; Innes, 1995), while cross-sector interorganizational 
collaboration (stemming from the field of business) is guided by resource dependency and social 
issue management theories (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011; Selsky & Parker, 2005). Despite 
these differences, there is conceptual overlap that allows for common characteristics, benefits and 
challenges of these various forms to be understood together (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Selsky 
& Parker, 2005).  
A number of authors (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 
2015; Innes & Booher, 2010; Thomson & Perry, 2006) have offered conceptual reviews of 
collaborative governance that collectively confirm its main characteristics. Common features 
include, foremost, the meeting of diverse actors in different formats (e.g., face-to- face, virtually, 
publicly, and privately) to deliberatively address specific issues (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). 
Also emphasized is the development, through this interaction, of a shared understanding of 
individual and common interests and an agreed upon procedure by participants. Most often, this 
interaction is characterized by consensus-oriented dialogue even if consensus is not formally 
required (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2010). Moreover, developing such shared 
motivations takes time to develop and requires participant trust, commitment, and belief in the 
collaboration. This makes collaborative governance a long-term endeavor (Emerson & Nabatchi, 
2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Finally, the pooling of resources (financial, human, information 
capital) by collaborative participants to address common problems is also generally a central 
component to collaboration (Fish et al., 2010; Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004).  
Specific to collaborative governance results, authors such as Booher and Innes (2010), 
Clarke and Fuller (2011), and Cooper et al. (2008) have created frameworks that suggest different 
types of collaborative outcomes. Most notable as outcomes are the potential to create change on 
the issue that initially lead to collaboration through the achievement of organizational goals 
(Gray, 2000; Thomson & Perry, 2006) as well as broader change to the system context by 
adapting services and resources to evolving complex situations (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). 
However, social change may also be a benefit as participants in the collaborative process develop 
improved mutual understanding of one another (Cooper et al., 2008; Gray, 2000; Mandarano, 
2008) leading to changed attitudes (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2004) and the 
possibility of greater cooperation and sustained agreements (Cooper et al., 2008; Gray, 2000; 
Holley et al., 2012a; Thomson & Perry, 2006).  
Despite these benefits, only a few analysts (e.g., Innes, 1999; Rogers & Weber, 2010) have 
challenged the extent to which collaborative outcomes are achieved. Critiques consist of debates 
about the appropriateness of collaborative governance for all complex problems or situations 
(Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Mandell & Steelman, 2003), the ability to 
ensure suitable representation, secure accountability, and overcome power imbalances among 
participating actors, as well as the actual benefit of consensus-building (Bingham, 2009; 
McClosky, 2000; McGuire, 2006). Furthermore, collaborative governance can easily fail without 
proper antecedents, namely adequate capacity and resources (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Holley 
et al., 2012a; Wood & Gray, 1991), the willingness of the “right” actors to participate and respect 
others interests (Holley et al., 2012a; O'Leary & Vij, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 2008) and 
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appropriate guidance/facilitation (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). 
Likewise, in environmental contexts, spatial and temporal variations between the work of 
collaborative bodies and actual environmental change may also leave some skeptical of 
collaborative governance’s ability to produce meaningful environmental change (Bäckstrand et 
al., 2010b; Holley et al., 2012a; Sabatier, Focht, et al., 2005a). The supposed benefits of 
collaborative governance as a system of governing thus do not guarantee its success in achieving 
desired goals, and the challenges facing collaborative governance may undermine attempts at 
developing and maintaining legitimacy.  
1.3.2 Collaborative Water Governance 
The utilization of collaborative governance in environmental contexts is common given the 
diversity of actors who use common pool resources and the complex nature of many 
environmental challenges (Ostrom, 1990). As such, there is a substantial body of literature on 
CEG (e.g., Ali-Khan & Mulvihill, 2008; Benson et al., 2013; Gunningham, 2009; Taylor & de 
Loë, 2012), which applies collaborative governance norms and characteristics to environmental 
contexts. In this application, CEG exists as a subsection of participatory environmental 
governance arrangements along with, but still distinguishable from other arrangements such as, 
co-management (e.g., Bown et al., 2013), adaptive co-management (e.g., Plummer, 2009), or 
general public stakeholder participation (e.g., Reed, 2008). Noting the distinguishing 
characteristics of different participatory arrangements is important as they represent not only 
different purposes and use different mechanisms, but also differ in structure, which requires 
various levels of trust and time for development (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). For example, 
collaborative governance arrangements tend to differ from co-management approaches in the 
sense that co-management tends to focus on joint decision making with the state for different 
natural resources, while collaborative arrangements tend to use consensus-based decision-making 
with a range of actors that may or may not involve the state (Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004). 
Attempts have been made also to distinguish different collaborative arrangements (e.g., Ali-Khan 
& Mulvihill, 2008; Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Margerum, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 
2003). For example, collaborations may be government-directed, citizen-directed, or a mixed 
initiative (Ali-Khan & Mulvihill, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 2003) that may take action developing 
direct operations, organizational policies and programs, or government legislation, policy and 
rules (Margerum, 2008). In this dissertation, government-, citizen-, and mixed-directed 
collaborations that focus on water governance are all studied.  
Water is one environmental challenge where these different forms of collaboration are often 
used. Water’s multiple uses and geospatial nature create a political arena that involves a broad 
collection of actors across local, regional, national, and international levels (Berger et al., 2007). 
These characteristics make collaborative governance well suited to address water issues. As a 
result, both integrated and adaptive water management theories of practice are built on 
collaborative notions such as non-government involvement and dialogue (Sabatier, et al. 2005; 
Van Buuren 2009), and collaborative governance is assumed to be an appropriate way to connect 
actors from across levels, sectors, and up-stream and downstream from each other. Furthermore, 
collaborative governance is increasingly used to address complex, often ethically-based, water 
problems that do not have a right or wrong answer and where solutions develop through emergent 
and adaptive processes (Watson, 2007). The common pool nature of water also creates an 
incentive for collaboration by bringing actors together to identify mutual interests and to work 
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towards common objectives (Ostrom, 1990). As such, collaborative governance is increasingly 
promoted and used, throughout North America, Australia, Europe and Southeast Asia, to address 
water-related issues (Koehler & Koontz, 2008). 
Although the use of CWG is prevalent at the watershed scale (Lubell, 2004), examples of 
CWG span all institutional levels and, like environmental governance arrangements, can be led 
by governments, citizens, or collectively. Examples at the watershed or basin levels include the 
Fraser Basin Council in BC (citizen-led) and the CALFED Bay-Delta Program in California 
(jointly managed), along with initiatives (government-led) that affect multiple watersheds such as 
Alberta’s Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils at the provincial level, the Australian 
National Water Initiative at the national level and the European Union Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) at the international level. Together these examples represent the different forms 
CWG may take and through their empirical assessment highlight different challenges that exist in 
delivering CWG. To illustrate, Dutterer and Margerum (2015) found that fluctuating leadership, 
informal structure, and flawed formal recognition contributed to the dissolution of CALFED in 
2007; Watson and Howe (2006) examined troubled stakeholder engagement in WFD 
implementation; and Brisbois and de Loë (2016) noted power differentials among actors within 
Alberta’s WPACs. Such governance problems all connect in different ways to the challenge of 
legitimacy and highlight the need for CWG legitimacy study. Studying CWG legitimacy can help 
answer how these problems (as well as others) influence the acceptance of or support for a 
collaborative body, suggest at what point such problems are most pivotal to the effective 
management and results of a collaboration, and highlight what problems matter more or less to 
different sectors of society. 
1.3.3 Legitimacy 
1.3.3.1 Theoretical Foundations 
To study CWG legitimacy, consideration must be given to both the broad theoretical literature on 
governance legitimacy, as well as the applied empirical literature on legitimacy in CEG and 
CWG contexts. Like the literature focused on other governance attributes (e.g., power, 
accountability, capacity), the theoretical knowledge on legitimacy is vast and includes multiple 
interpretations (Hurrelmann, 2017). To navigate this literature and clarify how legitimacy is 
interpreted in this dissertation, this section provides conceptual clarification and discussion on the 
decisive choices made for this study. This includes (a) defining legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2016), 
(b) placing this research within the evolution of legitimacy debates, (c) delineating the object of 
focus for legitimation (Hurrelmann, 2017), (d) making methodological choices about whether the 
study focus is normative, empirical, or diagnostic (Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004), and (e) 
making theoretical choices about the manageability of legitimacy (Sonpar et al., 2009; Tregidga 
et al., 2007). 
Within this dissertation, legitimacy broadly refers to the acceptance of governance. In this 
sense, legitimacy is about the judgement of appropriate behaviour. This definition is one of two 
dominant ways legitimacy is commonly interpreted. In the other, legitimacy is about the 
justification of governance as the normative validation of the exercise of authority. In both of 
these definitions, legitimacy is a social construct regarding the rightfulness of a certain object. 
Legitimacy as justification is usually discussed within the context of regulatory governance 
bodies that have power over a subordinate, while the legitimacy as acceptance is commonly 
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associated with non-regulatory organizations, and is sociologically- and perception-based 
(Marquez, 2016). Because the CWG cases used in this study (Section 1.5.2) are non-regulatory 
and do not yield decision-making power over a subordinate population, this research adheres 
more directly to legitimacy as a judgement of acceptance. This definition clarifies legitimacy as a 
specifically different concept compared to vague ideas of support or stability, both of which may 
be a by-product of legitimacy, but alone may also be conceived from non-normative 
considerations such as habitual compliance, fear of recrimination, or calculated cost-benefit 
decisions (Barker, 1990; Hurrelmann, 2017). Defining legitimacy as a judgement also allows 
other factors such as power, stakeholder interests and other normative values to be included in 
assessments. This inevitably makes legitimacy a broad concept that risks subsuming other 
theoretical fields of inquiry. This risk is recognized in this dissertation; nonetheless, the 
perspective adopted here is that a comprehensive approach to legitimacy is necessary so as to not 
exclude different influencing factors that may be present in judgements. The main reason for this 
stance is the proposed hybrid nature of CWG legitimacy along with uncertainty about how 
legitimacy is determined in alternative governance forms like collaborative governance (Van 
Buuren et al., 2012; Wallington et al., 2008). Thus, the central conceptual contribution of this 
dissertation is that a wide variety of perspectives is necessary for a thorough assessment of CWG 
legitimacy. This approach represents a deviation from common approaches to the study of 
legitimacy that typically remain within disciplinary and singular interpretations.  
Continuing to clarify how legitimacy is considered within this research, the dissertation as a 
whole must be positioned relative to existing legitimacy scholarship. This research is concerned 
with helping clarify the nature of legitimacy for a specific form of governance (CWG). This 
concern is based on a sense of need, argued for by authors such as Connelly (2011) and 
Deephouse and Suchman (2008) that a gap exists in understanding the sources of legitimacy in 
different institutional environments. Despite the prominence of legitimacy in the governance 
literature, it has remained an elusive concept often described only generally to make claims about 
the quality of governance in different settings (Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004). Moreover, 
the existence of multiple governance modes that address different types of governance issues 
means that legitimacy is increasingly context- and issue-specific, as a function of differing 
societal norms and values for different circumstances within the same setting. This means that 
legitimacy is increasingly conditional and requires situated analysis of the components of 
different governance types not only to assess how legitimacy exists for certain governance bodies, 
but also to determine the normative aspects of certain governance systems. Important to such 
analysis, and the focus of this research, are consideration of the specific sources and related 
legitimacy types that contribute to judgements as a whole, as well as the dynamic nature of 
governance legitimacy. 
In considering the sources and types of legitimacy, authors such as Borrás and Ejrnæs 
(2011), Connelly (2011) and Wallington et al. (2008) have found that legitimacy in its various 
forms (e.g., legality, justifiability and consent) within different governance contexts emerges 
from multiple components in a hybrid relationship. Multiple typologies exist that identify this 
hybrid relationship both in the context of governance and relative to other organizational forms. 
Perhaps most notable within environmental governance literature is Scharpf’s (1997, 1999) input 
and output typology that is often used to discuss this hybrid relationship. Input components 
concern procedural logic and consider norms such as the transparency, fairness, inclusiveness and 
accountability of decision-making. Output components, in contrast, are associated with 
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consequential logic, problem-solving, and effectiveness and consider whether decision making 
improves concerns such as welfare and social justice. Others (e.g., Beetham, 1991; Etsy, 2006; 
Matheson, 1987; Suchman, 1995) provide alternative typologies arguing that legitimacy sources 
also extend from other legitimacy types beyond input and output. For example, Etsy (2006) 
suggests democratic, results-based, order-based, systemic, deliberative and procedural legitimacy. 
In contrast, Suchman (1995) identifies pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy types and 
Matheson (1987) suggests legitimacy through convention, contract, universal principles, 
sacredness, expertise, popular approval, personal ties, and personal qualities. These examples 
suggest that there are multiple sources that comprise legitimacy judgements, and demonstrate that 
legitimacy cannot be studied as a single entity, but rather should be broken down into its multiple 
components. However, a framework that covers all of the different sources does not exist and 
how these sources together determine legitimacy is not well understood (Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008; Johnson et al., 2006).  
Perhaps a central reason such a framework does not yet exist relates to the study of 
legitimacy at different governance scales, as concerns vary at international, national, and sub-
national levels. At the international level, questions of legitimacy, particularly for international 
law and organizations, are often connected to questions of accountability and enforceability of 
global regulation (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000; Arnull, 2002; Bernstein, 2005; Bodansky, 1999; 
Buchanan & Keohane, 2006). Meanwhile, at the national level questions of state legitimacy often 
tie to challenges of representative democracy and who has the right to exercise political authority 
(e.g., Barker, 1990; Skogstad, 2003; Steen, 2001; Teague & Donaghey, 2009). Finally, at the sub-
national level are regional level governance issues such as resource support, the accountability of 
involved civil society, and regulatory or enforceability challenges (e.g., Chaskin, 2003; Connelly, 
2011; Hanberger, 2003; Welch, 2002). In addition to legitimacy studies within a governance 
context, extensive legitimacy study also exists for private (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Auld et 
al., 2008; Fisher et al., 2016) and non-government organizations (e.g., Brown & Jagadananda, 
2007; Jepson, 2005) at any level. Legitimacy typologies are suggested within studies that focus 
on any of these scales or organizational contexts. Legitimacy types suggested across all are drawn 
upon for this study to allow the exploration and categorization of CWG legitimacy sources to be 
as comprehensive as possible. 
From a practical standpoint, in addition to identifying all relevant sources, understanding 
how they work together is also necessary to know what constitutes actual legitimacy judgements 
towards governance bodies by different actors – i.e., legitimacy for or by whom (Hogl, et al. 
2012)? Assessing legitimacy for this purpose involves considering multiple audiences and the 
composition of individual legitimacy judgements (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Tost, 2011). In 
this dissertation, it is assumed that legitimacy is judged in a number of different ways, which 
influences whether legitimacy is established, sustained, and challenged based on whose 
perspective is being considered. As a result, the goal of this research is not to explicitly measure 
whether different audiences judge a collaborative body as legitimate or illegitimate. Instead, the 
goal is to first identify the composition of judgements to catalogue the different sources and 
related types of legitimacy as a collective regardless of the question of legitimacy for or by whom 
(Chapter Two). Second, the goal is to identify the dynamic nature of these legitimacy sources and 
types as they change over the course over the development of a collaboration (Chapter Three) and 
according to perspective from within different sectors of society (Chapter Four).  
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In relation to legitimacy dynamics, others (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; 
Tilling, 2004) have made the claim that legitimacy is a constantly moving target requiring 
different sources to adapt to various and evolving governance settings. Legitimacy as a social 
construct continually needs to be maintained and reproduced because it is always susceptible to 
challenge (Beetham, 1991). In this sense, it requires ongoing management to establish and 
maintain the status quo, and to address threats, such as changing social legitimacy norms or 
institutional structures that can lead to legitimacy deficits or decline (Tilling, 2004). Governance 
models that exist outside of the state may face legitimacy deficits because institutional structures 
and social norms may not yet be aligned (Schneider et al., 2010). These gaps reflect the shifting 
governance setting in which multiple forms of governance exist and depend on different 
governance attributes to develop legitimacy. Moreover, at the organizational level, the 
development of governance bodies may also lead to changing legitimacy dynamics (Black, 2008; 
Fisher et al., 2016). Awareness of the dynamics of legitimacy is thus necessary to ensure that 
assessments either evolve along with governance, or are clearly delineated as a snapshot of 
legitimacy at a certain time and place.  
Following from the need for clarity regarding the conceptual focus of this research, it is 
important to also identify the object that is actually legitimized. Because legitimacy may be 
granted to governance systems and institutions, rulers and governance organizations, operating 
norms, specific laws or policies (Weber, 1968), a decisive choice must be made about what aspect 
of governance is being studied (i.e., legitimacy of what?). Arguably, since the different aspects 
relate or are nested within one another to form the governance system, some inferences can be 
passed from the study of narrower aspects to the nature of legitimacy related to higher-level 
aspects. However, legitimacy analysis must differentiate between these various aspects. If all 
components are treated as one unitary object, bias may be introduced based on legitimacy 
concerns related to one component that is not necessarily applicable to the whole (Hurrelmann, 
2017; Suddaby et al., 2016). As a result, a deliberate decision was made in this research to focus 
the dissertation on organizational legitimacy (i.e., collaborative bodies). This means the focus of 
this research is on empirical accounts of legitimacy within specific uses of CWG; however, some 
insight can be gained around what legitimacy means for CWG as a system or model of 
governance in general. The decision to apply this organizational lens was based on empirical 
claims calling for the continued assessment of CWG legitimacy (e.g., Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015), 
while also recognizing that empirical assessment requires an objective focus. By focusing at the 
organizational level, the legitimacy object could be explicitly identified (i.e., collaborative 
boards); this allowed findings to have tangible application to practitioners, while allowing for 
insight into the systematic nature of CWG.  
To empirically assess legitimacy, methodological distinction about how to study legitimacy 
is also required. Much of the literature on legitimacy differentiates between normative and 
empirical approaches to the study of legitimacy (Beetham, 1991; Hogl et al., 2012; Schneider & 
Krell-Laluhová, 2005). Through a normative approach, researchers work to identify exhaustive 
benchmarks that determine legitimacy as a function of moral rightfulness (Provan et al., 2008; 
Schneider & Krell-Laluhová, 2005). In Western democracies, these benchmarks are 
predominantly a function of democratic quality using the state as the main reference point for 
legitimacy discourse (Beetham, 1991). In contrast, using empirical approaches, researchers 
observe the actual acceptance of specific political arrangements (Beetham, 1991; Hogl et al., 
2012; Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004). In this perspective, the notion of legitimacy is bound 
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by time and space and focuses on the extent to which a specific arrangement is legitimized by 
citizens and political actors (Beetham, 1991; Hogl et al., 2012). In addition to these two 
perspectives, Schneider and Krell-Laluhová (2005) suggest a diagnostic perspective that blends 
descriptive and normative ideas by drawing on a particular theory of legitimacy to benchmark and 
empirically evaluate specific political arrangements. Similarly, Scharpf (2007) suggests a 
functional perspective that speaks to the need to consider normative and empirical approaches 
based on the utility both can provide to a given situated context. This research adopts the 
perspective that both perspectives are needed to understand CWG legitimacy empirically. Thus, 
even though this research is empirical and no diagnostic or normative assessment is conducted, 
normative interpretations are still present as they often influence or are a part of empirical 
judgements (Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004). In the context of CWG, generalized norms 
identifying how collaborations should or should not function as well as expected benefits of a 
collaboration (along with its challenges) likely influence how those affected or involved judge a 
CWG body. For this reason, the sources of legitimacy empirically identified in this dissertation 
are connected to normative legitimacy types that appear in the literature. 
To empirically identify and categorize contextually-based CWG legitimacy sources, this 
dissertation uses both descriptive sociological and normative typologies. To do so, the 
dissertation adopts an inductive and deductive cross-disciplinary approach to deconstruct multiple 
typologies for empirical use. This approach represents a divergence from traditional methods both 
within the legitimacy and the collaborative governance literatures. Commonly, when legitimacy 
is empirically studied it is done so in either a descriptive fashion that explores the situated context 
and compares it to a select typology (e.g., Connelly et al., 2006; Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; 
Sandstrom et al., 2014), describes the legitimacy context in general without making a connection 
to an existing typology (e.g., Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011; Luig, 2011; Pinkerton & John, 2008; 
Ramstad et al., 2009), or studies a select aspect (type) of legitimacy within a given context (often 
democratic process) (e.g., Hard et al., 2012; Van Buuren et al., 2012). Few studies (e.g., 
Goldsmith & Pereira, 2014) recognize the need for an integrated typology to study empirical 
legitimacy. This dissertation embraces the idea that an integrated approach is necessary for the 
comprehensive assessment of CWG. However, this dissertation also recognizes the 
inappropriateness of blending normative and sociological legitimacy interpretations (Deephouse 
& Suchman, 2008), and instead only presents legitimacy types together as a simple form of 
integration.  
Additionally, in applying this empirical approach, this dissertation makes a further 
distinction between legitimacy and legitimation. According to Barker (2001) legitimacy is an 
attribute of governance, while legitimation is the process through which legitimacy is either 
established and affirmed or disputed and withdrawn. In this sense, legitimation is actually the 
only variable that can be empirically studied; this occurs through the study of others’ perspectives 
via communication (Hurrelmann, 2017). As such, by identifying legitimacy sources, the focus of 
this research is on identifying the processes that create legitimacy as a desirable governance 
resource (Suddaby et al., 2016).  
Finally, a deliberate decision must also be made about the theoretical position of the study 
in relationship to the types of recommendations that can be made. Theoretically, two main 
schools of thought influence conceptualizations of legitimacy as a manageable entity: institutional 
theory and strategic management (Sonpar et al., 2009; Tregidga et al., 2007). Legitimacy within 
institutional theory is synonymous with institutionalization in the sense that legitimacy’s 
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existence leads to a stable and ordered society (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Hybels, 1995; 
Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy as institutionalization is achieved by following a set prescription 
that aligns with currently accepted societal norms (Sonpar et al., 2009). In contrast, the strategic 
management literature offers an instrumental approach, claiming legitimacy can be managed 
through specific planning and manipulation behaviours that generate societal support (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; Tregidga et al., 2007). Largely, this literature is associated with 
sociological analyses of organizational legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Cashore, 2002; Scherer et 
al., 2013; Suchman, 1995). Suggestions for legitimacy management vary usually based on 
whether attempts are being made to establish, maintain, strengthen, or repair legitimacy (Tilling, 
2004). Types of strategies that can be used to influence legitimacy typically fall within one of 
three categories: conforming to external expectations, manipulating audience perceptions, or 
engaging in discourse with those who challenge their legitimacy. Example of strategies within 
these categories could include adapting organizational practices to match accepted community 
forms, using myths, ceremonies, and symbols to create new community beliefs and values that 
match with the actions of the organization, or communicating with community members to build 
common discourse about socially acceptable practices (Baumann-Pauly et al., 2016; Brinkerhoff, 
2005; Massey, 2001; Scherer et al., 2013). This dissertation adheres to the belief that CWG 
legitimacy is manageable and offers suggestions for management when appropriate. The rationale 
for this position stems first from the still informal nature of collaborative governance in society 
(Blomgren Amsler, 2016), which suggests that CWG may not yet have engrained institutional 
norms to which to adhere. Second, the position stems from the inclusionary nature of CWG, 
which may enhance the tractability of strategic management actions through the representative 
nature of collaborative participants.  
1.3.3.2 Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy 
In the CEG and CWG literature, legitimacy is discussed in one of three ways: as a part of a 
broader framework of necessary governance attributes (e.g., Armitage et al., 2012; Biermann & 
Gupta, 2011; Innes & Booher, 2004; Lockwood et al., 2010; Lundqvist, 2004; Moss & Newig, 
2010; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013); within a critique of specific governance systems or bodies (e.g., 
Kallis et al., 2009; McClosky, 2000); or as an in-depth assessment (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; 
Edwards, 2016; Gearey & Jeffrey, 2006; Hard et al., 2012; Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Orr, 2015; 
Sandstrom et al., 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2012). Together these 
studies provide insight into the sources, challenges, and situated nature of CWG legitimacy, while 
also confirming knowledge gaps and justifying this research.  
Within the literature where legitimacy is viewed as part of a broader framework, discussion 
generally revolves around the value of public participation as a legitimating tool (e.g., Innes & 
Booher, 2004; Koontz & Johnson, 2004), the importance of legitimacy for effective governance 
(e.g., Fuller, 2009; Innes & Booher, 2004), the general change to the nature of legitimacy in 
collaborative contexts compared to the traditional benchmark of democratic legitimacy for the 
state (e.g., Armitage et al., 2012), and possible ways to achieve legitimacy (e.g., Lockwood et al., 
2010). In this work, legitimacy is generally discussed either conceptually with the occasional use 
of empirical examples to support claims or as a part of an empirically assessment. For example, 
Armitage et al. (2012) use the example of gaining non-government actor support for locally based 
CWG in the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia to support claims about the changed complex 
nature of collaborative governance legitimacy. Meanwhile, in studies where CWG or CEG 
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systems or components have been empirically assessed (e.g., Davis, 2008; Koontz & Johnson, 
2004; Rickenbach & Reed, 2002), legitimacy is one measure of success. Such assessment also 
represents instances were legitimacy challenges emerge as a part of an empirical critique. One 
such study is Kallis et al.’s (2009) assessment of the CALFED program, which identified 
legitimacy challenges stemming from democratic deficits related to representative accountability. 
A number of CEG and CWG scholars have also specifically assessed legitimacy (e.g., 
Bäckstrand, 2006; Baird et al., 2014; Connelly, 2011; Connelly et al., 2006; Edwards, 2016; 
Gearey & Jeffrey, 2006; Hard et al., 2012; Hogl et al., 2012; Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Newig & 
Kvarda, 2012; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom et al., 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 
2012). In these studies, legitimacy is analyzed using different legitimacy interpretations and 
typologies to explore its characteristics in CEG and CWG contexts. Most commonly, CWG or 
CEG legitimacy is diagnostically or empirically approached using one legitimacy typology as a 
guide. To illustrate, Orr (2015) uses Beetham’s (1991, 2013) typology of rules, expressed 
consent, and justifiability of rules to diagnostically assess CWG legitimacy in Quebec, Canada. In 
contrast, Baird et al. (2014) use Trachtenberg and Focht’s (2005) input and substantive 
legitimacy typology to empirically examine CWG legitimacy in Ontario, Canada, while Edwards 
(2016) uses Suchman’s (1995) pragmatic, cognitive, and moral legitimacy typology to 
empirically assess CWG in the states of Washington and Nebraska. Collectively, these studies 
establish CWG and CEG legitimacy as a complex hybrid dynamic that is interrelated with 
multiple other collaborative attributes such us inclusivity, accountability, transparency, power 
dynamics, effectiveness, and the surrounding legal structure. However, what these scholars have 
not done yet is recognize all relevant legitimacy typologies to CWG, examine how legitimacy 
types change over the development of a collaboration, or assess the composition of legitimacy 
judgements by sector.  
1.3.4 Summary 
Collaboration is advocated by policy-makers, practitioners, and academics as a form of 
governance that produces more ethical and rational outcomes based on its inclusion of multiple 
interests, thus making its ideal premise more effective and less likely to cause opposition (Innes 
and Booher 1999; Murray 2005; Gunningham 2009). Legitimacy is particularly important for 
collaborative governance to function and achieve its goals. However, legitimacy for collaborative 
governance systems, in comparison to the traditional governance legitimacy of the state, is 
inherently more complex and multifaceted in nature. Although initial work has been undertaken 
to understand this complexity and to identify the various dimensions of collaborative governance 
legitimacy, many crucial outstanding questions remain. Specific questions involve identifying the 
full range of CWG legitimacy sources, mapping the dynamic nature of these sources, and 
understanding how they are used in various legitimacy judgements. The urgency and sensitivity 
of many environmental issues, particularly those concerning water, along with the increased use 
of collaborative governance to address these issues, makes these questions important areas to 
address. The governance legitimacy literature provides guidance and tools to help assess and 
measure legitimacy and the CEG and CWG literatures provide the context in which legitimacy 
can be studied.  
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1.4 Empirical Context 
To empirically study CWG legitimacy, five collaborative bodies were chosen as case studies. The 
selection of these cases and their specific characteristics are discussed in detail in Section 1.5. 
Here, the empirical context surrounding these cases is introduced. All cases are located within the 
socio-political context of the Canadian province of BC (see Figure 1.1) where collaboration is 
increasingly promoted and used in a diversity of ways to address water challenges in the 
province’s watersheds. This diversity reflects the absence of a provincially-mandated strategy for 
CWG and the belief by the Province that one CWG model is not be appropriate for all of the 
watersheds in the province (Brandes & Curran, 2009). Given that CWG exists in multiple forms, 
BC’s varying CWG watershed level structures allow this research to study different cases within 
one socio-political context.  
1.4.1 British Columbia Water Policy and Governance Context 
Geographically, BC is the third largest province in Canada occupying an area of 944,735 km2 – 
95 percent of which is Crown Land and only two percent of which is accessible freshwater 
(McGillivary, 2005). The province’s approach to water management historically over the last 
century has been driven by economic growth through the development or harvesting of BC’s 
resources. This strategy resulted in decisions such as large water licenses being given for 
industrial purposes – for example RioTinto AlCan’s license for 70% of the Nechako River’s 
average annual flow (Christensen, 1996) – and the construction of large dams, such as the Kenny 
and Bennet Dams in Northern BC. The adverse impact of these decisions on ecological values 
such as such as biodiversity, fish and wildlife habitat, and water supply was recognized by the 
1970s and by the 1980s a new strategy began to prioritize concern for social, economic, and 
ecological sustainability along with public consultation in decision-making (Day et al., 2003; 
Dorcey, 1991). This resulted in the instigation of collaborative governance initiatives in various 
forms throughout the 1990s particularly for land use planning (Day et al., 2003; Frame et al., 
2004).  
From this introduction of CEG in BC, CWG also began to emerge in various formats 
(Nowlan & Orr, 2010). Notably, CWG that involved non-government actors at the watershed 
level emerged either as grassroots non-government led forums, such as the Fraser Basin Council 
or as decision-making with multiple government and non-government actors, such as the 
Okanagan Basin Water Board (Nowlan & Bakker, 2007). These approaches have had varying 
success in different watersheds throughout the province and have resulted in many BC 
watersheds having some form of participatory water governance process that includes multiple 
actor groups in decision-making. The BC Government recognizes the importance of including all 
major watershed interests in governance processes (British Columbia Ministry of Environment, 
2010b); however, it has not provided an overarching framework that creates a systematic model 
of CWG across BC watersheds (Brandes & Curran, 2009). The main reason such a framework 
does not exist is the geographic, resource, and social diversity among BC’s watersheds, 
particularly differences with title and rights claims made by various First Nations within each 
watershed (Brandes & Curran, 2009). Nevertheless, through the reformation of the Province’s 
main water law – the Water Act (R.S.B.C. 1996 c 483) – in 2014 to the Water Sustainability Act 
(S.B.C. 2014, c. 15), objectives have been put in place by the Province to allow for collaborative 
planning and decision-making, which may in the future include collaborative development of 
Water Sustainability Plans through watershed-based governance (British Columbia Ministry of 
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Environment, 2010b). To date, authority or responsibility of local CWG bodies for such plans has 
not yet been developed.  
BC represents a setting where CWG is being practiced by both state and non-state actors. It 
also represents an area where concerns about the legitimacy of CWG exist (Brandes & Curran, 
2009; Nowlan & Bakker, 2007). Notably, questions exist regarding whether the Provincial 
Government will recognize or give authority or responsibility to watershed-based collaborative 
bodies and how challenges implementing CWG (e.g., resourcing, maintaining momentum, 
overcoming local opposition) may be overcome (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). As such, the 
watershed-based organizations that practice collaboration specifically including non-government 
actors form an appropriate empirical context for this research.  
 
Figure 1.1: Case Study Watersheds within British Columbia, Canada 
 
1.5 Research Design and Methods 
Following is an overarching review of the methodology employed for this entire study. The 
methods relevant to the goals of each specific manuscript are also reiterated in Chapters Two, 
Three, and Four. Qualitative methods were used to achieve the objectives of this dissertation 
(Section 1.2) and a constructivist epistemology guides this study’s design and analysis (Gray, 
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2004). Hence, I assume that the meaning of legitimacy is constructed, not discovered. As such, 
knowledge generation is believed to be relative and based on situated contexts (Creswell 2009). 
Moreover, within each of these constructed realities, multiple perceptions and meanings may 
exist (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). In this sense actors construct their own meaning of legitimacy in 
different ways and multiple contradictory, but equally valid, claims of legitimacy may exist. 
Thus, throughout the study, interpretations of CWG legitimacy are sought through qualitative 
data collection within specific social contexts that determine the “truth” of these interpretations. 
The rationale for using qualitative data collection and analysis is based on the assumption that 
determining the truth of legitimacy interpretations is a narrative-based exercise to understand the 
nuances behind the opinions, feelings, and behaviours of people in different social contexts. As 
such, data on legitimacy are not easily reduced to numbers (Suddaby et al., 2016).  
 To guide the data collection process, the research methodology draws from both grounded 
theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and post-positive (Creswell, 2007) insights. To start the research 
process, in line with post-positivism, a deductive conceptual framework is used to establish 
parameters for data collection and analysis. From here, borrowing from grounded theory, this 
study assumes an iterative inductive and deductive research process is necessary to form 
knowledge on CWG legitimacy. Thus, theoretical as well as emergent empirical insights guide 
both the data collection and analysis. While the conceptual framework guided the data collection, 
actions such as asking open-ended interview questions allowed emergent themes to materialize 
(Creswell, 2007). Analysis included these themes along with those from the conceptual 
framework. Specifically, the research used qualitative data analysis to explore and to reflect upon 
the polycentric nature of legitimacy. Because legitimacy can be judged in many different ways, 
each judgement may be based on any number of different sources depending on who is judging 
and the context they are judging within. For example, in one setting a specific audience’s 
judgement towards a collaboration could matter more than in a different setting. Therefore, the 
focus of this research is on identifying the range of legitimacy sources and revealing recurrent 
themes rather than quantifying what matters most within legitimacy judgements.  
1.5.1 Case Study Method 
In line with post-positivist and grounded theory methodology, a multi-case study approach was 
used to direct and organize the data collection and analysis methods. Multiple cases were chosen, 
in comparison to a single case study, on the basis that this approach would allow for a 
comprehensive inquiry into CWG legitimacy, while also allowing for a degree of generalizability 
(Yin, 2009). This approach was deemed to be appropriate for the study of CWG legitimacy 
because case study methods have the ability to explore areas requiring theoretical and in-depth 
contextual analysis (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 2006). CWG legitimacy knowledge gaps and 
legitimacy’s interpretive and situated nature (Johnson, et al. 2006; Connelly 2011), make case 
studies a suitable approach to the study of legitimacy.  
Case units (Yin, 2009) for this multi-case study design were organizations that practice 
CWG. The five cases used include the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere 
Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board 
(OBWB), and the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap Watershed Council 
(SLIPP/SWC). All are within the province of BC. The reason for locating the cases all within one 
province was to allow for deeper and quicker understanding of the social and political context of 
each case, and to allow for easier comparisons among the cases. The province of BC was selected 
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for its diverse geography and the presence of CWG bodies, as well as its prioritization of 
inclusive governance within the provincial Water Sustainability Act (S.B.C. 2014, c. 15) (Brandes 
& Curran, 2009; Nowlan & Bakker, 2007).  
To select each case, four criteria were used. First, the CWG bodies had to be involved in 
water governance at the watershed or local level. CWG’s increasing popularity as a method to 
make decisions and take action for water at the local or watershed level (Leach, 2006; Lubell, 
2004) means that this criterion strengthens the relevance of the research. Second, the body had to 
self-identify as being a collaborative process involving multiple cross-sector actors that were 
formally organized as a board or council so their goals, policies, programs, and participants could 
be clearly identified. Third, geographic diversity among all cases was required to increase 
generalizability by providing different and more comprehensive understandings of CWG 
legitimacy across varied contexts. Fourth, diversity in the age of each case was also required to 
increase generalizability and to facilitate inquiry for Objective Two (to identify how legitimacy 
evolves as CWG bodies develop). The ability of interviewees to reflect more precisely on more 
recent variables compared to ones from the distant past was another reason for this criterion. 
Having current empirical knowledge of bodies at each stage of development, while also being 
able to make cross-case and longitudinal analysis for some of the development stages, enhanced 
the validity of findings. To use these four criteria, a list of BC-based CWG bodies was compiled 
based on personal knowledge and reviews of academic and grey literature on BC CWG. Applying 
the four criteria to this list led to the five selected cases.  
The research findings from using these five cases have applicability beyond the context of 
each case and BC; however, because of distinguishable characteristics among the cases, not all 
findings are generalizable (Gerring, 2007). Nevertheless, the use of five case studies, over that of 
a single case or a larger number of cases, was preferred to allow for an in-depth examination with 
findings that have a higher degree of reliability and application in other settings (Yin, 2009). The 
diversity of these cases in terms of their geographic and temporal diversity also helped ensure 
findings that emerged from studying small BC-based cases were relevant to CWG at a broader 
system level. Recommendations from the study as a whole were also made independent from 
situated concerns specific the individual cases, thereby allowing the reliability of 
recommendations to also be enforced (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). 
1.5.2 Case Descriptions 
Following are descriptions of each case. The water governance characteristics of each case are 
also summarized in more detail in Appendix 1.  
1.5.2.1 Cowichan Watershed Board 
Context 
The Cowichan Watershed (Figure 1.2) is 940 square kilometers and is located on the eastern side 
of Vancouver Island. Principally, water flows west to east in the watershed from the Cowichan 
Lake, through the 50-kilometer-long Cowichan River, and empties into the Strait of Georgia at 
the Cowichan and Koksilah Estuary. Significant diversity exists in the amount of precipitation at 
the headwaters (5000ml+) versus the lower portion of the watershed (>1000ml), with a large 
majority of the precipitation falling in the winter months (Hunter et al., 2014). This diversity is 
further aggravated by climate change, which is increasing the frequency of summer droughts and 
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winter storms. The flora and the fauna of the areas include Douglas fir and Western red cedar; 
elk, deer, and bear; as well as salmonids (chinook and sockeye) and shellfish in the tidal flats of 
the estuary (Hunter et al., 2014).  
. Currently, the Cowichan Watershed supports a population of approximately 82,000 – 
4,600 of which are Cowichan Tribes people (Hunter et al., 2014). The Cowichan Tribes are BC’s 
largest First Nation and have lived in the watershed and depended on its resources since time 
immemorial. Changes to the basin began with the introduction of Euro-Canadian settlers and 
include dykes to manage winter floods and large volume extraction of both surface and 
groundwater for both irrigation and industry purposes. A weir also was built in 1957 to control 
outflow of the Cowichan Lake for a water license to operate a pulp mill at the town of Crofton; 
the weir and mill are currently run by Catalyst Paper, the largest employer in the area (Catalyst 
Paper Corporation, 2012). Agriculture and forestry are the main resource-based industries within 
the watershed. The watershed is unique in the province as one of the few, where the majority of 
land (including Cowichan Lake’s bottom) is privately owned or managed (Hunter et al., 2014).  
Challenges facing the watershed are human and climate change driven. For example, the 
loss of old growth forests and mono-cropping for forestry has weakened forest soil and its water-
absorption capacity; shellfish beds are polluted and cannot be harvested; and the increased 
frequency of summer droughts have threatened salmon populations to the point that the fish are 
being caught and trucked upstream to bread because of low river levels (Hunter et al., 2014). 
Droughts also affect Catalyst Paper and have threatened, but not yet led to, the shutdown of pulp 
and paper operations. Critical drought in 2003 acted as a policy window to take action on these 
challenges and led to the development of the Cowichan Valley Regional District’s Cowichan 
Basin Water Management Plan (Westland Resource Group Inc., 2007).  
Water Policy and Governance 
Recommended within the plan was the establishment of a collaborative watershed advisory 
council to help deliver the six goals, 23 objectives, and 89 actions of the plan (Rutherford, 2011). 
After another drought in 2008, the Cowichan Watershed Board was implemented in 2010 as a co-
management partnership between the Cowichan Tribes and Cowichan Valley Regional District 
(CVRD) (rather than a governance model involving all interest groups) with involvement from 
the provincial and federal governments and the support of a technical advisory committee (TAC) 
of relevant technicians and stakeholder groups. The board is comprised of 12 members who are 
CVRD and Cowichan Tribes elected officials or appointees along with up to four members at 
large and two provincial or federal government nominated members (Fraser Basin Council, 
2015a). The purpose of the CWB is threefold, to implement the watershed plan, to provide 
leadership in managing the watershed, and to engage communities in water sustainability 
(Rutherford, 2011). Eight water management targets are used by the CWB as a way to structure 
activity and make the actions of the plan more tangible. These targets include ensuring water 
quality meets accepted water quality guidelines, being able to harvest shellfish from the 
Cowichan Bay by 2020, matching or beating the Town of Ladysmith’s per capita water 
consumption, watershed education for grade four and five students, meeting or exceeding target 
densities of Steelhead fry in the Cowichan, ensuring the Cowichan River summer flows are seven 
cm or higher, and protecting 50% of Cowichan Lake’s riparian habitat and restoring 10% of 
impacted riparian habitat by 2021 (Rutherford, 2011). The specificity of these targets is 
particularly celebrated by the CWB for their measurability. Attention is particularly paid to flow 
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issues in the Cowichan River and the CWB is an active proponent for localizing and improving 
flow control via a weir at the mouth of Cowichan Lake (Hunter et al., 2014). Decisions are made 
by consensus based on advice by the TAC at monthly board meetings that are open to the public. 
Action on the targets include water quality monitoring and reporting, technical reports and 
presentations, restoration bodies, public education campaigns and advocacy work on flow and 
legislation development to senior government. Funding is drawn from both CVRD and First 
Nations gas taxes as well as grants. Accountability is primarily to the regional district and the 
Cowichan Tribes as fund contributors. Legal mechanisms of the CWB include registration as a 
charitable society and formalized terms of reference.  
Figure 1.2: Cowichan Watershed (CWB) 
 
1.5.2.2 Lake Windermere Ambassadors 
Context 
Lake Windermere is located in southeastern BC in the Columbia Valley in the Rocky Mountain 
Trench and is actually a widening of the Columbia River as it flows north (Figure 1.3). The lake 
has a surface area of 1610 hectares, a perimeter length of approximately 36 kilometers, and an 
average depth of 3.4 meters (Neufeid et al., 2010). The lake provides both environmental and 
human values. Inherent environmental value is provided as fish and wildlife habitat, particularly 
as the lake acts as the entry point to the Columbia Wetlands, which are recognized internationally 
under the RAMSAR Convention on Wetlands. Additionally, local communities use the lake for 
drinking water and recreational activities, which is of significant economic value for seasonal 
tourism. The lake also provides cultural value to the people of the Akisqnuk First Nation and the 
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Shuswap First Nation Band. Three political jurisdictions surround the lake; the Regional District 
of East Kootenay (RDEK), the District of Invermere (DOI), and the Columbia Lake Indian 
Reserve #3 (Akisqnuk First Nation). 
Both human and natural values of the lake have been impacted in recent years by 
unprecedented development in the area. Development pressures are connected to Lake 
Windermere’s close proximity to the border of Alberta, where the province’s strong economy has 
led to demands for recreational and investment properties (Regional District of East Kootenay, 
2008). Nutrient enrichment of the lake is a primary concern with evidence of the lake becoming 
more eutrophic with time (Neufeid et al., 2010) creating risk that the lake may exceed its 
ecological carrying capacity and that drinking water quality may be degraded.  
Water policy and governance 
In response to concern for the lake’s water quality both civil society and local government have 
taken stewardship and management action. Together, the RDEK and the DOI have developed the 
Lake Windermere Management Plan (LWMP) (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2011), and 
the Lake Windermere Official Community Plan (OCP) (Regional District of East Kootenay, 
2008) in recognition that planning, policy, and development regulations related to the shoreline of 
the lake needed to be updated to match the rate of economic growth and building development in 
the area. Meanwhile, Wildsight, a local environmental non-government organization (ENGO) 
developed and delivered the Lake Windermere Project (LWP) from 2005-2009 with the mandate 
of water quality monitoring and water stewardship education for the public. Following the 
completion of the LWP, the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA) were established as a 
volunteer organization to carry on and further the LWP.  
The LWA act as a collaborative grassroots stewardship organization comprised of a board 
of volunteers from different sectors of society. The Ambassadors formed as an inclusive, 
consensus-based community stewardship group with an open fee-based membership. The general 
paid membership allows citizens to participate in LWA activities. Following from the LWP, the 
LWA main objectives continue to be water quality monitoring and water stewardship education 
for the Lake. However, the LWA have also taken on the additional goals of establishing a 
watershed governance organization for the entire watershed as well as acting as the Lake 
Windermere Management Committee (LWMC) to deliver the non-regulatory action of the 
LWMP. One of the main actions of the LWA as the LWMC is to act as a non-partisan advisor for 
referral review on development applications to the regional governments assessing impact on the 
Lake. The LWA have renewed their position as the LWMC until 2021. Work connected with the 
LWMP provides the LWA with a fee-for-service; this fee along with general membership dues 
provide base funding for operations, while project-oriented grants are also secured on an annual-
basis. The legal basis of the Ambassadors includes recognition in the Lake Windermere OCP 
Bylaw No. 2061 Section A (10) as the LWMC (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008), 
charitable status, and documented terms of reference for both the Ambassadors and the LWMC 
(Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2010; Regional District of East Kootenay et al., 2011). 
Examples of output from the LWA includes annual community water celebrations, ongoing water 
monitoring and reporting, and foreshore restoration. Meanwhile, the LWA continues to work on 
securing grant funding, maintaining an identity as a non-partisan group, and building community 
awareness for watershed governance (Melnychuk et al., 2012). 
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Figure 1.3: Columbia Watershed (LWA) 
 
 
1.5.2.3 Nechako Watershed Council 
Context 
The Nechako Watershed (Figure 1.4) covers an area of 52,000 kilometers squared and is 
comprised mainly of the Nechako Reservoir, Nechako River, and the Stuart River. The Nechako 
River flows west to east from the Coastal Mountains to the City of Prince George where it meets 
the Fraser River (Canada’s third largest river by flow volume) as its second biggest tributary 
(Fraser Basin Council, 2015b). The Nechako River was dammed in 1954, forming the Nechako 
Reservoir to divert water west to the Town of Kitimat for hydrological power of aluminum 
smelters and production owned originally by the Canadian company Alcan (merged as RioTinto 
Alcan in 2007). The Watershed is dominated mainly by coniferous forests, is sparsely populated 
with approximately 105,000 people, 83,000 of which live in greater Prince George (Fraser Basin 
Council, 2015b). The fauna of the region includes moose, bears, wolves, and great horned owls, 
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along with many fish species including chinook and sockeye salmon, rainbow trout and a 
critically endangered population of white sturgeon (Wood, 2013).  
The Nechako Watershed is the unceded territory of the Carrier (Dakelh) people, which 
includes the First Nations communities of Tl’azt’en, Nak’azdli, Saik’uz, Takla Lake, Stellat’en, 
Lheildli T’enneh, Cheslatta, Nadleh Whut’en, Ts’il Kaz Koh, Wet’suwet’en, and Nee Tahi Buhn 
(Fraser Basin Council, 2015b). Traditionally the rivers in the watershed were important for 
transportation and food of these people (Wood, 2013). The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council 
represents and advocates for some, but not all of these communities.  
Resource development and climate change have had the most environmental and social 
impact on the Nechako Watershed. The most profound change is a result of hydro-electric 
development; however, forestry, agriculture, and mining are also factors. The Kemano 
development project, namely the construction of the Nechako Reservoir including the Kenney 
Dam and the Skins Lake Spillway caused long-lasting or permanent environmental, social, and 
cultural impacts (Christensen, 1996; Wood, 2013). Most notable is the altered and significantly 
reduced flow regime of the Nechako River. The water licence held by Alcan/RioTinto Alcan 
diverts up to 70% of annual flows from the Nechako River for production. This diversion resulted 
in raised river temperature and low flow rates, which negatively affect fish habitat and 
populations as well as the region’s food security by limiting agricultural water supply (Wood, 
2013). In addition to the fisheries impact as a traditional food sources for First Nations, forceful 
displacement of the Cheslatta First Nation with the flooding of the reservoir has created long 
lasting and complex implications for community well-being. Some compensation for the manner 
in which the Cheslatta were displaced has been achieved; however, there are still many 
outstanding issues such as the annual flooding of traditional burial grounds that uncovers 
ancestral remains (Christensen, 1996). The Cheslatta Band is still in the process of trying to shift 
the release of water from the Skins Lake Spillway to the Kenney Dam so that they may reclaim 
and put to rest some of their grievances with the Kemano project (Wood, 2013). Despite the 
negative impacts of Kemano, a range of opinions exist on the benefit of the project due to aspects 
such as its small carbon impact, the creation of jobs (centralized mainly in Kitimat), and even 
flood control downstream.  
Forestry impacts in the watershed are also an issue particularly due to the Mountain Pine 
Beetle epidemic in the 2000s. The epidemic, which affected between 41-72% of the timber 
supply area in the watershed, led to an increase in the annual allowable cut encouraging clear-
cutting as well as forest fires and leading as a result to changes in soil moisture, the hydrology of 
peak flows and flooding, and water quality (Southern Interior Beetle Action Coalition, 2011). 
Agricultural demand for water and non-point source pollution also have stressed the Nechako 
system. Likewise, mining operations around the region for copper, gold, molybdenum, and silver 
(e.g., Huckleberry and Endako Mines) also create a demand for water and increase risk for 
contamination (Fraser Basin Council, 2015b). 
Water Policy and Governance 
In the last four decades, governments and civil society groups have worked to improve the overall 
health of the watershed. The most publicized efforts have been public protests in an effort to stop 
development work by Alcan in the 1980s and 1990s to expand Kemano (i.e., Kemano II) and 
increase water diversion. This effort contributed to a provincial review of the development 
proposal through the BC Utility Commission (BCUC) hearings eventually leading to the 
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cancellation of the expansion project in 1995. Following the cancellation, Alcan filed a lawsuit 
against the BC Government for $500 million of already invested costs. This led to the 1997 
Settlement Agreement between both parties and the establishment of the Nechako Environmental 
Enhancement Fund (NEEF) allocating what was assumed at the time to be $50 million from each 
party (due to vague language in the agreement, BC has not yet contributed) (Nechako 
Environmental Enhancement Fund, 2001).  
Also stemming from the BCUC hearing and settlement agreement was the recommendation 
to form a collaborative multi-actor initiative to identify and problem-solve the multiple issues 
related to the Nechako River and Reservoir and to reconcile conflict among different stakeholders 
(including Alcan), First Nations, and governments. The Fraser Basin Council, a sustainability 
oriented NGO within the province initiated discussions, establishing the Nechako Watershed 
Council (NWC) in 1996 (formalized in 1998). The formal goal of the NWC was to provide a 
recommendation to NEEF for best way to spend funds (Nechako Watershed Council, 2009). 
Some of the main activities of the NWC included the systematic identification of grievances 
related to water quality and quantity, informal networking and education of participants through 
field tours throughout the watershed, and the commissioning of scientific work to identify a 
technical solution to the challenges facing the watershed. Originally, the NWC brought together 
18 different organizations from across the watershed; by 2001 the collaboration reached 
consensus that the best allocation of NEEF funds to solve the most downstream problems was a 
water release facility at the Kenney Dam. The NWC received funding from NEEF (4Thought 
Solutions Inc., 2005) and had established terms of reference and legal recognition within Section 
4 of the BC/Alcan 1997 Settlement Agreement. After providing the water release facility 
recommendation to NEEF, the NWC faced challenges of declining participation and stagnant 
governance process as their recommendation was not followed through and no other significant 
issues were taken on. Eventually the NWC ended in 2011. Following the closure of the NWC, 
dialogue began to form a new collaborative initiative (the Nechako Watershed Alliance) in 2015 
with the intent of focusing on broader watershed issues and planning (Fraser Basin Council, 
2015a). 
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Figure 1.4: Nechako Watershed (NWC) 
 
 
1.5.2.4 Okanagan Basin Water Board 
Context 
The Okanagan Basin (Figure 1.5) is an approximately 200-kilometre-long narrow valley in south-
central B.C. Water flows north to south via the Okanagan River, which drains six main lakes 
before crossing into the US as a Columbia River tributary. It is semi-arid region that annually 
receives less than 30 centimeters of rain in a precipitation gradient decreasing north to south. The 
annual precipitation highly varies, ranging from over 1,300 million cubic meters to less than 100 
million cubic metres annual inflow into the Okanagan Lake (Summit Environmental Consultants 
Ltd., 2010). Flora and fauna of the Okanagan Basin include sockeye salmon and 23 species at risk 
(Jatel, 2013).  
The Okanagan Basin is home to the Okanagan (Syilx) First Nations people since time 
immemorial. Their territory extents 69,000 square kilometres across southern BC and 
Washington State. The Syilx people now form eight communities, which are represented by the 
Okanagan Nation Alliance (ONA). Like most bands in BC, the ONA has not negotiated treaties 
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with the Province. However, despite unsettled title and rights, the ONA is involved in Okanagan 
water management – especially regarding fisheries.  
The main water challenges for the basin include water scarcity, pollution, and invasive 
species control – all of which have been ongoing issues since the 1960s. Climate change has 
aggravated these challenges by increasing weather variability and extremes. Local water scarcity 
in the basin is natural to the area, but is also worsening due an increasing human population with 
estimated daily average residential water use of 675 litres per person (Summit Environmental 
Consultants Ltd., 2010), approximately 270% more than the average daily demand per person in 
the rest of Canada in 2011 (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2014). Irrigation is the most intense 
human water use in the Okanagan – 55% for agriculture, 24% for residential irrigation, 7% for 
parks and golf courses; while commercial, indoor domestic, industrial, and institutional uses 
account for the other 14% of water allocations (Summit Environmental Consultants Ltd., 2010). 
Drought, increasing water demand, and the timing of water availability throughout the year are 
the main water scarcity issues. The estimated population of the three regional districts in the 
Okanagan was 354,012 in 2014, which across the valley had increased at rates between 0.9% and 
1.8% from the year before (BCStats, 2014). With such population growth, water scarcity will 
likely become more severe in the future.  
Nutrient loading due to point source and non-point source pollution is also an ongoing 
management challenge causing algal blooms and aquatic plant growth. Managing municipal 
sewage and fertilizer runoff are particular important management issues as the main valley lakes 
are sources of drinking water. Invasive species also receive management attention, particularly 
for Eurasian Watermilfoil (Myriophyllum spicatum) control, and the prevention of other species 
such as zebra and quagga mussels (Dreissena polymorpha and D. bugensis).  
Water policy and governance 
The OBWB is the oldest CWG body in the province (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). It was formed 
to address the valley-wide water issues and establish management practices in 1968 and was 
legislated provincially in 1970 under the Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act (Province of 
British Columbia, 2015). This Act brought the three Okanagan regional districts together as the 
OBWB through Supplementary Letters Patent, which also gave the OBWB power of taxation 
through annual property tax assessments on lands within the basin. This power provides stable 
base funding for program operations. Following the OBWB’s legislation, the board was 
designated as the local coordinating authority to implement recommendations from the joint 
Federal/Provincial Okanagan Basin Study (Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, 1974).  
From the Okanagan Basin Study, the OBWB was recommended to have a broad mandate of 
valley-wide water leadership; however, the overwhelming extent of watermilfoil invasion and 
water pollution in the 1970s narrowed the OBWB’s initial focus. As a result, from approximately 
1973 to 2006, the aquatic weed control and funding sewage infrastructure were the sole focal 
points of the OBWB. However, concerns by citizens about population growth, climate change, 
drought, and forest fires led the OBWB to revitalize its mandate in 2006. The current mandate of 
the OBWB is now to “provide leadership for sustainable water management to protect and 
enhance the quality of life and environment in the Okanagan Basin” (Okanagan Basin Water 
Board, 2010b). With the revitalization of the OBWB’s mandate, the Okanagan Water 
Stewardship Council (OWSC) was also established as the technical advisory group to the OBWB.  
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Structurally, the OBWB now brings together appointed politicians from the regional 
governments (which include 12 municipalities) to provide water leadership. The renewal also led 
to representation from the ONA, the OWSC, and a member at large on the board (Okanagan 
Basin Water Board, 2010a). The creation of the OWSC brings together a wide range of water 
technicians and stakeholder interests to provide consolidated advice to the OBWB. For the 2013-
2015 term, two dozen groups were represented on the OWSC– ranging from technicians from all 
four orders of government to representatives from stakeholder groups such as the BC Fruit 
Growers Association and the Okanagan Real Estate Board. The actions of the OBWB fall into 
five categories: delivering basin-wide programs for watermilfoil control, sewage infrastructure 
funding, and water research and management; advocating and representing Okanagan needs to 
senior government; providing science-based information to local government and water 
managers; facilitating communication and coordination among all four levels of government and 
interest groups for effective water initiatives; and building funding opportunities to strengthen 
local water management and stewardship capacity. However, while the OBWB takes action and 
leadership in all these areas, it does not assume all basin water management responsibilities. 
Federal and provincial agencies, First Nations fisheries, regional districts, municipalities, 
irrigation districts, research institutes, and non-government stewardship and advocacy 
organizations all still play vital roles in managing the Okanagan’s water. Likewise, the actions 
and leadership the OBWB does provide is done without regulatory authority. Examples of work 
include the establishment of the BC Water Use Reporting Centre, the Okanagan Sustainable 
Water Strategy, and continuous water modeling and data collection. However, despite the long-
standing history and institutionalization of the OBWB, it is not without its own governance 
challenges; for example, developing meaningful First Nations engagement on the board and 
dealing with competing human and environmental needs, such as food security, which demand 
community attention and resources.  
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Figure 1.5: Okanagan Watershed (OBWB) 
 
 
1.5.2.5 Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Program/Shuswap Watershed Council 
Context 
The Shuswap Watershed (Figure 1.6) is located on the interior plateau in south central BC and is 
the headwaters of the South Thompson River, a major tributary to the Fraser River. The main 
sections of the watershed include the Shuswap, Little Shuswap, and Mara Lakes, along with 
Salmon, Shuswap, and Adams Rivers as major tributaries. The Shuswap Watershed is famed for 
its significant contribution to the genetic diversity of Fraser salmon populations, particularly 
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sockeye; however, its tributaries also support chinook, coho, and pink salmon (Shuswap Lake 
Integrated Planning Process, 2009). 
The Shuswap Watershed is the unceded territory of the Secwepemc People, which within 
the watershed today includes the Little Shuswap, Adams Lake, Neskonlith, and Splatsin First 
Nations Bands. In addition to the Secwepemc People, the Shuswap is also home to a population 
of approximately 50,000 (Cooperman, 2012). 
 Water quality and foreshore degradation dominate as water-related concerns. Most notable 
impacts included point and non-point discharge into the lake from agriculture, industry, building 
development, and houseboat greywater (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009). In 
connection, increased nutrient loading has resulted in two algae blooms (2008 & 2010). As well, 
42.8% (174 km) of the shoreline has been highly impacted by human development, such as 
groynes, docks, and retaining walls (Ecoscape Environmental Consultants, 2009). Safe 
recreational use of the lake is also a public concern due to a number of boating accidents and 
casualties (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009). 
Water policy and governance  
Water quality, recreational, and development concerns for the Shuswap and Mara Lakes were 
voiced by the provincial and regional governments as well as by civil society, especially in the 
early 2000s. To address these concerns, the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process (SLIPP) 
was formed. It was initially led by the Ministry of Environment (MOE) as a multi-agency 
initiative to coordinate water management efforts that had been siloed among different agencies 
(Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009). The board of SLIPP was comprised of 
representatives from the three regional districts, a Secwepemc representative, a member at large, 
and provincial agency representatives (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014).  
Collaboration began in 2006 with public consultation working groups leading in 2011 to a 
three-year pilot program on water quality, foreshore mapping, recreational management planning 
and ad hoc habitat restoration and derelict dock removal. Management of SLIPP transferred in 
2010 from MOE staff to the Fraser Basin Council. Funding of SLIPP was through local 
government gas tax within the Columbia Shuswap Regional District (CSRD) and the Regional 
District of the North Okanagan (RDNO), a parcel tax within the Thompson Nicola Regional 
District (TNRD), and in-kind support from provincial agencies. Meetings under MOE were 
closed to the public, held quarterly and were run by consensus. Shortly after management 
responsibilities shifted, meetings were opened to the public and run by a majority voting system. 
SLIPP’s output included a three-year (2011-2013) water quality monitoring data program, a 
recreational management plan, and foreshore and aquatic habitat mapping, which led to the 
initiation of restoration projects and the provincial government initiating regulatory action for 
private foreshore infringements. Analysis from the water quality monitoring program confirmed 
that Shuswap water quality is gradually deteriorating in some areas of the lake indicating a need 
for continued monitoring and remediation (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014). Throughout the 
existence of SLIPP, programing was contentious due to misconceptions of mandate by the public 
and provincial bylaw officers using the SLIPP name to take action on foreshore violations 
(Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association, 2015). In connection to these issues along with the 
need for continued water quality monitoring work, SLIPP members decided to rebrand at the end 
of the three-year pilot project and in 2015 became the Shuswap Watershed Council (SWC) 
(Fraser Basin Council, 2015a).  
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The SWC maintained a similar governance structure, but established a more permanent 
funding and legal structure within the CSRD via Bylaw 5705 (Columbia Shuswap Regional 
District, 2015). Now, the SWC resource structure is through a parcel taxation bylaw by the 
CSRD, TNRD and the City of Salmon Arm along with continued in-kind support from the BC 
Ministries of Agriculture and Environment until at least 2021. The SWC also narrowed its focus 
to only water quality monitoring and safety (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014).  
Figure 1.6: Shuswap Watershed (SWC) 
 
 
1.5.3 Conceptual Framework 
To guide the research process, individual conceptual frameworks were developed for Chapters 
Two, Three, and Four. Each of these frameworks integrate insights from literature on governance, 
collaborative governance, CEG, CWG, and legitimacy. As well, the constructivist approach used 
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in this research meant that the frameworks also included insight from the empirical contexts and 
interviewees. As such, initial versions were deductive in nature and then were further developed 
with inductive insight from empirical fieldwork. Table 1.1. presents a structural outline of the 
conceptual frameworks. 
Table 1.1: Outline of Conceptual Frameworks 
Chapter Key Legitimacy Concern Key Governance Concern  Specific Concern for CWG 
2 Types of legitimacy  Governance attributes What legitimacy types are 
experienced and relevant to 
CWG? 
3 Legitimacy dynamics  Organizational 
development stages  
How does CWG legitimacy 
change as a governance body 
evolves? 
4 Composition of legitimacy 
judgements  
Watershed-level sectors of 
society 
What are the CWG sources and 
associated types of legitimacy 
that comprise legitimacy 
judgements by sector 
 
The conceptual framework of Chapter Two is based on the premise that multiple legitimacy 
types are relevant to both normative and empirical judgements of CWG legitimacy. As such, 
Chapter Two first provides a comprehensive synthesis of legitimacy types from typologies within 
the organizational, political, sociological, and legal literatures and identifies possible legitimacy 
sources suggested within the broad environmental governance and collaborative governance 
literature. To organize the legitimacy types within this framework, five groupings are used: 
legitimacy through (a) ideal practice, (b) results, (c) institutional setting, (d) social acceptance or 
consent, and (e) individuals. The conceptual framework is then applied to the five case studies to 
explore the possible ways such sources and types may be experienced in CWG.  
 Building on Chapter Two’s conceptual framework, Chapter Three explores when 
different CWG legitimacy sources and types are more or less important at different stages of a 
body’s development. To achieve this exploration, Chapter Three’s conceptual framework uses a 
generic five stage model of organizational development (stages of establishment, growth, 
maturity, decline, and either dissolution or renewal) in connection to legitimacy dynamics 
(establishment, extension, maintenance, defense, and either loss or extension) as an 
organizational tool to explore when and in what way different legitimacy concerns matter in each 
of the five cases. Therefore, Chapter Three uses Chapter Two’s synthesis of legitimacy types as a 
supplementary framework to identify relevant CWG legitimacy types and then organizes 
dominate themes by stage.  
 Chapter Four also utilizes Chapter Two’s synthesis of legitimacy types to identify the 
composition of legitimacy judgements by actors from different sectors towards the case bodies. 
As such, Chapter Four’s conceptual framework first identifies common CWG sectors that were 
present and interviewed in all sectors and their common concerns for water. From these concerns, 
the framework is then used to explore the legitimacy sources that are most prevalent within 
legitimacy judgements by sector. 
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1.5.4 Data Collection 
Summaries of the data collection methods for the empirical case study research of Chapters Two, 
Three and Four are outlined here and are reiterated, as appropriate, within each of the mentioned 
chapters. Semi-structured interviews, documents, and personal observations between November 
2013 and February 2015 were used as data for each manuscript. Interviews were the primary 
source of data as they allowed for direct questioning on different aspects of legitimacy. 
Documents and personal observations acted as supplemental sources for triangulation to cross-
check data sources as well as to provide contextual information to guide interview questioning or 
provide deeper understanding on topics identified in the interviews.  
Across the five cases, 99 interviews were conducted with representatives from a range of 
sectors both internal or external to each case body. Table 1.2 provides a summary of the 
background sector and number of interviewees. The sector of interviewees was determined based 
on their professional role. In cases where interviewees had more than one professional role, 
clarification was sought about what role they were representing within the interview; 70 of these 
interviewees were past or current participants or staff of the case studies. In cases where the 
interviewee spoke about knowledge or experiences across multiple cases, they are represented as 
having ‘multi-case knowledge’ in Table 1.2. Interviewees were included from relevant sectors for 
each case and included current CWG body participants, past-participants, and those not involved 
but familiar with the case(s). Interviewees were sought using either purposeful and snowball 
techniques and interviews were conducted in-person, by phone, or electronically. Interviews 
ranged from thirty minutes to over three hours and some interviewees provided written comments 
in follow-up to the interview.  
Table 1.2: Summary of Interviewee Backgrounds and Case Association 
Case→ 
Societal actor ↓ 




Senior Government (federal and 
provincial) 
3 0 1 3 2 5 
Local Government (regional and 
municipal) 
7 4 3 6 9 0 
Title and rights holders (First 
Nations) 
3 1 2 1 2 0 
Collaborative body staff 1 1 3 2 2 0 
Non-government interest groups 
(e.g., agriculture, industry, 
environment, residents, funders, 
youth) 
7 11 4 7 5  4 
Total Interviewees (n=99) 21 17 13 19 20 9 
 
Interviews were semi-structured, and provided a framework of themes to be explored, while 
also allowing interviewees to express and emphasize different and new ideas as they saw fit. The 
interview guide was thus developed to direct interviewees to reflect on their case’s process, 
results, legal status, social acceptance and the individuals involved (i.e., the five legitimacy type 
groupings). Table 1.3 provides examples of such questions demonstrating how the conceptual 
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frameworks of each manuscript helped in the development of the interview guide. The conceptual 
framework of Chapter Two acted as the primary source for the interview guide and Chapter Three 
and Four’s conceptual framework acted as prompts to guide follow-up questions. For example, 
when a legitimacy source such as the community’s readiness to participate in a collaborative body 
was being discussed by an interviewee, depending on the case a follow-up question might include 
why this issue matters specifically to that interviewee and whether they felt that issue mattered 
more or less at the current time than it did earlier in the body’s development. Such questions thus 
aimed to identify different legitimacy sources and types during a body’s development (Chapter 
Three) and specific legitimacy concerns by sector (Chapter Four). Furthermore, the interview 
guide was iteratively tailored during the data collection process to reflect identified concerns 
within each case and to different sectors to gain context-specific insights. The revised and 
completed interview guide is available in Appendix 2.  
Table 1.3: Sample Interview Questions 
Legitimacy concern 
identified by conceptual 
frameworks 
Example interview questions to address theme 
Legitimacy from ideal 
practice 
How would you characterize the collaborative process? 
Follow up: Did everyone participate and were they treated equally? 
Follow up: Were decisions transparent and followed through with? 
Follow up: Was any sector missing from the collaboration? 
Follow up: Were decisions deliberated on fairly and consistently? 
Follow up: Where there any specific problems at different points in time 
that hindered the process? 
Follow up: Where there any aspects of the process that helped the 
collaboration function or achieve its goals? 
Legitimacy from results What kind of influence or impact has resulted from the collaboration? 
Follow-up: Has this changed over time? 
Follow-up: Has it been adequate? 
Legitimacy from social 
acceptance 
What has been the general community to response to the collaboration? 
Follow up: Have there been times of notable resistance or support? 
Follow up: What actions of the collaboration have helped or hindered this 
response? 
Follow up: To what extend does the community response affect the 
collaboration? 
Legitimacy evolution Do the origins have an impact how the collaboration has been perceived? 
What do you anticipate of the future of the collaboration? 
 
The goals of the research were clearly provided by email or in person to all interviewees in 
an information letter that was provided to all people sought for an interview. Anonymity was 
discussed with interviewees and they were asked to sign a consent form. Interviews were either 
digitally recorded and took place in-person or over the phone, or occurred through written 
responses by interviewees using email. During the interviews, notes were made regarding the 
content and personal observations. Interviews not in written format were transcribed verbatim by 
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myself or by an online transcription service (www.transcribeme.com) with the exception of 
interviewees that request that portions of their interviews not be recorded or transcribed. The 
opportunity for member checking of interview transcripts was provided to verify the content and 
provide clarification if required by the interviewee. These interview procedures were approved by 
and in accordance with the University of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics.  
In addition to interviews, the research analyzed 656 documents identified online or through 
key informants or interviewees. Types of documents included meeting minutes, newspaper 
articles, promotional material, technical and policy reports, draft and finalized plans, emails and 
letters, interpersonal communications, and collaborative group publications, policies, and 
websites. Appendix 3 outlines the documents and provides a breakdown of the number of each 
document type. Newspaper articles were searched via keyword (i.e., the name of each body) 
using Factiva – an internet media database – or local community newspaper databases directly if 
the newspaper was not available through Factiva. Many of the other documents besides 
newspaper articles, were retrieved through a collaborative body’s website or from other 
institutional websites associated with BC or each case’s watershed. The one major exception to 
this retrieval was for the majority of the documents (of all types) associated with the NWC. Most 
of NWC’s documentation was stored on hardcopy by the Fraser Basin Council and the University 
of Northern British Columbia in Prince George. As a result, manual searches were conducted of 
all archived work and relevant material was scanned and uploaded into the Nvivo software. 
Generally, documents were utilized to cross check data from interviews and observation or to 
gain additional information on topics highlighted by interviewees or during observations.  
Personal observations were conducted and field notes were recorded within each of the five 
case studies throughout the data collection period. Observations included attending board 
meetings of the LWA in December 2013, OBWB in May 2014, and SLIPP in December 2013 
and April 2014. Board meetings of the NWC and CWB could not be attended as the NWC had 
dissolved as an organization by the time of field work and the CWB did not have a Board meeting 
during the time spent within the Cowichan Watershed. Observations were also conducted during 
water management-based fieldtrips or social outing with the LWA’s Program Coordinator of 
Lake Windermere in December 2013, with the OBWB’s Board of Directors to the West Kelowna 
Water Treatment Plant in May 2014, with the Band Manager of Cheslatta First Nation to the 
Nechako Reservoir’s Kenney Dam and with the Mayor of Cowichan Lake to the Cowichan Lake 
Weir. Additionally, two public hearings (February and May 2014) regarding foreshore zoning 
bylaws in the Shuswap Watershed were also observed to understand the local social context 
surrounding SLIPP/SWC. Watersheds 2014, a BC-wide practitioner-based watershed governance 
conference in January 2014 was also attended with members from all five cases in attendance; 
general observations of the broader BC context relative to the case studies were observed. Finally, 
observations were made during the 99 interviews as well.  
1.5.5 Data Analysis 
QSR Nvivo 10 software was utilized to organize, code, and analyze the data from all of the 
interview transcripts, observation notes, and documents for each of the three empirical chapters. 
For each manuscript, coding stemmed deductively from the theories that formed the conceptual 
frameworks of each article. The key legitimacy or governance concerns associated with the 
conceptual framework of each manuscript led to the initial pattern code categories (Saldaña, 
2009). Chapter Two pattern codes reflect the range of identified legitimacy types, Chapter Three 
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pattern codes relate to the stages of development, and Chapter Four pattern codes were common 
watershed governance actors. Descriptive open coding (Creswell, 2007) was conducted for all of 
the data related to all three manuscripts to inductively identify legitimacy sources. Axial coding 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) was then applied to all data types through several iterative rounds to 
identify the interconnections between the descriptive open codes with the pattern categories. This 
approach allowed the identified legitimacy sources to connect (a) to the associated legitimacy 
types (Chapter Two), (b) to the different development stages as they were experienced (Chapter 
Three), and (c) to the legitimacy judgements of individuals from different sectors (Chapter Four). 
Using this coding strategy, study findings reflect both existing theory as well as new concepts and 
ideas – particularly as they relate to identifying CWG-specific legitimacy sources. Triangulation 
was used to confirm the validity of legitimacy sources and to identify when conceptual saturation 
occurred within the data (Charmaz, 2006; Yin, 2009). Validity was determined when legitimacy 
sources were apparent across more than one interview or data form within and across two or more 
cases. Cross case analysis was conducted on a case-by-case basis comparing the individual cases 
to each other. Where appropriate, noteworthy differences are shared within the results sections of 
each empirical chapter. However, for the most part results were relatively similar across all five 
cases and as a result, findings are presented by themes specific to each chapter rather than by 
individual case. Evidence is provided primarily through the use of quotations from assessed 
interviews and documents as well as from written observation reflections. The selection of 
evidence is based on choosing either typical or especially poignant comments or observations that 
highlight and illustrate the different coded themes (Sandelowski, 1994). As a result, quotations 
were selected for both their verbal content as well as their style and tone to ensure that findings 
are aesthetic, while also being informative. For all interview quotations used within the findings 
of this research, care was taken to preserve the anonymity of the participant by removing personal 
identifiers including the case name if necessary.  
1.6 Organization of Thesis 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation include three stand-alone empirically-based 
manuscripts that each act as their own chapter (Chapters Two, Three, and Four). A subsequent 
concluding chapter acts as a summary and discussion of the findings and collective contributions 
of this work (Chapter Five). The three empirical chapters are intended to stand-alone as 
manuscripts that will be published as co-authored articles with my advisor, Dr. Robert de Loë. 
Some repetition of the empirical and theoretical context as well as methodology exists in each of 
these chapters as a result of their stand-alone nature. Despite this nature, the three chapters 
collectively build on each other to provide a global contribution to the understanding of CWG 
legitimacy, which is discussed detail in Chapter Five.  
Chapter Two is a manuscript entitled Synthesizing Legitimacy Typologies for Collaborative 
Water Governance. This paper synthesizes 18 legitimacy typologies to generate a conceptual 
framework of legitimacy types that can be used to identify and categorize CWG legitimacy 
sources. It then empirically demonstrates the applicability of this framework through analysis of 
legitimacy within the five case study bodies. The work of this paper corresponds to objective one 
and four of this thesis. The Natural Resources Journal will be targeted for publication.  
Chapter Three and Four utilize the conceptual synthesis of legitimacy types provided in 
Chapter Two and provide empirical analysis using the five case study bodies regarding the 
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dynamic nature of legitimacy and the composition of legitimacy judgements. Chapter Three, The 
Legitimacy Lifecycle in Collaborative Water Governance: An Assessment, explores which 
legitimacy types are more relevant at different stages of a CWG body’s development. This paper 
thus addresses Objective Two of this dissertating by exploring the evolving nature of CWG 
legitimacy. This paper will be submitted to Environmental Policy and Governance. 
Chapter Four, Collaborative Water Governance: The Composition of Sector-based 
Legitimacy Judgements examines the composition of different actor’s legitimacy judgements by 
sector to identify the dominant legitimacy sources and types within each interpretation. Given the 
multiple social sectors involved in collaborative governance, legitimacy judgements vary towards 
CWG. This paper will be submitted to the Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning and 
responds to objective three of this dissertation. 
Chapter Five provides a summary of the major findings of the three manuscripts and 
integrates findings together to represent the overall contribution of this research. Theoretical and 
empirical contributions are offered reflecting on the nature of CWG legitimacy, its strategic 
management, and the values of using legitimacy to assess collaborative water governance, 
thereby addressing objective four. Additionally, the chapter addresses the strengths and 
weaknesses of this research and areas for future study. References and appendices for all chapters 





1 Chapter 2 
 
Synthesizing Legitimacy Typologies for Collaborative Water  
Governance 
1.1 Introduction 
Collaborative water governance (CWG) bodies are organizations that are increasingly utilized in 
Western contexts to address water concerns that exist cross multiple societal sectors (Pahl-Wostl 
et al., 2007). These bodies are characterized as the “processes and structures of public policy 
decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, 
levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose 
that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). Legitimacy is one 
aspect of these bodies that lacks clarity because of the inclusion of non-state actors into decision-
making and the relative newness of collaboration as a governance model for water (Baird et al., 
2014; Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Sabatier, Focht, et al., 2005a).  
Legitimacy is about the justifiability or acceptance of governance and is generally 
acknowledged as a necessary attribute to enhance order, stability, and effectiveness (Beetham, 
1991, 2013). Beyond this generalization, legitimacy remains an elusive concept with a range of 
typologies that describe the various ways it can form. The consequence of this elusiveness is that 
different legitimacy typologies emphasize different types of legitimacy (Hogl et al., 2012). As a 
result, when empirically assessing legitimacy and using these typologies for guidance, the 
typology used influences what legitimacy types and related sources are examined. The result is 
that the typology chosen may lead to different evaluations and create challenges in assessing what 
sources actually influence legitimacy empirically. Given that legitimacy is a necessary 
governance attribute, it is important to know the range of legitimacy sources so that efforts can be 
made to establish, maintain, and enhance legitimacy for effective governance. Such 
understanding is particularly vital in CWG contexts given the pressing nature of water 
governance problems (Rogers & Hall, 2003). To help understand the range of sources for CWG 
legitimacy, identifying and then drawing on a range of legitimacy typologies can allow for a more 
robust empirical understanding of the sources of legitimacy for a CWG body.  
However, to date in the context of collaborative governance broadly, and CWG more 
specifically, there have been limited attempts to synthesize relevant legitimacy typologies. 
Although legitimacy has been assessed in a variety of collaborative governance contexts such as 
sustainable development (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2006), environmental governance (e.g., Wallington et 
al., 2008), water management (e.g., Van Buuren et al., 2012), and rural planning (e.g., Connelly, 
2011; Connelly et al., 2006), assessments generally only use one typology of legitimacy. For 
example, Beetham’s (2013) three dimensions of legitimacy – rules, expressed consent, and 
justifiability of rules – is used by Orr (2015) to assess CWG in Quebec, Canada, while Baird et 
al. (2014) use Trachtenberg and Focht’s (2005) process and substantive legitimacy typology to 
examine CWG in Ontario, Canada. Given the many theoretical stances on legitimacy that exist, 
using only one typology can miss other relevant types of legitimacy. For example, Beetham’s 
(2013) typology dismisses legitimacy as judgement of social acceptance; however, legitimacy 
through social acceptance is regarded by others (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 
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1995; Tost, 2011) as a vital type of legitimacy that determines whether constituents or 
subordinates to a body actually abide by or support its actions (Johnson et al., 2006). To judge 
whether collaborative governance is the best form of decision-making for certain issues, 
comprehensive legitimacy assessment using multiple typologies is necessary.  
To address this need, this paper synthesizes legitimacy typologies from across multiple 
disciplines such as public administration, law, and sociology with the ultimate aim of building a 
broad synthesized conceptual framework of legitimacy types that are relevant to CWG. Following 
this synthesis, the framework is then used as a guide to empirically identify legitimacy sources for 
five local level CWG bodies. By taking this dual approach, the paper makes both a theoretical 
contribution to the CWG literature by developing a comprehensive framework of relevant 
legitimacy types, and an empirical contribution by demonstrating how these legitimacy types are 
experienced across multiple case studies. 
1.2 The Need for a Collaborative Governance Legitimacy Framework  
Numerous typologies suggest a variety of ways governance bodies can be justified (Hogl et al., 
2012). Table 2.1 outlines the main types of legitimacy according to key proponents. Although 
legitimacy interpretations and the purposes behind these typologies may differ, this paper 
organizes all of these types into five main groups of legitimacy types: legitimacy related to (1) 
ideal practice, (2) the potential for or actual results, (3) institutional setting, (4) social acceptance 
or consent, and (5) individuals. These groups represent an organizational structure that allows the 
various sources that make up empirical legitimacy judgments toward CWG to be identified. 
However, there are three notable challenges in presenting and using this framework.  
First, this paper represents a synthesis of legitimacy types that are rooted in different 
interpretations and approaches to the study of legitimacy. Some studies interpret legitimacy as a 
normative concept, while others treat legitimacy as an empirical entity about social acceptance. 
Consequently, legitimacy is either about justifying the normativity of authority or the acceptance 
of the behaviour of an organization with or without authority. These differences make 
comparative assessment inherently complex (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) and by extension 
make the combination of different approaches inappropriate. For this reason, while this paper 
synthesizes legitimacy types that transcend both normative and empirical interpretations, it does 
not attempt to blend these approaches. Instead, the argument is made that both approaches simply 
should be presented together to allow for the comprehensive assessment of legitimacy. 
Second, despite the following subsections of this paper distinguishing the boundaries of 
each grouping of legitimacy types, there are interconnections among all of them. To illustrate, 
legitimacy sources related to social acceptance may draw on sources of legitimacy from any of 
the other groupings to form a cognitive judgement towards an organization. For example, 
participation of non-state actors in collaborative water governance is noted in Trachtenberg and 
Focht’s (2005) typology as a procedural source of legitimacy. However, participation can also be 
indicative of social acceptance and is identified as its own type of legitimacy in Jachtenfuchs et 
al.’s (1998) typology. Likewise, legitimacy types that have a legal basis could be grouped as 
legitimacy related to ideal practice when rules are formed internally and related to process. 
However, such rules can also be identified as being values normatively dictated by the 
institutional setting surrounding a governance body (Ostrom, 2009). Legitimacy related to 
individuals also are discussed by some authors (e.g., Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Suchman, 1995) 
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within the context of the value they provide to legitimacy related to social consent or ideal 
practice (as members of an organization). However, there are also others that distinguish 
legitimacy from individuals as a distinct form of legitimacy (e.g., Easton, 1965; Weber, 1964). As 
a result of such interrelations, it is plausible that the groupings of legitimacy could be organized 
in other ways and that the groupings could be further debated. However, the point of this 
organizational strategy is to provide a way to recognize the many different sources of legitimacy 
as they connect in different ways to the theoretically identified types. 
Third, similar to the interrelatedness of the legitimacy groupings is the relationship of the 
different typologies to each other. Some typologies draw on others as benchmarks. For example, 
Suchman (1995) aims to synthesize the literature on organizational legitimacy and highlights the 
typologies of Weber (1964) and Scott (1995) in the development of his own. Likewise, Bekkers 
and Edwards (2007) acknowledge and expand upon Scharpf’s (1997, 1999) input and output 
typology by identifying throughput legitimacy (i.e., a judgement on process quality) as separate 
from input legitimacy. Meanwhile, there are other authors such as Trachtenberg and Focht (2005) 
who create their own typology without relating their typology to others with similar legitimacy 
types. As a result of these types of relationships among the typologies, there are duplicate 
legitimacy types described across multiple typologies that are sometimes expanded on or altered 
(e.g., a type is given a new name or applied to a different context) from legitimacy types related 
to other typologies. Despite the interrelations among typologies and groupings as well as the 
variations in interpretations, the five groupings of legitimacy represent an organizational tool to 
show the range of legitimacy sources that inform judgements of CWG legitimacy.  
In the context of collaborative governance, scholars acknowledge legitimacy as an essential 
governance attribute, but rarely focus on more than one legitimacy typology or type. This 
phenomenon is apparent in both overarching frameworks of collaborative governance (e.g., 
Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2003; 
Thomson & Perry, 2006) as well as empirical collaborative governance legitimacy studies in 
specific contexts (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Connelly, 2011; Orr, 2015; Van Buuren et al., 2012). 
For example, Bryson et al. (2006) and Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) focus exclusively on 
internal legitimacy and Ansell and Gash (2007) focus mainly on procedural legitimacy in their 
reviews of collaborative governance. As a result, what the collaborative governance literature 
does not yet do is provide a comprehensive review or assessment tool of the many ways CWG 
legitimacy may be interpreted or sourced. However, studies on collaborative governance in 
general and legitimacy specifically along with other research on various collaborative governance 
attributes such as power (e.g., Brisbois & de Loë, 2015), accountability (e.g., Biermann & Gupta, 
2011), outcomes (e.g., Connick & Innes, 2003), and legality (e.g., Bingham, 2009) provide 
insight into some of the governance dynamics that can act as or influence CWG legitimacy 
sources in relationship to the different legitimacy types. 
Assuming that collaborative governance legitimacy is inherently hybrid in nature (Van 
Buuren et al., 2012; Wallington et al., 2008), the next section through a literature review 
synthesizes 22 legitimacy types from 18 legitimacy typologies. Duplicate types with the same 
name, or that have a different name, but are effectively the same, are only counted once. This 
judgement was made based on similarities in discussion, on whether different authors were citing 
and drawing from the other typologies, and whether similar empirical legitimacy sources were 
identified.  
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Table 2.1: Legitimacy Typologies and Key Proponents 
Legitimacy Typologies  Key Proponent 
Formal, Social  Arnull (2002) 
Rules; Expressed Consent; Justifiability of Rules  Beetham (1991); (2013) 
Democratic, Identification, Performance  Beetham and Lord (1998) 
Input, Throughput, Output  Bekkers and Edwards (2007) 
Principled, Legal, Sociological  Bernstein (2004) 
Internal, External  Boulding (1967) 
Ideological, Structural, Personal Easton (1965) 
Democratic, Results-based, Order-based, Systemic, Deliberative, 
Procedural 
Etsy (2006) 
Legality, Compliance, Problem-solving, Justifiability  Føllesdal (2005) 
Input, Output, Social  Horeth (1999) 
Participation, Output, Identity  Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998) 
Indirect, Parliamentary, Technocratic, Procedural  Lord and Magnette (2004);  
Convention, Contract, Universal Principles, Sacredness, Expertise, 
Popular Approval, Personal Ties, Personal Qualities  
Matheson (1987) 
Input, Output  Scharpf (1997); (Scharpf, 
1999) 
Regulative, Normative, Cognitive  Scott (1995) 
Pragmatic, Moral, Cognitive  Suchman (1995) 
Procedural, Substantive  Trachtenberg and Focht 
(2005) 
Traditional, Rational-legality, Charismatic  Weber (1964) 
1.3 A Conceptual Framework for Studying Collaborative Governance 
Legitimacy 
In the following section, the five groupings of legitimacy types are reviewed in terms of their 
theoretical background and coverage in the collaborative governance literature. The typologies 
discussed in Table 2.1 are deconstructed and the individual legitimacy types are organized by 
their fit within each group. These legitimacy types then act as sub-groups to organize the different 
empirical sources of legitimacy for CWG. Where there are multiple types grouped together a 
suggested sub-group name has been given for organizational purposes. The groupings are 
presented in no particular order to reflect that empirical legitimacy judgements also combine 
sources of legitimacy in ad hoc arrangements. Summary tables of each grouping are provided at 
the end of each sub-section and collectively act as the conceptual framework to guide the 
empirical analysis of this paper. The intention of this paper is not to combine normative- and 
empirical acceptance-based interpretations of legitimacy. Thus, this conceptual framework is not 
a new legitimacy typology. Instead, it simply is a tool that can be used to identify and organize 
different legitimacy sources relevant to CWG. 
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1.3.1 Legitimacy Types Related to Ideal Practice 
For governance bodies, legitimacy related to ideal practice stems from mechanisms that move the 
‘will of the people’ into decisions and action. As a label, ‘ideal practice’ involves two dimensions 
– a normative value (‘ideal’) and a procedural aspect (‘practice’) that can conceivably adhere to 
any value foundation. In Westernized contemporary contexts, common ideals relate to both 
procedural (e.g., accountability, participation, procedural fairness) and substantive (e.g., 
autonomy, equality, and distributed justice) democratic principles. Principled (Bernstein, 2004), 
democratic (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Etsy, 2006), deliberative (Etsy, 2006) and justifiability of 
rules (Beetham, 1991, 2013) legitimacy types adhere to various democratic theories to legitimize 
modern day rules, policies, and institutions. For example, in contexts favoring representative 
democracy, the electoral process may be enough to ensure legitimacy, while in deliberative 
democracy contexts ideal speech conditions and consensus-building may be required (Manin et 
al., 1987). Alternative legitimacy types related to ideal practice include Matheson’s (1987) 
convention, universal principle, and sacredness legitimacy; Weber’s (1964) traditional 
legitimacy; and Easton’s (1965) ideological legitimacy. All of these are based on legitimacy from 
long-standing societal customs or religious norms. 
Connected to ideal types of legitimacy are those more generally focused on process or 
practice. Examples include input legitimacy (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Scharpf, 
2007; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), throughput legitimacy (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007), 
procedural legitimacy (Etsy, 2006; Lord & Magnette, 2004; Suchman, 1995), systemic legitimacy 
(Etsy, 2006), and structural legitimacy (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995). These types alone do not, 
per se, imply a principled quality. Although, it is common to equate legitimacy from practice with 
various democratic qualities such as transparency, accountability, and deliberation, it is possible 
that non-democratic practices such as flexibility and informed decision-making could also could 
be legitimized (Schneider & Krell-Laluhová, 2005). Furthermore, Bekkers and Edwards (2007) 
also distinguish throughput legitimacy from input legitimacy, which focuses more on the quality 
of practice. For example, if input legitimacy is gained from a decision-making process having 
citizen participation, then throughput legitimacy will be gained from the quality of that 
participation. Structural (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995) and systemic (Etsy, 2006) legitimacy 
types also relate to practice stemming from idealized organizational features or forms.  
1.3.1.1 Collaborative Ideal Practice 
The practice of collaborating is perhaps the most well studied area of collaborative governance 
meaning that related legitimacy norms are already well documented. Underpinning the 
collaborative process are Habermasian ideals of communicative rationality (e.g., inclusive, 
honest, informed and equitable deliberation) (Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999), interest-
based negotiation (Innes & Booher, 2010), and good governance principles (e.g., accountability, 
transparency, fairness, social legitimacy, adaptability, integration, inclusiveness) (Lockwood et 
al., 2010). Norms from these fields of thought are reflected in legitimacy judgements as 
demonstrated by studies such as Baird et al. (2014), Connelly (2011), Hogl et al. (2012), Kronsell 
and Bäckstrand (2010), and Trachtenberg and Focht (2005). For example, Kronsell and 
Bäckstrand (2010) identify normative standards of representation, fairness, and accountability as 
key legitimacy traits related to process. Additionally, challenges such as power differentials 
among participants (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2009), accurate representation 
(Parkinson, 2003), and effective consensus (McClosky, 2000) have been raised in connection to 
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the legitimacy of collaborative processes. Notably, the inclusion of non-state actors in decision-
making through collaboration introduces questions about accountability and legitimacy in terms 
of who is responsible and who has the right to make decisions (Gunningham, 2009; Holley et al., 
2012a). Table 2.2 frames how these collaborative governance norms may relate to the various 
legitimacy types of this grouping and form part one of five of this paper’s conceptual framework. 
Table 2.2: Legitimacy from Ideal Practice  
Legitimacy Type How Legitimacy is 
Created 
Examples of Related 
Collaborative or 
Environmental 












based on moral and 
ethical systems: most 
commonly 
democratic (i.e., the 
institutional and 
formal protection of 
rights and the 






(Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 
2010; Vileyn, 2011); 
qualities of common pool 





• Involvement of all 
relevant actor groups 
• Due deliberation 
• Consensus decision-
making 
• Ability for 
stakeholders to 
express their voice 
and influence 
decision-making 
• Responsibility and 
ownership for 
decisions, decision-
making process, and 
to public  
• Justness, flexibility, 
unified, part of a 
network 




Deliberative ideal speech 
conditions (Innes & 
Booher, 2004); autonomy 
(Singleton, 2002) 
• Cooperative dialogue, 
opportunities for 
debate incorporating a 
wide range of views 
• Consensus-based 
decision-making 
Throughput Quality of 
procedures 
Perceptions of fairness, 
procedural justice, 
equality of participation 
(Hard et al., 2012) 
• Quality of deliberation 
and equality of access 
to deliberation by 
participants 
• Sincerity of 
propositions/follow-
through on actions 
• Comprehensibility 




Legitimacy Type How Legitimacy is 
Created 
Examples of Related 
Collaborative or 
Environmental 
Governance Norm  
Example CWG 
Legitimacy Sources 




Consideration for scope, 
diversity and size, 
formalness, roles and 
responsibilities of 
collaboration (Plummer & 
Armitage, 2007) 
  
• Procedural tasks, e.g., 
agenda setting and 
reporting, suitability 








Religious or sectoral 
formula that justifies 
the possession and 
sacredness of 
authority and power 
Value of water (Hamlin, 
2000; Linton, 2010) 
• Fundamental nature of 
water 
1.3.2 Legitimacy Types Related to the Potential or Actual Achievement of Results  
Legitimacy types related to the potential or actual achievement of results are about ‘government 
for the people’ and stem from the utilitarian view that a governance body should contribute to 
citizen well-being, usually by addressing a public concern (Benhabib, 1994). Outputs or 
outcomes of a governance body must actually produce a desired benefit for the people, but the 
capacity of a body to solve a problem may also be used as a proxy measure (Horeth, 1999). 
Specific types of legitimacy in this grouping include results-based (Etsy, 2006), problem-solving 
(Føllesdal, 2005), output (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998; 
Scharpf, 1997), substantive (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), consequential (Suchman, 1995), 
performance (Beetham & Lord, 1998), and technocratic (Lord & Magnette, 2004). Together, 
these types represent a spectrum of ways potential or actual results may provide legitimacy. As a 
collective, they explicitly tie legitimacy to effectiveness. If a governance body does not have 
legitimacy it may struggle to be effective; likewise, the ineffectiveness of a body may challenge 
its legitimacy as well.  
Consequential, output, and substantial legitimacy focus on legitimacy attained through the 
production of actual accomplishments and their outcomes. However, each type has a different 
focal point claiming legitimacy from different aspects of an accomplishment. Output legitimacy 
results from the production of tangible goods or services; consequential legitimacy results from 
the outcomes of that product; and substantive legitimacy concerns both outputs and their 
outcomes. The distinctions among these legitimacy types, while not entirely clear cut in the 
literature, indicate the difficulty of measuring impact. Not all results of an action or body are 
empirically identifiable and some occur over long timeframes or are evident only in retrospect 
(Suchman, 1995). As such, action-based legitimacy types – performance, technocratic, and 
problem-solving legitimacy – draw instead from the effort of a body to work towards socially-
desirable results. Problem-solving legitimacy relates to a body’s capacity to remedy collective 
problems, performance legitimacy relates to the quality of results, and technocratic legitimacy 
focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of a body’s problem-solving capacity.  
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1.3.2.1 Collaborative Potential for or Actual Results 
Collaborative governance results also have been well studied (Clarke & Fuller, 2011; Innes & 
Booher, 1999) and range from interim to long-term effects such as immediate social and political 
capital to longer-term changes in attitudes, behaviours and context (Emerson et al., 2012). 
Legitimacy related to these results depends on the justification of output related to welfare 
improvements or social or environmental justice (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005). However, 
determining the achievement of improvements or justice is difficult as often spatial and temporal 
differences between collaborative action and actual improvements, particularly for environmental 
change, can hinder judgements (Bäckstrand et al., 2010b; Holley et al., 2012a; Sabatier, Weible, 
et al., 2005). As a result, proxy perception-based measures of change are often used as a 
substitute to outcome evaluations (Leach et al., 2002; Mandarano, 2008). Legitimacy concerns 
related to this challenge stem from uncertainty around the extent to which collaborations can 
produce substantive change (Koontz & Thomas, 2006) and are effective and efficient at achieving 
desirable results (Newig & Fritsch, 2008). Baird et al. (2014) and Trachtenberg and Focht (2005) 
also highlight legitimacy concerns related to trade-offs between social and environmental welfare 
improvements, and results that benefit some collaborative actors more than others. Table 2.3 
frames how these collaborative governance norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this 
grouping and form part two of five of this paper’s conceptual framework. 
Table 2.3: Legitimacy from the Potential for or Actual Results 
Legitimacy Type How Legitimacy is 
Created 
Examples of Related 
Collaborative or 
Environmental 
Governance Norm  
Example CWG 
Legitimacy Sources 
Problem-solving  Capacity to produce 
certain solutions that 
help remedy collective 
problems 
Perceptions of success, 
(Frame et al., 2004); 
social capital developed 
(Lubell, 2004) 
• Actor group 
satisfaction with the 
quality of results and 
















(Frame et al., 2004) 
• Quantity of actions 
and results 
Performance Quality of results Second order effects, e.g., 
change in behaviours 
(Frame et al., 2004; Innes 
& Booher, 2010) 
• Extent output of 
collaborative 




based ability to offer 
solutions 
Use of knowledge and 
expertise in decision-
making (Connelly, 2011) 
• Use of evidence-
based knowledge to 
inform decisions and 
action 
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1.3.3 Legitimacy Types Related to Institutional-setting 
The study of legitimacy as it relates to institutional-setting stems predominantly from the fields of 
political theory and law and reflects the formalized and legal structures that influence both 
normative and perception-based judgments. Debates centre on the legitimation of power, 
questioning, for example, how legitimacy is acquired, who is entitled to use it, and its limits 
(Beetham, 2013). From a legal focus, legitimacy questions focused on the interpretation of law 
relate to its development, revision, and enforcement (Bernstein, 2004). As such, legitimacy is 
linked to legality or legal validity, and is about accordance to law, rules, norms, or procedures 
relevant to a certain issue or context (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007). Adherence to these qualities 
provides a basic structure of social life and enables the prediction of behaviours and the setting of 
expectations. Related to this concern is the formalization and institutionalization of these qualities 
and their ability to establish power and authority over a subordinate through customary, 
conventional or legal order (Beetham, 2013). In this sense, legitimacy is a contact between a 
dominant regime and its subordinates. The most traditional contract between an authority and 
subordinates has commonly been regarded as the adherence of the state to law making legitimacy 
synonymous with legality (Hanberger, 2003). This legality has been held as a benchmark or 
institutional goal for many processes and organizations outside of the state for the sense of 
formalness and permanence it can instil (Blomgren Amsler, 2016).  
Types of legitimacy related to this grouping include legal (Bernstein, 2005; Weber, 1964), 
regulative (Scott, 1995), rules (Beetham, 1991), order (Etsy, 2006), formal (Arnull, 2002), and 
contract (Matheson, 1987) legitimacy. As a group, these types of legitimacy are bestowed on 
actors who have some form of sovereignty over organizations or society. Individually, legal, 
regulative, and rule legitimacy types differ from contract and formal legitimacy because of their 
attention to the rational establishment of legal doctrines and conventions. In contrast, formal 
legitimacy is about adhering to established rules and procedures over time (Arnull, 2002) and 
contract legitimacy stems from the use of binding agreement to establish rights and obligations 
(Matheson, 1987). Although some of these legitimacy types may be interconnected or associated 
with legitimacy related to ideal practice (particularly when contracts exist as a part of the 
governance structure), they can also be interpreted as values that stem from externally prescribed 
institutional norms. 
1.3.3.1 Institutional-setting of Collaborations 
Although collaborative governance scholars have made significant developments in 
understanding collaborative governance design, challenges, and opportunities, institutional 
frameworks such as laws, rules, regulations and mandates often are omitted as variables 
(Blomgren Amsler, 2016). A major reason for this absence is that a large number of 
collaborations are grassroots, informally initiated outside of statutory decision-making, and rely 
on voluntary compliance (Stoker, 1998; Tan et al., 2012). Moreover, while legislative, 
administrative, regulatory, and judicial systems can enable the work of collaborative bodies, they 
can also constrain them (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Finding ways to constructively embed a 
collaboration within an enabling legal framework is therefore a normative goal for collaborative 
bodies, because, as Orr (2015) explains, collaborative water governance legitimacy in the form of 
legality is tied to its institutional setting. However, in lieu of a legal framework, Connelly (2011) 
claims that collaborations can maintain legitimacy by developing justifiable rules and procedures. 
Moreover, scholars in support of collaborative arrangements are arguing for legal infrastructure 
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that can authorize collaborative governance as a model of decision-making outside of traditional 
legislative, executive, and judicial systems (Bingham, 2009). Policy processes at every judicial 
level have begun to catch up and are in various stages of implementing a legal framework to 
institutionalize various collaborative regimes (Blomgren Amsler, 2016). Table 2.4 frames how 
these collaborative governance legitimacy norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this 
grouping and form part three of five of this paper’s conceptual framework. 
Table 2.4: Legitimacy from Institutional-setting 
Legitimacy Type How Legitimacy is 
Created 
Examples of Related 
Collaborative or 
Environmental 








rules and conventions 
following belief in the 









• Integration within 
existing structures 
Contract Contract in which those 
holding and subjecting to 
power agree to mutual 
rights and obligations 
Administrative law 
(Bingham, 2009) 






1.3.4 Legitimacy Types Related to Social Acceptance or Consent 
Legitimacy types related to social acceptance and consent are sociological in nature and stem 
from the context specific concerns of different actors such as interest groups, the general public, 
opinion leaders or politicians. When a process aligns cognitively with the cultural knowledge or 
moral background of such actors, a body may be accepted as appropriate or right (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy types associated with this grouping are thus identifiable by their 
focus on specific expressions or discourses. Commonly in the literature these legitimacy types are 
confused with the broader legitimacy judgements of actors, which can be distinguished as an 
empirical decision that uses a variety of different sources (including those related to legitimacy 
types within this grouping and others). As a legitimacy type, social acceptance or consent is not 
about what is normatively right, but about what sways a particular society to interpret a 
governance body as legitimacy (Bernstein, 2004). 
The most encompassing legitimacy types in this group include Jachtenfuchs, et al.’s (1998), 
and Bernstein’s (2004) identity and sociological legitimacy respectively. These types are broadly 
about the alignment of a body’s values with those of a given community. Other legitimacy types 
within this grouping are more specifically based on actions that express acceptance or consent. 
Beetham’s (1991, 2013) legitimacy through express consent focuses on voluntary actions that 
signify support. Boulding (1967) goes further and distinguishes acceptance or consent from those 
internal or external to an organization or process (internal/external legitimacy). Internal 
legitimacy, in addition to Jachtenfucks, et al.’s (1998) participation legitimacy, stems from the act 
of involvement and the perceptions of those internal to a body. Meanwhile, external legitimacy, 
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along with social (Arnull, 2002) and identification (Beetham & Lord, 1998) legitimacy, relates to 
the acceptance of a body by persons in the surrounding environment. Specific sources of external 
acceptance are further identified as legitimacy types through popular approval (legitimacy 
through the vocal will of the people) (Matheson, 1987), parliamentary (legitimacy as an 
expression of judgement through the election process) (Lord & Magnette, 2004), and compliance 
legitimacy (legitimacy through adherence to the decisions of a body) (Føllesdal, 2005). These 
types represent specific ways or actions that can signify social acceptance or consent.  
 Suchman (1995) also distinguishes between cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy types to 
clarify the underlying motivations for granting acceptance or consent. Cognitive legitimacy exists 
as either an active or passive (taken-for-granted) acceptance or need for a body that validates its 
norms, rules, and practices through alignment with existing cultural structures. Conversely, 
pragmatic legitimacy relates to the direct value a body may provide an evaluating community. 
This type of legitimacy differs explicitly from problem-solving legitimacy (within the legitimacy 
through results grouping) as pragmatic legitimacy is based on the self-serving benefit provided to 
a certain audience, while problem-solving legitimacy is about the ability of a group to solve an 
issue they were charged with addressing. 
1.3.4.1 Collaborative Acceptance or Consent 
The social acceptance of CWG in Western contexts is still developing despite its steadily 
increasing use since the 1990s (Lubell & Leach, 2005). This increase, along with the willingness 
to participate in CWG by the range of actors that have interests in solving water problems, 
indicates social acceptance of collaboration as a method for public engagement in decision-
making (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Legitimacy studies that have examined social acceptance of 
CWG include Edwards (2016), Leino and Peltomaa (2012) and Sandstrom et al. (2014). Findings 
of these studies stress the situated nature of social acceptance and the variety of ways legitimacy 
may be attained through acceptance. Notably, the achievement of results (Edwards, 2016), the 
past-socio political context (Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Sandstrom et al., 2014) and the 
involvement of formal government actors in collaborations (Sandstrom et al., 2014) contribute to 
acceptance. However, skepticism about the performance measurement of collaboration by authors 
such as Andrews and Entwistle (2010) and Leach (2004) also indicates a challenge to 
collaborative governance’s acceptance. The diversity of actors involved in a collaboration and the 
degree of conflict present can create varying perspectives on a collaboration’s performance and 
therefore legitimacy (Emerson et al., 2009). Table 2.5 frames how these collaborative governance 
norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this grouping and form part four of five of this 




Table 2.5: Legitimacy from Social Acceptance or Consent 
Legitimacy Type How Legitimacy is 
Created 
Examples of Related 
Collaborative or 
Environmental 
Governance Norm  
Example CWG 
Legitimacy Sources 
Cognitive  Cultural and belief 
system that suggests 
need and motivation  
Belief in the severity of 
watershed degradation 
(Lubell & Leach, 2005) 
• Purpose, goals, 
activities “make 
sense” and/or are 
“taken for granted” 
according to social 
constructed reality 
Pragmatic  Benefits provided to 
the evaluator 
Adequate and adequately 
delivered benefits 
(Connelly, 2011) 
• Exchange of goods 
and services that 







Connection to the 
audience’s shared 
belief or culture 
Environmental 
responsibility; belief in 
collaborative benefits 
(Ananda & Proctor, 2013) 
• Socially correct and 
desirable purpose and 









participants in an 
organization 
Willingness to participate; 
citizen empowerment 
(Koontz, 2005); general 
consent and abidance to 
governance body (Craik, 
2007) 
 
• Willingness of 
affected actors to be 






Acceptance by persons 
in the surrounding 
environment  
Collective identity (Hardy 
et al., 2005); stakeholder 
acceptance (Paulson, 
1998); popularity of 
collaborative governance 
(McClosky, 2000); 
• Positive normative 
judgements about 
outputs, procedures, 
structures, leaders and 
personnel by those 
subject, but not 
involved with the 
collaboration 
• Media recognition 
Parliamentary  Popular sovereignty 
and elected procedure 
Elements of 
representative democracy 
• Use of elections 













1.3.5 Legitimacy Types Related to Individuals  
Legitimacy types in this grouping stem from the performance, qualities, views, actions, or 
relationships of a person or set of people that provide legitimacy for a whole governance body. 
The personal qualities (e.g., charisma) of leaders in a governance body act as one such legitimacy 
type; the personality of those involved can establish beliefs such as trust in a body (Easton, 1965; 
Matheson, 1987; Weber, 1964). The possession of certain knowledge or expertise by an involved 
individual or group (i.e. expertise legitimacy) or the personal ties people have with those involved 
(i.e., personal ties legitimacy) may also infer legitimacy (Matheson, 1987). As well, the already 
established belief in the legitimacy of participating individuals may be extended to a governance 
body through indirect legitimacy (Lord & Magnette, 2004). Although this legitimacy type is 
discussed by Lord and Magnette (2004) in the context of the European Union’s legitimacy being 
an extension of member states’ legitimacy, it is also relevant at smaller scales.  
Controversy over whether an individual’s traits can actually act as legitimacy types is 
addressed by Scharpf (2009) who distinguishes between sources and types of legitimacy. 
According to Scharpf (2009) individuals act as legitimacy sources that produce different types of 
procedural (e.g., productive leadership) or social acceptance (e.g., helping enhance public 
support), related legitimacy. This paper acknowledges this perspective, but also accepts that there 
are legitimacy types that specifically relate to individuals where a person’s involvement in a 
governance body or their personal qualities may be inherently valued (Brinkerhoff, 2005).  
1.3.5.1 Collaborative Individuals 
In the collaborative governance literature, legitimacy related to individuals is not clearly 
identified; however, the value of leadership, relationship and trust building, and informed 
participants is frequently discussed (e.g., Huxham & Vangen, 2005; O'Leary & Vij, 2012). In 
general, people are emphasized as a dimension of collaborative governance for the roles they may 
play including convener, champion, sponsor, facilitator, participants, experts, and public decision 
maker (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In these roles, individuals are responsible for helping to 
convene a body and include others, act neutrally as facilitators, build trust among actors of 
various perspectives, and establish community support (Frame et al., 2004). Furthermore, criteria 
deciding who should participate in a body may include assessment of whether individuals have 
resources such as finances, knowledge, expertise, experience, information, labor ability, or legal 
authority, to further the agenda of a given collaboration (McGuire, 2006). Likewise, O'Leary and 
Vij (2012) emphasize collaborative leader characteristics (e.g., open-mindedness, flexibility, 
diplomacy, and honesty) and skills (e.g., strong interpersonal communication, interest-based 
negotiation, conflict resolution, compromise and mediation) as antecedents of collaborative work. 
This emphasis highlights the importance of people within collaborative governance. Table 2.6 
frames how these collaborative governance norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this 




Table 2.6: Legitimacy from Individuals 
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1.3.6 Synopsis  
The above section synthesized knowledge on the five groupings of legitimacy types and related 
collaborative governance norms. Collectively, the summary tables of each of the five groupings 
(Tables 2.2 – 2.6) act as a conceptual framework for the empirically assessment of CWG 
legitimacy. This work adopts a broad encompassing interpretation of legitimacy assuming it is 
comprised of multiple legitimacy types and sources. Although the compatibility of different 
legitimacy typologies is limited, CWG legitimacy is fundamentally hybrid. By using this 
framework for empirical CWG assessment, a comprehensive range of legitimacy sources can be 
identified relevant to the different legitimacy types. The framework can be used to either 
deductively identify legitimacy sources, or inductively assess the nature of legitimacy sources. 
Awareness of the full range of legitimacy types applicable to collaborative governance is 
necessary for accurate assessment.  
1.4 Methods and Case Descriptions  
To identify the empirical sources of legitimacy for CWG using the developed conceptual 
framework, multi-case fieldwork was undertaken (Yin, 2009). This form of inquiry is appropriate 
for addressing areas where existing theory is inadequate and where in-depth contextual analysis is 
necessary (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 2006). Support for this approach stems from the need for 
exploratory interdisciplinary analysis of legitimacy types as well as the interpretive perception-
based nature of legitimacy, which makes legitimacy’s analysis context dependent (Johnson, et al. 
2006; Connelly 2011). A constructivist paradigm (Creswell, 2009) guided the examination of five 
cases to identify key concerns and to infer patterns and trends (Stake, 2006). The following 
describes the cases and data collection and analysis. 
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1.4.1 Case Selection and Description 
Five watershed-based CWG bodies were examined to identify different collaborative governance 
legitimacy sources and their associated legitimacy types. For the purpose of this study, 
collaborative governance bodies acted as the case-units, focusing the study on the legitimacy of 
the organization rather than just its actions or policies. The cases were all selected from within the 
Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) for the purpose of achieving both literal and 
theoretical replication (Yin, 1994). Using one province as the overall study setting for all cases 
allowed for an in-depth understanding of the individual cases’ broader socio-political contexts. 
BC was also specifically chosen for its geographic diversity, its prioritization of CWG 
provincially, and the diversity of collaborative governance models in use (Brandes & Curran, 
2009; Nowlan & Bakker, 2007). To select the cases from the province, a short-list was created of 
BC-based CWG bodies that self-identify as a collaborative body involving multiple cross-sector 
actors and that operate at the local level. Five cases were collectively selected from this list to 
ensure geographic diversity across BC and diversity of the age of each case.  
The five cases chosen include the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere 
Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board 
(OBWB), the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap Watershed Council 
(SLIPP/SWC). The CWB represents a collaboration that is co-managed between local 
government and First Nations and is delivering actions established within a water management 
strategy laid out by collaborative efforts of the regional government to address both water quality 
and quantity challenges. The LWA emerged from an environmental non-government organization 
(ENGO) project and is now a citizen-led inclusive water stewardship group who primarily 
conduct water quality monitoring and educational activities for Lake Windermere, while also 
acting as an advisory body to local governments on the ecological water impacts of development 
proposals. The NWC, while disbanded in 2011, was an inclusive collaboration open to all 
impacted actors effected by social and ecological effects from water flow diversions for large 
scale industry; the group’s goal was to address conflict among actor groups and make a 
recommendation about how to allocate funds to remediate water flow impacts. The OBWB 
represents the longest-standing collaboration in BC and the only CWG body legislated under a 
provincial act, which provides the power of taxation among three regional governments. The 
OBWB is accountable to the regional governments of the watershed and is primarily responsible 
for sewage infrastructure granting and Eurasian Milfoil management; however, they also provide 
a suite of other water management, education, and stewardship activities. SLIPP was an 
interagency collaboration among all levels of government (including First Nations) to address 
water quality, recreational safety, and development impacts on the main lakes of the watershed; 
after identifying a need for continued water quality monitoring and facing public controversy due 
to misconceptions about their mandate, SLIPP rebranded as the SWC in 2015. Table 2.7 provides 
a brief summary of case characteristics and Figure 2.1 indicates the location of the respective 




Table 2.7: Case Descriptions 
Case → 
Characteristic ↓ 
CWB LWA NWC OBWB SLIPP/SWC 
Date Active 2010- 2009 -  1996-2011 1968- SLIPP 2006- 
2014 
SWC 2015- 
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Figure 2.1: Respective Watersheds of the Five Cases 
 
 
1.4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Qualitative data collection and analysis methods were deemed necessary to explore the meaning 
and values behind legitimacy judgments, while also identifying the range of legitimacy sources 
based on recurrent themes. Data were collected between 2013-2015 from three sources: 99 in-
depth semi-structured key informant interviews, 656 documents, and nine in-person observation 
sessions. Interviews were conducted with staff and politicians from all four orders of government 
(including First Nations) and appropriate non-government groups all of whom were either 
internal or external to each case. Of the 99, 70 interviewees were either past or present 
participants or employees of the different cases. Selection of interviewees was based on ensuring 
representation of all relevant societal sectors to each case, which were identified both prior to and 
throughout the interview data collection process. Interviewees were selected using a snowball 
approach starting with the program managers of each collaboration. Table 2.8 details the 
breakdown of interviewees by sector within each case as well as those who had multi-case 
knowledge through experience working with more than one case. Interview recruitment was 
conducted by email, phone, and in-person during meeting and conference observation. Interviews 
were recorded using a digital microphone and transcribed verbatim by the first author or by an 
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internet-based transcription company, TranscribeMe. Transcripts were then member checked to 
verify the data (Carlson, 2010). Conceptual saturation or when actors from all relevant sectors 
where interviewed signified the conclusion of interview data collection for each case. Documents 
include meeting minutes, newspaper articles government reports, letters, promotional material, 
draft and finalized plans, emails, personal communications, collaborative group publications and 
websites. Documents were identified through key-informant interviews and internet searches; 
newspaper articles were located through Factiva using a keyword search of each body’s name, as 
well as through searches of local community newspapers. Observations include board and 
committee meetings and fieldtrips, public hearings, BC-based water conferences and workshops, 
as well as observations during interviews and site-visits in each watershed.  
NVIVO 10 software was used to analyze data for themes and patterns following an 
inductive and deductive process using iterative axial coding; triangulation of sources was utilized 
for validity (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Yin, 2009). Validity was determined based on the existence 
of the same theme or pattern by more than one data source both within and across cases. The 
conceptual framework guided the analysis process to suggest how different CWG dynamics (e.g., 
power) act as sources related to the various legitimacy types. This was achieved by using the 
different legitimacy types identified in Section 2.3 as parent nodes and coding the data as child 
nodes to identify legitimacy sources that related to either multiple or single parent nodes. This 
coding scheme was also duplicated to differentiate positive and negative legitimacy sources 
related to the same legitimacy types. Positive legitimacy sources that helped establish and 
maintain legitimacy were coded under one set of parent nodes and negative legitimacy sources 
that decrease or lead to the loss of legitimacy were coded under the other set. Pattern-matching 
(Yin, 2009) was then achieved and is presented as findings (Tables 2.9-2.13) that identify how 
legitimacy sources are positively or negatively experienced and how they relate to various 
legitimacy types for each case. Cross-case analysis was conducted on a case-by case basis to 
identify findings linked to individual cases. Some differences were noted among all cases, which 
are shared below as nuances within the results. However, because the intention was exploratory to 
identify the range of legitimacy sources across all cases and because mainly the results were 
relatively similar across cases, findings are presented according to the five legitimacy groupings 
rather than by case. Key differences are noted where they exist. Evidence of findings is 
demonstrated using quotations from interviews and documents and vignettes from observation 
reflections with the intent of illustrating common patterns. Anonymity of interviewees was 





Table 2.8: Interviewee Sectors Per Case 
Case→ 
Sector↓ 




Government (federal, provincial, 
local) 
11 4 4 9 11 5 
Title and rights holders (First 
Nations) 
3 1 2 1 2 - 
Non-government interest groups 
(e.g., agriculture, industry, 
environment, residents, 
collaborative managers, funders, 
youth) 
7 12 7 9 7 4 
Total Interviewees (99) 21 17 13 19 20 9 
1.5 Results 
Results show a variation of CWG legitimacy sources related to a range of legitimacy types. The 
five groupings are used to organize and discuss these sources and their relationship to legitimacy 
types. Tables 2.9-2.13 present the different legitimacy sources on a case-by-case basis reporting 
on both legitimizing (+) and non-legitimizing (-) ways the sources were used. In each sub-section, 
following the presentation of a summary table, selected examples are used to highlight the many 
types of legitimacy relevant to CWG on a comparative basis among cases.  
1.5.1 Legitimacy Related to Ideal Practice 
Legitimacy types related to ideal practice stem from normative process-based sources. Table 2.9 
summarizes the dominant findings related to these legitimacy types. 
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In order of most frequently discussed to least, interviewees from across all cases highlighted 
the following procedural values in their judgments of each case: inclusivity, transparency, public 
engagement, equitable representation, accountability, respect for different perspectives, honesty 
and sincerity of interactions, open agenda setting, fairness in terms of benefits and rights of 
involvement, and deliberation to identify shared-interests. These norms were to a great extent all 
documented in the terms of reference (LWA, NWC, SLIPP/SWC) or governance manuals (CWB, 
OBWB) of the cases. However, these values manifested differently in each case, had both 
positive and negative influence on legitimacy perspectives, and were not always followed. For 
example, inclusivity was most commonly touted as the most important democratic value: “I think 
the legitimacy comes from having all those different parties at the table, agreeing on a direction 
and really acting very responsibly about moving forward” (Interview 38, CWB, regional 
government). However, inclusivity was also touted as a delegitimizing aspect:  
The [OBWB’s] Stewardship Council, there are over 20 members in there now and 
quite often that is unwieldly when you get that size of group. If I was chair of that 
kind of group, it would be very difficult to get everybody's opinion. When you have a 
group that large you tend to have the loudest voice having the largest influence 
(Interview 83, OBWB, board member). 
Such variation in judgements was common across all the democratic values in all cases regardless 
of the case’s structure. For example, the CWB, the OBWB, and SLIPP demonstrate inclusivity by 
utilizing technical advisory groups made up of non-state actors to advise boards comprised 
mainly of elected government officials. This model is in contrast to the LWA and the NWC, 
which foster inclusivity through a board structure that is open to any and all actors. However, 
inclusivity challenges were apparent in both models. Notable were challenges to efficient group 
management (LWA, NWC, OBWB), balancing interests (CWB, LWA, NWC), ensuring accurate 
representation (NWC, OBWB, SLIPP), efficiently achieving consensus (OBWB, SLIPP), and 
feelings of exclusion from the process (OBWB, SLIPP). While these challenges were both 
expressed in interviews and observable, they were not openly documented in meeting minutes or 
reports. The only exception was the OBWB that, through progress reports attached to their 
Okanagan Sustainable Water Strategy (Okanagan Water Stewardship Council, 2008), regularly 
assess the challenges facing this strategy and by extension, the organization. As an example, the 
2010 progress report (Okanagan Water Stewardship Council, 2010) addressed process challenges 
such as board structure, involvement of local First Nations, and equitable representation.  
Conventional, normative, traditional, and procedural legitimacy not related to democratic 
input appeared in interviews across all cases highlighting (from most frequently discussed to 
least) norms of autonomy, ethical justness, financial responsibility, respect for all views, planning 
flexibility, impartiality, consistent action, political and social connectedness, partnerships, 
participant unity, government and community leader endorsement, active participation, non-
authoritative, future-orientation, evidence-based decision-making using science and traditional 
knowledge, and First Nations co-management where appropriate. This is illustrated in the 
following example from a local Cowichan Watershed newspaper article: 
We have a great deal of knowledge about our watershed that is held and developed by 
local groups and First Nations. We can leverage all the scientific data, traditional 
knowledge and future climate projections to create a “State of the Watershed” report 
and a Watershed Sustainability Plan that will form part of the presentation for local 
control (Jefferson, 2016). 
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Throughput legitimacy was apparent in the evaluation of both democratic and non-
democratic legitimacy sources in all of the cases. The most frequently discussed quality 
judgements across the cases included strategic-foresight and thoroughness of a case’s actions and 
decisions, the quality of participation, and the stability of resourcing. When or how certain 
legitimacy sources are introduced also mattered for quality judgements. For example, the NWC’s 
inclusive structure meant that the aluminum corporation RioTinto AlCan (formally AlCan), 
which controls approximately 70% of the Nechako River’s annual flow (Wood, 2013), was 
involved in the NWC with those who felt negatively impacted by this control. The participation 
of the corporation led a coalition of environmental and First Nations groups to quit the NWC 
because they believed it could not fairly balance interests: “As long as Alcan maintains its 
disproportionate influence through representation… we see no means for other stakeholders to 
exert sufficient leverage to ensure the restoration of the Nechako actually happens” (Sandborn, 
1998). In this case, the extent of inclusivity damaged positive beliefs towards the body. 
In contrast, organizational characteristics provided structural or systematic legitimacy to all 
cases. These include contextually-based judgements about the scope, staff and budgetary size, the 
adequacy of checks and balances, and the body’s degree of formality. However, judgements of 
the same nature could have either a positive or negative influence depending on factors such as 
who designed the body, the type of problem, the socio-economic and -cultural make-up of the 
watershed community. To illustrate this variability, SLIPP/SWC’s narrowing and the OBWB’s 
expansion of mandate both contributed positively to their reestablishment of legitimacy. Initially, 
SLIPP had a three-pronged mandate focusing on water quality, safe recreation and development 
management; public controversy over the extent and regulatory association of the body’s mandate 
particularly related to development management contributed to a narrowing of the mandate as 
SLIPP rebranded itself into the SWC. The narrower mandate focused principally on water quality 
monitoring and secondarily on recreational safety as a way to gain consensus on action and calm 
opposition towards the organization. The following comment demonstrates how the narrower 
mandate helped calm opposition. 
My first impression was that it was too broad of scope with too many components and 
too difficult to manage... I think that as far as the current direction I am generally not 
an advocate per say, but they have moved away from agenda creep… I am okay with 
it if they keep it simple and keep it focused on water quality (Interview 48, 
SLIPP/SWC, regional government). 
In comparison, the OBWB’s mandate for approximately the first 30 years focused on Eurasian 
Water Milfoil management and providing sewage infrastructure improvement grants to local 
governments. Citizen concern about the growing number of water scarcity and climate change 
related issues in the watershed in the early 2000s led to support for the OBWB to expand its 
mandate. As a result, the OBWB took on a broader leadership role taking action on topics such as 
water use surveying, water supply and demand modeling, groundwater monitoring, water quality 
monitoring and improvements, and water education, as well as continuing infrastructure grants 
and invasive species control. The legitimacy value of this structural expansion is exemplified by 
the following “[The OBWB] used to be a very narrowly focused organization… [and is now] one 
that is meeting the region's needs and interests much better than it had before (Interview 90, 
OBWB, board member).” The comparison of the OBWB and SLIPP/SWC demonstrates how 
finding the right organizational format for a body to operate efficiently can enhance or develop 
structural and systematic legitimacy. Finally, the focus on water itself fostered ideological 
 58 
legitimacy: “if you ask people whether water is important and worth working on, you get a 
universal yes” (Interview 6, CWB, non-government actor). The universal importance of water for 
life helps justify collaborative action for water sustainability for all of the cases.  
1.5.2 Legitimacy from the Potential for or Actual Results 
Legitimacy types related to the potential for or actual results stem from the actions of governance 
bodies and subsequent or likely outcomes. Table 2.10 summarizes the findings related to these 
legitimacy types. 
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In each case, the assessment of results commonly justified a body’s existence. Such output 
was discussed by interviewees and documented regularly as a way to communicate actions to 
community and resource supporters. For the OBWB and LWA, this documentation exists as 
annual reporting of activities or results. For the CWB and SLIPP/SWC summaries of activities 
were documented as projects were completed (e.g., Fraser Basin Council, 2014). For the NWC, 
this reporting existed as progress reports at different points throughout the body’s existence. 
Additional to written recognition of output after production, substantive norms were also 
explicitly valued in documented objectives (CWB) and work strategies (OBWB, LWA, SLIPP). 
The CWB’s efforts to convey tangible action-oriented norms as objectives/targets of the 
organization are particularly valued and promoted as evidenced within interviews with board 
participants as well as documented presentations (e.g., Rutherford, 2011) by the body. 
Visual outputs such as restoration work (all but the NWC) and public education workshops 
(all) were particularly reported in each case as proof of the short-term measurable delivery of 
substantive output (output, substantive, results-based, and consequential legitimacy). However, 
output eventually must produce social or environmental change related to a body’s goals to prove 
utility and maintain legitimacy. Improved relationships, increased public awareness, and greater 
public policy influence were most commonly highlighted as social outcomes of each case’s work. 
For example, in a province-wide webinar, the CWB listed its top achievement as “the 
development of relationships/partnerships with diverse watershed stakeholders” (Polis Project on 
Ecological Governance, 2012). Environmental change was influenced through activities such as 
restoration projects (all cases but the NWC), agriculture sustainability programing (CWB, 
OBWB) and sewage infrastructure grants (OBWB). Quantitative measurement of environmental 
change was not always directly attributed to each case’s actions; however, this was not expressed 
in interviews as a detriment to a case’s legitimacy.  
Substantive output and performance legitimacy were consistently connected across the 
cases. The following remark emphasizes the connection of these two types of legitimacy showing 
that it is not enough for the NWC to achieve its objectives, but that those objectives must be 
morally desirable and effectively and efficiently achieved.  
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There's been some habitat tinkering that's gone on. But really, it's just fiddling at the 
margins. And depending on somebody's interest, they might choose to be involved in 
that, or aware of it. Other people, like me, decided that other things were more 
important…it [legitimacy] would therefore be about effectiveness. Does this have a 
mandate that will actually let it do something to influence the course of events, or is it 
just tokenism? Is this just harmless, busy work to keep people from annoying the 
courts (Interview 62, NWC, non-government actor)? 
For the NWC, such a statement reflects the challenges the body faced in producing output that 
would lead to environmental change (one of the reasons the collaboration dissolved). The 
capacity of each case was also used in legitimacy judgements across all cases (problem-solving 
legitimacy). The ability for a collaboration to bring various actor groups together, conduct 
research, manage and plan for water resources, make recommendations, leverage funding to 
attain additional resources, or provide support to other groups were particularly noted for all 
cases. To illustrate, SLIPP facilitated coordination across government departments and the NWC 
case allowed local First Nations who were socially and culturally impacted by water flow controls 
by industry to sit at the same table with the aluminum corporation, AlCan. In both cases, it was 
the action of working together that eventually led to improved communication among parties and 
subsequent output from the collaboration and spin-off initiatives. The following quotation relative 
to the NWC echoes this sentiment: 
The process of sitting down and talking with each other about how we are going to do 
business for two years was huge; we gained some respect and perspective for each 
other... One of the greatest accomplishments of the NWC – when we started Cheslatta 
and AlCan wouldn’t even sit in the same corner of the room together and when we 
ended they were in two different business relationships (Interview 67, NWC, First 
Nations representative). 
Thus, legitimacy from results is a product of capacity along with the actual production of results.  
Finally, science-based output from all cases was also noted as a form of technocratic 
legitimacy. For example, the OBWB supported research on endocrine disruptors (e.g., Steeves & 
Brett, 2014), which was utilized by municipal governments such as the City of Vernon to inform 
the city’s Liquid Waste Management Plans (Huang, 2014). The production and use of science-
based knowledge was present for all the cases producing legitimacy through objective science in 
connection with the technical nature of water governance. This is evidenced by the number of 
scientific studies produced by each case, which included water quality monitoring data, annual 
water flow and temperature studies, bathymetry mapping, and water use trends.  
1.5.3 Legitimacy Types Related to Institutional-Setting 
Legitimacy types related to institutional-setting stem from the presence of or adherence to 
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Within each case, legitimacy types related to institutional-setting presented as rule or 
contract legitimacy. First, rule-based legitimacy for each case is still in its infancy. Observed 
reasons for this infancy include the lack of institutionalization of collaboration as a model of 
governance through provincial legislature or regulation and the advisory or non-regulatory nature 
of each case. Of the five cases, the OBWB is the collaborative body that holds the most legal-
based and formal legitimacy due to supplementary letters of patent mandated under the 
Province’s Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act (Province of British Province of British 
Columbia, 2015).  
These supplementary letters patent, they give us legitimacy - it is a legislated thing so 
automatically we are seen as something better - not more credible necessarily - but 
more entrenched than a volunteer organization (Interview 3, OBWB, board member). 
Such sentiment was expressed by both OBWB interviewees and interviewees connected to other 
cases as well as those with government with multi-case knowledge. However, even though the 
OBWB has legislated taxation power, they do not hold any regulatory authority.  
In the absence of legitimacy through provincial legislation, the other cases utilized different 
institutional tools that helped develop legitimacy. Examples include, registering as a society or 
charity (LWA, CWB) and having local government pass bylaws for taxation purposes (SWC) or 
to mandate a bodies’ advisory role to local government (LWA). Each of these different 
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legitimizing tools are formally documented as legal contracts or agreements and are shared on the 
websites of each case (with the exception of the NWC, which did not have an online presence). 
All of these tools are also referred to within the meeting minutes of each case.  
The recent introduction of the provincial Water Sustainability Act (Province of British 
Columbia, 2014), also has led to speculation about the future legal development of CWG bodies. 
Such action was anticipated by some to help create a sense of institutionalization for CWG: 
It will enable local governments and community-based organizations (such as the 
Lake Windermere Ambassadors) to contribute to decision-making in our Columbia 
Valley homewaters (Hubrecht, 2015). 
Similarly, the use of a taxation bylaw by government to fund a collaboration versus annual funds 
alone helped institutionalize the SWC by extension of the established legitimacy of local 
government. SWC’s ability to secure a parcel tax funding model through the Columbia Shuswap 
Regional District (CSRD), guaranteed the SWC another five years of existence allowing it to be 
seen as more of an initiative embedded within the CSRD: “taxation will create a feeling of 
permanence and sustainability versus an annualized model where it is, ‘are we alive again’” 
(Interview 59, SLIPP/SWC, government member)? Stability by support through a local bylaw is 
thus allowing the SWC to focus on broader efforts that are not dictated by annual demands for 
funds or results.  
Administrative formalities (e.g., documented meeting minutes, professionalism of 
meetings) and the documentation of procedures and roles and responsibilities (e.g. terms of 
reference, strategic plans) were also observed to provided formal and contract legitimacy for all 
cases. For example,  
The [OBWB] Water Governance Manual – what it did is it spelled in black and white, 
not only what their relationship was – it was written down and could easily be referred 
to – but it also spoke to the protocols of the chairs of the respective groups of the 
Council and the Board and how they would interact and work on different issues. That 
settled everything down. So, once that governance manual defined some of the 
operational and working parameters of the Council, much of the concerns of the 
Board, I felt, disappeared (Interview 91, OBWB).  
Contract legitimacy, as such, helps ensure a body is not a threat to the interests of those involved.  
1.5.4 Legitimacy Types Related to Social Acceptance or Consent 
Legitimacy types related to social acceptance or consent stem from social or cognitive norms as 
sources. Table 2.12 summarizes the findings related to these legitimacy types. 
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Cognitive legitimacy, conveyed as a sense of need for a body to solve complex water 
resource problems, was most frequently discussed in newspapers and interviews across all cases 
as a form of social acceptance. Notably, the urgency of water issues such as degraded water 
quality or scarcity, departmental silos concerning water management and policy in the federal and 
provincial government, the complexity of overlapping jurisdictions responsible for water, the 
changed capacity of provincial and federal government departments to provide action on water 
issues alone, the fear of environmental deterioration as a result of not taking action, and the 
popularity and use of collaboration in other watersheds contributed to this sense of need. Crises, 
such as seasonal drought, in all cases but the LWA, were particularly important in establishing 
this sense of need, which help justify a collaboration’s establishment, maintain its legitimacy, and 
motivate ongoing participation in and action of a case. For example, with SLIPP/SWC, algae 
blooms in 2008 and 2010 led to local newspaper headlines such as “Shuswap Lake ‘Stewardship 
Council’ Needed Now!” (Nadeau, 2010), which illustrate the popular sense of need for the body. 
Similar sensationalism was noted for other bodies as well with media stories about salmon 
needing to be put in pails and trucked up river in the Cowichan Watershed as well as media 
attention in the Okanagan Watershed about the threat of invasive species (e.g., zebra mussels), 
which respectively helped reinforce the value of the CWB and OBWB. 
Social identity legitimacy types developed when qualities of each case aligned with the 
beliefs of those judging the different collaborative bodies. Commonly identified beliefs across all 
cases included the idealization of collaboration as a way to solve common resource problems, 
provide environmental protection, localize ownership or responsibility for resources, value water, 
and act cooperatively. However, not all actors in each case prioritized the same values. To 
illustrate, the project leading up to the LWA was originally established by Wildsight, an ENGO 
that is commonly known for its strong environmental ethic lobbying for conservation on various 
issues. The association of LWA with Wildsight led some actors to support the LWA by extension 
and others to judge it as being too biased towards environmental protection even after Wildsight 
stepped back from leadership and coordination roles. 
The Ambassadors were originally under the wing of Wildsight… which was a good 
thing. But outside it is perceived as very left-wing and tree hugging by a large part of 
the community and this has divided the community’s opinion [of the LWA] 
(Interview 4, LWA, resident). 
For the LWA, the perception of bias had both a legitimating and delegitimating value, indicating 
a need for impartiality to gain widespread public acceptance. 
Another way a collaboration may be legitimized is through the pragmatic benefit provided 
to the evaluator. Pragmatic legitimacy from a case’s direct value to an actor group was most 
commonly expressed by industry participants in the CWB, OBWB, and NWC cases. 
Collaborating helped industries meet their responsibilities to consult, communicate, or work with 
local community through expectations of corporate social responsibility, or through the protection 
of water for capital gain purposes. For example, “[The CWB] provides social license because by 
[sharing] the way that I manage the weir and the river, Catalyst, therefore gains the respect of all 
other stakeholders which is huge (Interview 9, CWB, industry).” The self-serving value of 
collaborating can therefore help justify its existence and different sector’s participation within a 
collaboration.  
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Legitimacy as social acceptance can also be expressed as action. Willing participation in 
each case was the most dominant action-based way to show consent internally. General 
community awareness or consent of a case indicated social acceptance in a range of ways 
(expressed consent, external, social, and popular approval legitimacy). At one end of the 
spectrum, active support groups were present for all the cases that advocated for the body 
(expressed consent legitimacy). For example, in the Shuswap Watershed, ENGOs such as the 
Shuswap Environmental Action Society and the Shuswap Water Action Team were outspoken 
groups that worked to rally public support for SLIPP and the subsequent creation of the SWC. 
The act of financing or providing resources for a body can also indicated expressed consent. Both 
community support and funding may also be tied together, particularly when grant funding 
requires evidence of community support for an organization. For example, the LWA requires 
documented community support for Columbia Basin Trust funding. Observed actions by the 
OBWB, CWB, SLIPP, and the LWA that helped gain such community support included adding 
the objective of public engagement and education to collaborative goals and a neutral 
unauthoritative positioning. Even if the primary goal of a body does not require public education 
it helped build a positive social image. Similarly, when the cases were unbiased and lacked 
authority they were able to gain social acceptance through the development of positive, non-
regulatory relationships with the public. For example, comments such as “as an organization we 
can support accurate water quality monitoring, but we do not want to see this group get an 
enforcement and remediation power (Interview 97, SLIPP/SWC, civil society)” were present as 
concerns for all cases except the NWC. However, this lack of authority along with the absence of 
formal electoral procedure meant that parliamentary and compliance legitimacy were not found to 
contribute to the cases’ legitimacy. 
At the other end of the spectrum of social acceptance within the community is no action at 
all, i.e., acceptance through the act of doing nothing or being unaware of the benefit provided by 
the collaboration. For example, for almost four decades the OBWB provided Eurasian Milfoil 
management. Some within the OBWB believe that this service is taken for granted by the public 
and only with the removal of the service, would the public realize the program’s and by extension 
the OBWB’s value. For example, 
Does the layperson know if they go to the beach that it is the OBWB with the milfoil? 
Not really - it is something that has to be done to enhance tourism and keep beaches 
clean… it is about appealing to the public (Interview 52, OBWB, resident). 
This underacknowledged action demonstrates how the OBWB has gained acceptance as an 
engrained or institutionalized body that is taken for granted in the community. This taken-for-
granted sense of value acts as a source of unexpressed action-based external approval, social 
identity, and cognitive legitimacy. 
Additionally, external and popular approval legitimacy were apparent through the action of 
other watershed bodies mimicking another collaboration’s process or activities (e.g., Columbia 
Lake Stewardship Society modeled after the LWA (Flynn, 2013)), media recognition (e.g., 
frequency of publications, positive news stories) and by proxy of the re-election of regional 
district and municipal government politicians involved within the cases. The ability for each case 
to effectively communicate their action in lay language was seen as pivotal to gaining these 
legitimacy types. For example, the OBWB has been particularly successful in gaining public 
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awareness and support for their work through this approach using media campaigns such as 
‘Don’t Move a Mussel’ to stop the spread of zebra and quagga mussels: 
I think the OBWB has got on to a really good issue here that has a lot of public 
support. The public awareness has gone sky-high on it and people are writing letters, 
and councils that were previously uninformed are writing letters to the senior levels of 
government (Interview 20, OBWB, regional government). 
Such communication effort is documented in the form of media coverage and within the meeting 
minutes of all the cases. It is also observable as communications or public relations committees 
within the CWB, LWA and NWC. Effort to promote and build a positive image of the work of 
the organization can then reinforce the local value of the body.  
1.5.5 Legitimacy Types Related to Individuals 
Legitimacy types related to individuals are sourced from the value different individual people or 
groups provide a governance body. Table 2.13 summarizes the findings related to these 
legitimacy types. 
Table 2.13: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Individuals by Case 
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The involvement of certain individual people or organizations helped each case gain 
legitimacy by enhancing popular approval, the willingness to participate by different sectors, and 
by providing additional resources through individual contributions or access to different funding 
options (e.g., involvement of First Nations allows for Aboriginal-specific funding). Notably, the 
involvement of past federal or provincial ministers (CWB, OBWB), wealthy civil society actors 
(LWA), experts with relevant skill-sets (CWB, OBWB), or organizations with already established 
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credibility (all case) contributed positively towards judgements of the collaborations. For 
example, the participation and leadership of the Fraser Basin Council (FBC) in SLIPP/ SWC 
contributed to both positive and negative judgements of the case: “I am more in favor of the 
council with the Fraser Basin Council being there because they have some professional 
expertise... [that] has brought some common sense back to the table” (Interview 70, SLIPP/SWC, 
local government) and “ I was critical of the FBC… in that they are supposed to be neutral 
facilitators of the process and I thought they were getting too involved” (Interview 12, 
SLIPP/SWC, local government). Therefore, the positive or negative judgement towards an 
individual entity can transfer to a collaboration depending on their involvement (or lack of). In 
addition, across all of the cases, individual participants helped personalize each collaborative 
body allowing for a personal connection to be made with each collaboration. For First Nations 
actors, this relationship was commonly discussed in interviews: 
Going to that group of people… having [that] guy... up there. When you see him from 
fifty feet away you have different thoughts, but then you get talking to him and he just 
pulls you into the group (Interview 72, First Nations). 
However, having unfriendly or disrespectful people or positional organizations involved also 
subtracted from perceptions of legitimacy by some actors. 
It's all about people to make this work. I would say that applies whether you're talking 
First Nations or not. You will find that some people - and they can be on various sides 
or various issues - but they just are poison in the group (Interview 5, provincial 
government). 
Individuals who challenged the organization and created disdain for the collaborative process 
were commented on in 15 of the 99 interviews from all cases but the LWA. Conversely, positive 
perceptions of the role individual participants and groups play for a collaboration were reported in 
50 of the 99 interviews. Such sentiment, while commonly referenced in interviews, did not 
materialize as strongly within the documents reviewed. Exceptions include a public opinion piece 
in the media that called for the removal of the public representative on the SWC on the basis that 
they had an anti-business bias (Cunliffe, 2014) and meeting minutes across all cases that discuss 
potential participants who should be invited to participate. 
Participants’ or staffs’ educational credentials or scientific or strategic-based intelligence 
also helped establish expertise legitimacy. Involvement of experts in ways such as participation 
on a case’s technical advisory committee, as exemplified with the OBWB and CWB, made it 
more difficult for laypeople to disagree with the premise or direction of an organization. 
The technical nature [of the OBWB]… a lot of deference is given to that expertise and 
the fact that our executive director has a PhD - there are credentials that go into it that 
lend weight in a way that it is harder for Joe Schmo to say… ‘this is wrong’” 
(Interview 89, OBWB, municipal government). 
In sum, who is involved and the abilities they bring to a collaboration can justify or influence 
legitimacy judgements towards a collaborative body.  
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1.6 Discussion 
The following offers observations on the application of the conceptual framework to CWG 
legitimacy and on the nature of CWG legitimacy. First, the use of the broad conceptual 
framework demonstrates the value of considering the array of legitimacy types in empirical 
settings. Five observations concerning the different legitimacy type groupings follow:  
• Sources of legitimacy related to ideal practice are formed from a mixture of norms that are 
used in different ways within legitimacy judgements. These norms relate to process, 
structure, focus, and values that are commonly discussed in the collaborative governance 
literature as necessary governance qualities (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; 
Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). While these norms were frequently 
discussed in each case, how they were assumed and actually delivered supported, subtracted 
from, or were not factored into legitimacy judgements. Thus, how these norms are 
actualized matters when assessing legitimacy empirically. For example, inclusive process 
both contributed to and subtracted from legitimacy judgements both within and across the 
cases. It is not adequate to simply state a source of legitimacy, how it is used in legitimacy 
judgements must be qualified. 
• Output and social improvements are currently used in lieu of demonstrable environmental 
improvements as legitimacy sources; this could create challenges for collaborations as they 
age. Examples of such sources include improved community relationships and the 
production of projects and programs. The extent to which each case is able to produce 
environmental welfare or justice improvements remains to be seen. Even though all cases 
have documented output, some of which includes environmental enhancements (e.g., 
foreshore restoration), there is limited evidence of the significance of this work on the 
overall ecological resilience of the area. Moreover, all cases worked to produce scientific 
data on different aspects of their watersheds (e.g., bathymetry mapping, water quality 
monitoring, water flow studies). While having this information can be essential for making 
informed decisions, if it is not utilized for such decision-making in a timely manner it will 
not contribute to legitimacy. This challenge links to Newig and Fritsch’s (2008) concern 
about collaborative governance effectiveness. Legitimacy contributes to effectiveness and 
effectiveness contributes to legitimacy. Likewise, the loss of one can also affect the other. 
In the future, if the output of collaborations does not lead to environmental improvements, 
output may not contribute to legitimacy. The degree to which collaborations are not faulted 
for this inability to create environmental change is likely dependent on the future 
environmental context and on the demands collaborations place on constituents.  
• The institutional-setting of CWG is still in development and so too are related legitimacy 
sources. All of the cases were dependent on the situated willingness of the state to help 
institutionalize CWG and in lieu of a broader legal framework, used formal rules and 
procedures to develop clarity around the roles and responsibilities of each case and its 
participants. Findings support claims by Bingham (2009) that an enabling legal framework 
for CWG legitimacy is still in development. The development of such a framework speaks 
to the policy and support roles governments can play for CWG bodies. Such support is 
noted by Lockwood et al. (2009) as a way to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative 
bodies through legitimacy. The legislation supporting the OBWB in combination with the 
case’s longevity and productivity are empirical evidence of this point.  
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• A sense of need to address water issues (cognitive legitimacy) dominates as the primary 
source of legitimacy in the form of gaining public willingness to support CWG development. 
In this sense, collaboration is accepted as the best option to address complex problems that 
cannot be easily solved (O'Leary & Vij, 2012). For all cases, the problem context within the 
watershed provided initial legitimacy to the collaborations as a solution to local issues. 
However, the dominance of this acceptance raises important questions about how to 
maintain legitimacy given longstanding uncertainty about collaborative governance’s ability 
to produce social and environmental welfare and justice (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005).  
• Individuals supporting and leading CWG bodies generate legitimacy. Legitimacy sources 
related to specific individuals and groups are worthy of consideration in future CWG 
assessments, especially since past assessments (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Orr, 2015; 
Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2012) have largely ignored this form of 
legitimacy. Notably, collaborative managers in all cases as well as the participation of 
certain individuals in the community (particularly those with past or present political status) 
helped either strengthen the process of the cases by adding expertise as well as time and 
effort or were able to help generate popular approval for the efforts of the CWG body.  
Second, it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of legitimacy sources for 
empirical assessments for the accurate evaluation of collaborative bodies to help determine ways 
to improve management and judge whether collaboration is a contextually suitable governance 
form. The findings offer insights into CWG legitimacy hybridity, circumstances of non-
legitimacy, conceptualization, and management. Concerning the hybridity of CWG legitimacy, 
broadly, each case experienced, albeit to different extents and using different sources, almost all 
the same types of legitimacy. This was surprising given significant contextual differences across 
the cases such as the geographic setting, objectives, and the age of each body. This finding not 
only confirms the hybrid nature of CWG legitimacy (Van Buuren et al., 2012; Wallington et al., 
2008), but also emphasizes the relevance of legitimacy types from across a range of legitimacy 
typologies to assess CWG legitimacy. Thus, unless a specific type of legitimacy is being 
researched (e.g., democratic legitimacy), empirical assessments should go beyond analysis using 
one legitimacy typology alone. This has implications for the study of collaborative governance 
literature, where to date researchers have tended to use only one typology (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2010; 
Baird et al., 2014; Hogl et al., 2012; Van Buuren et al., 2012). This is problematic because using 
one typology alone can exclude other sources of legitimacy from empirical analysis. To continue 
to address this problem, future research, should examine whether and in what contexts different 
legitimacy types matter more than others. While the intention of this paper was not to examine 
the interconnections of legitimacy types or typologies, assessments could also benefit from 
understanding how the groupings and legitimacy types interconnect. Notably, the findings 
indicated that some legitimacy sources relate to multiple legitimacy types even though the 
definitions of these types differ. For example, participation may provide both internal consent as 
legitimacy through social acceptance or may be democratically valued as an input norm. Authors 
such as Newig and Fritsch (2008) and Mayntz (2010) have begun examining some of these 
interconnections within individual typologies. Future research should supplement this work by 
exploring interconnections across typologies and legitimacy groupings. This is important to 
continue to build clarity around the terminology used to define each legitimacy type used in the 
literature. Such work may help understand how legitimacy types mutually enforce or contradict 
each other. 
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Next, although this paper focused primarily on the positive features of the five groupings of 
legitimacy types, each legitimacy type also has an opposing negative side (i.e., delegitimization 
or illegitimacy sources) (O'Kane, 1993). Within each type of legitimacy, different collaborative 
components could be positively identified in support of legitimacy, not mentioned, discussed as a 
value that did not provide legitimacy, or discussed because the opposite form was present. For 
example, inclusivity in collaborative practices often acts as a source of democratic input and 
normative legitimacy. However, it could also not be considered as pertinent to a body’s 
legitimacy, could be considered harmful to the establishment of legitimacy (i.e., too many actors 
at the table or implications for accountability), or the failure of a collaboration to be inclusive 
could be viewed against a collaborative body’s legitimacy. These variations emphasize on one 
hand the dynamic nature of legitimacy because a collaboration must continually establish, 
enhance, maintain and defend its legitimacy (Tilling, 2004) and on the other hand, the 
subjectivity and situated nature of the concept (Connelly, 2011). Moreover, the variations suggest 
that the legitimacy types themselves are neutral analytical constructs that do not infer or detract 
from legitimacy assessments; it is the discourse surrounding source norms that determines the 
situated value of each legitimacy type.  
How legitimacy is conceptualized in this paper also can be critiqued. Brinkerhoff (2005) 
and Marquez (2016) caution against the treatment of legitimacy as a concept that is so broad that 
it subsumes the analytic territory of other governance attributes (e.g., norms such as inclusivity, 
behavioural change, supportive legislation, trustworthiness, collaborative champions). When this 
happens, legitimacy as a concept can become complex and vague. This paper, with its 
comprehensive and in-depth treatment of legitimacy, runs this risk. A collection of legitimacy 
types from multiple typologies can validate so many social norms that the common discourse on 
what is and is not legitimacy may be misleading (O'Kane, 1993). Furthermore, a multitude of 
types can create contradictory understandings of what is necessary to establish, maintain, and lose 
social or political order (Marquez, 2016). Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider how empirically 
valuable legitimacy is when broadly interpreted. Marquez (2016) claims that the concept of 
legitimacy, when broadly interpreted, is not capable of being empirical utilized and thus a narrow 
interpretation of the concept, such as the justification for subordination to a dominant authority, 
should be used for empirical assessments. For CWG, this could mean narrowly conceptualizing 
legitimacy only as the relationships necessary for compliance with a body and its work. However, 
given the fact that many collaborations (including all the cases) do not have regulatory authority, 
such a definition could also be deemed irrelevant. Ultimately, the breadth of legitimacy 
interpretation chosen will depend on the researcher and the study context. To help with this 
choice, this paper offers a synthesis so that the many types of legitimacy can be collectively 
recognized. While narrower, more parsimonious decisions about how to interpret legitimacy and 
which sources and types to focus on for empirical assessments of specific bodies may be more 
manageable, this synthesis and empirical confirmation of relevant legitimacy types for CWG can 
help researchers clearly define what type(s) of legitimacy they are investigating and establish 
more precisely their conceptual parameters. 
Finally, this paper’s broad conceptual framework has utility as a strategic analytic tool to 
help develop and manage a collaborative body’s organizational capacity. Conceptualizing 
legitimacy as a strategic tool assumes actors can intentionally influence legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995), which involves increasing practitioner understanding of the nuances and methods to 
enhance, establish, maintain, or defend legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). To develop 
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such understanding, one option includes having open dialogue among collaborative governance 
participants about legitimacy, its variations, and its meaning from individual perspectives. 
Stemming from this deliberation would be the development of contextually-based methods to 
establish, enhance, maintain, or defend legitimacy. Ways legitimacy development can be 
undertaken, according to Brinkerhoff (2005) include mimicking structures, processes, or systems 
of the same form that are already legitimate; informing constituents of a body’s goals, activities, 
and outcomes in contextually desirable ways; or working to align values of a body with its 
community’s through celebration and symbols. Knowing which types of legitimacy need 
development can thus direct and enhance the effectiveness of strategic efforts. For CWG, where 
the stakes involved in managing water can have significant social and ecological effects, ensuring 
strategic efforts is vital. However, such management effort should be embedded within a larger 
strategic process that considers trade-offs between legitimacy types as well as other governance 
attributes (Sonpar et al., 2009). 
1.7 Conclusion 
One typology of legitimacy alone cannot fully evaluate CWG legitimacy. However, a common 
approach by researchers (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Van Buuren et al., 2012) to evaluate CWG 
legitimacy has been to use legitimacy typologies to evaluate legitimacy that only recognize ideal 
practice and results-based legitimacy types (e.g., Scharpf’s (1997) input and output typology, 
Trachtenberg and Focht’s (2005) procedural and substantive typology, and Bekkers and Edward’s 
(2007) input, throughput, and output typology). Using such typologies or others can miss 
recognizing other crucial legitimacy sources such as social norms, legal frameworks, or 
individual people or groups. If CWG legitimacy is to be managed within different contexts, all 
legitimacy sources must be identifiable. The ultimate aim of this paper as a result was to build a 
synthesized framework of legitimacy types to assist in the identification of the range of sources 
and demonstrate its use empirically. This undertaking was inherently complex as not only are 
multiple typologies grounded in different legitimacy interpretations examined together, but the 
contextual nuances of the cases also required consideration. This complexity represents a 
weakness in the framework that should be noted if it is used in other empirical settings without 
in-depth knowledge of the theoretical dynamics of legitimacy. 
 Multiple legitimacy typologies from a range of disciplines depict the legitimacy of 
collaborative bodies as a political, democratic, institutional, utility-based, legal, social, personal, 
and organizational phenomenon. Empirically, this means that a collaborative body may face 
opportunities for or challenges to legitimacy in a myriad of ways; for example, through calls for 
an elected or inclusive representation, through competition for grant monies or resources against 
other collaborative bodies, or through judgement by higher political authorities as to whether a 
body is worthy of specific responsibilities, funding, or authority for certain water management 
tasks. For both practitioners and researchers alike, clear specification is needed about what types 
of legitimacy are in question. Such consideration, for the better or worse of collaborative 
governance, could help tailor how legitimacy is managed for the governance of water resources.  
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2 Chapter 3 
 
Legitimacy Assessment Throughout the Life of Collaborative  
Water Governance 
2.1 Introduction 
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) and Mandell and Keast (2008) have proposed that collaborative 
governance bodies progress through various development stages as they evolve as organizations. 
At each stage in their lifecycles, collaborations may have a different focus, vary in their approach 
to governing, and produce different results (Provan et al., 1996). The legitimacy of any 
governance or organizational body, is also known to change as a body evolves through stages of 
development (Fisher et al., 2016). However, little is known about the dynamic nature of 
legitimacy as CWG bodies evolve.  
Legitimacy, broadly defined as justifiability or acceptance, is essential for the order, 
stability, and effectiveness of governance (Beetham, 2013). It forms from multiple sources and 
associated legitimacy types (Hanberger, 2003) that matter more or less to establish, maintain, 
enhance and defend an organization’s acceptability (Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004). Developing 
knowledge about which sources and types of legitimacy matter throughout the stages of a 
collaborative body’s development is important, given that the ways legitimacy is established and 
maintained may change as an organization evolves (Fisher et al., 2016). If management of 
legitimacy does not evolve with an organization, it may risk losing its legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995).  
Developing understanding of the dynamic nature of legitimacy is particularly valuable in 
settings where collaborative governance is frequently used. Water governance, a field commonly 
regarded as one of the most globally important for the sustainability of water (Lautze et al., 
2011), is one such setting; collaborative water governance (CWG) is increasingly utilized in 
Western contexts (Lubell, 2004). However, not only is little known about the dynamic nature of 
CWG legitimacy, but there is also inconclusive evidence as to whether all CWG legitimacy types 
and sources are known because existing CWG literature draws on various legitimacy typologies 
for empirical assessment (e.g., Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van 
Buuren et al., 2012). Since legitimacy is such a pivotal governance attribute, it follows that 
identifying which legitimacy sources and types matter at different development stages of a 
collaborative body will help practitioners strategically plan for legitimacy changes. Such 
knowledge will also help CWG practitioners make water governance more efficient and effective. 
This paper takes up the question of how legitimacy changes throughout the various stages 
of CWG. Using a multi-case study approach, it seeks (a) to identify which sources and types of 
legitimacy are most influential at different points in a CWG body’s development and (b) to gain 
insights into strategic actions practitioners can take to gain, enhance, maintain, or restore 
legitimacy for collaborative bodies. The paper makes a contribution to the literature at the 
intersection of legitimacy and CWG by adding an assessment of CWG legitimacy’s dynamic 
nature to existing CWG legitimacy scholarship (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Orr, 2015; Trachtenberg 
& Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2012).  
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2.2 Literature Review 
Collaborative governance can be defined as “the processes and structures of public policy 
decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, 
levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose 
that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). CWG bodies are 
the organizations that embody these processes and structures for decision-making concerning 
water. The purported benefits of collaborating (e.g., shared risks, increased likelihood of project 
success), along with the inability of traditional state institutions and mechanisms to solve the 
multi-jurisdictional and complex nature of many water problems, have led to its increasing use as 
a way to address water challenges (Innes & Booher, 2000; Sabatier, Focht, et al., 2005a). While 
many have studied collaborative governance dynamics, including their antecedents, structure, and 
performance variables (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 
2015; Innes & Booher, 2003; Margerum, 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006), there is still much that 
is unknown about how these dynamics evolve over time as a collaboration ages (Emerson & 
Nabatchi, 2015). 
One analytic framework that can help explore collaborative governance over time is 
“development stages”. Development stages are constructs that are presented in either a linear or 
cyclical (i.e., the biological metaphor of a lifecycle) schematic that detail an organization’s 
development and growth through time using a set number of stages. Although many variations of 
the model exist, they are similar in nature and thus choosing one is a semantic, rather than 
substantive, decision (Fisher et al., 2016; Lester et al., 2003). This paper adopts a combination of 
models based on an inductive-deductive interpretation of the collaborative governance bodies in 
question. It also draws on insights from organizational (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 
1995; Lester et al., 2003), small group development (e.g., Tuckman, 1965) and network (e.g., 
Mandell & Keast, 2008; Sydow, 2004) literatures. These literatures provide an important 
foundation because collaborative governance bodies mimic traits of public organizations (e.g., 
Edwards, 2016), small groups (e.g., Fraser Basin Council, 2015a), and inter-organizational 
networks (e.g., Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Presented below and in Figure 3.1 is the five-stage 
model used in this study. In this model, organizational development is a series of stages that each 
have identifiable organizational dynamics (e.g., structure, process, performance, output) that 
change over time. These stages, discussed in more detail below, provide a framework for 
understanding the different legitimacy challenges and opportunities collaborative governance 
bodies face as they evolve. Importantly, while the stages are presented linearly for simplicity in 
this model, the empirical experience may be more complex; for example, some groups may never 
move from one stage to another, some may skip stages, and others may face multiple crises and 
points of decline before ever moving to a new developmental stage. 
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Figure 3.1: Five Stages of CWG Development 
 
2.2.1 Collaborative Governance Development Stages 
2.2.1.1 Stage One: Establishment  
The establishment stage solidifies a body’s purpose, roles and responsibilities and organizational 
boundaries (Lester et al., 2003). For collaborative governance development, this means getting 
participants involved and working together towards a common goal, deciding on the direction of 
the body, and building positive organizational culture such as relationships, trust, and 
commitment (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Mandell & Keast, 2008). As such, the right 
combination of interpersonal (e.g., recognized interdependence), interorganizational (e.g., need 
for resource sharing, willingness to take risks) and systematic (e.g., history of collaboration and 
failed single-sector approaches and a sense of need for collective action) antecedents (Bryson et 
al., 2006) is needed to motivate people to work together for the establishment of a collaboration.  
2.2.1.2 Stage Two: Growth 
If acceptance is gained, then bodies enter the second stage – growth – where, in general, there is a 
formal organizational structure and an established identity with clear roles and responsibilities 
(Lester et al., 2003). In this stage, the focus is on building organizational sustainability and 
proving worth by working towards a body’s goals to demonstrate impacts (Avina, 1993). For the 
organizational sustainability of collaborative governance, Keast et al. (2004) emphasizes the need 
for government support and participant commitment in inter-organizational networks. However, 
many bodies remain at this stage due to resource challenges (Lester et al., 2003), intergroup 
conflict (Tuckman, 1965), and recognition challenges by external community members (Mandell 
& Keast, 2008; Sydow, 2004).  
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2.2.1.3 Stage Three: Maturity 
Eventually, when a body becomes self-sufficient with routine cooperation and procedures, focus 
may shift from expansion to maintenance of procedures and activities and it may be considered 
engrained or institutionalized within the community (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). For collaborative 
governance, this maintenance is acknowledged as the preservation of relationships (Vangen & 
Huxham, 2003) and momentum towards goals (Ansell & Gash, 2007); however, for CWG, 
consensus does not exist in the literature about whether bodies can or should be maintained in the 
long-term (Bingham, 2009; Kallis et al., 2009).  
2.2.1.4 Stage Four: Decline 
At any point, a body may face challenges that can cause organizational decline, leading to 
reinvention or dissolution (Stage 5) (Lester et al., 2003). In this sense, organizations may decline 
before they reach maturity. For collaborative governance, sources of decline that hinder a body’s 
ability to function may include the loss of belief in collaboration as an appropriate choice to 
address a problem (Holley et al., 2012b), inadequate sectoral representation (Parkinson, 2003), 
poor accountability (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bingham et al., 2008), power imbalances (Ansell & 
Gash, 2007; Moody, 2009), and the inability for collaborations to effectively and efficiently 
achieve their goals (Bevir, 2009; Kallis et al., 2009). 
2.2.1.5 Stage Five: Dissolution or Renewal  
Finally, when organizational decline becomes contextually too severe, bodies either end or use 
innovation to reinvent themselves leading to a new growth stage (Lester et al., 2003). This 
dissolution or renewal proves may happen at any stage within the development of an organization 
following a period of decline. In the context of collaborative governance, Emerson and Nabatchi 
(2015) discuss reinvention as adaptation when a collaboration must respond to changes that are a 
result of its own actions. Although this does not necessarily equate with renewal, it does suggest 
an iterative reflection and processes modification to fit a new reality.  
2.2.2 Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy 
Since CWG exists outside of the traditional decision-making structures (e.g., 
legislative/parliamentary processes), how its legitimacy is achieved is a question that is being 
actively explored through both in-depth assessment (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Edwards, 2016; 
Gearey & Jeffrey, 2006; Hard et al., 2012; Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom et al., 
2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2012) and general review as one of a 
number of important attributes for collaborative governance (e.g., Armitage et al., 2012; 
Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Innes & Booher, 1999; Lockwood et al., 2010; Lundqvist, 2004; Moss 
& Newig, 2010; Newig, 2012; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013). Collectively, these studies provide 
valuable insights into CWG legitimacy’s sources, challenges, and situated nature. Also, revealed 
within many of these in-depth and general reviews are a number of different legitimacy types that 
categorize legitimacy sources. For example, Orr (2015) uses rules, expressed consent, and 
justifiability of rules legitimacy types (Beetham’s (1991, 2013) typology) to assess CWG in 
Quebec, Canada. Baird et al. (2014), in contrast, used input and substantive legitimacy types 
(Trachtenberg and Focht’s (2005) typology) to examine CWG in the Canadian province of 
Ontario. However, what this literature collectively does not do is identify all relevant legitimacy 
types for CWG, which is necessary to understand the composition of legitimacy judgements.  
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A review of the broader legitimacy literature suggests that there are at least 22 different 
legitimacy types, not all of which appear in the CWG literature. These legitimacy types are based 
within different interpretations of legitimacy, where legitimacy is treated as a normative or 
empirical construct and the focus is on legitimacy as the justification or authority or as the 
justification of appropriate behaviour by any entity. This paper, acknowledges these differences 
in interpretations and suggests that a comprehensive approach is needed to consider all different 
legitimacy types regardless of theoretical background. The main reason for this approach is the 
documented awareness of the hybridity of both collaborative governance legitimacy (Van Buuren 
et al., 2012; Wallington et al., 2008) as well as collaborative governance bodies themselves as a 
structural mix of public and non-governmental organizational norms without authority (Borrás & 
Ejrnæs, 2011). 
Table 3.1. provides a summary of the 22 legitimacy types grouping together similar 
legitimacy types under a common sub-heading. These groupings are not entirely exclusive of 
each other as, for example, some forms of rules (identified as a type under institutional-setting) 
may be internal to a collaboration and dictate process. However, the groups represent a way to 
synthesize and organize the range of possible CWG legitimacy types. The ideal practice grouping 
concerns process-based variables, which are often associated with various democratic values. 
These legitimacy types stem from the ways governance occurs and are often based on normative 
assessment of how a certain form of governance should be carried out. In contrast, legitimacy 
related to results stems from the production and quality of output from a governance body. The 
technical nature of water governance, means that often such results are scientific in nature and 
focused on improving environmental welfare (Sabatier, Focht, et al., 2005a). Comparatively, 
legitimacy related to institutional-setting emerges from the existence and use of external formal 
rules and legal frameworks that provide stability and structure for a collaborative body. 
Legitimacy types associated with social acceptance represent legitimacy that is based on 
cognitive reasoning as it aligns with different discourses and values of a society (Bernstein, 
2004). Finally, legitimacy types related to individuals stem from the qualities or relationships of 
specific individuals or groups that generate support. A gap exists in the CWG literature in terms 
of verifying the applicability of all of these legitimacy types not only in general, but also specific 
to which types are more or less relevant at different CWG development stages. 
Table 3.1: Relevant CWG Legitimacy Types 
Grouping Legitimacy Type Definition 
Ideal 
Practice 
Democratic or non-democratic input: input 
(Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; 
Scharpf, 1997; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), 
procedural (Etsy, 2006; Lord & Magnette, 
2004; Suchman, 1995), democratic (Beetham 
& Lord, 1998; Etsy, 2006), principled 
(Bernstein, 2004), normative (Scott, 1995), 
justifiability of rules (Beetham, 2013), 
traditional (Weber, 1964), convention 
(Matheson, 1987) 
Observance of certain practices based 
on moral and ethical habits and norms; 
when democratic norms focus on the 
institutional and formal protection of 
rights and recognition of authority 
Deliberative (Etsy, 2006) Political dialogue engaging multiple 
perspectives 
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Grouping Legitimacy Type Definition 
Throughput (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007) Quality of rules and procedures 
Structural: structural (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 
1995); systematic (Etsy, 2006) 
Evaluation of categories and structural 
characteristics 
Universal: ideological (Easton, 1965), 
sacredness (Matheson, 1987), universal 
principle (Matheson, 1987) 
Conformity through values that are 
generalizable to a large population, 
e.g., religious or sectoral norms  
Results-
based 
Problem solving (Føllesdal, 2005) Capacity to produce specific output or 
outcomes that help solve collective 
problems 
Substantive output: output (Bekkers & 
Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Jachtenfuchs et 
al., 1998; Scharpf, 1997), substantive 
(Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), consequential 
(Suchman, 1995), results-based (Etsy, 2006) 
Measurable delivery of goals 
Performance (Beetham & Lord, 1998) Quality of results 
Technocratic (Lord & Magnette, 2004) The efficient and effective tackling of 
political challenges on the basis of its 
general problem-solving capacity 
Institutional-
setting 
Rule: legal (Bernstein, 2004), rational-legality 
(Weber, 1964), regulative (Scott, 1995), rule 
(Beetham, 1991, 2013), order-based (Etsy, 
2006), formal (Arnull, 2002) 
Measured on degree of obligation the 
rules imposed, the precision of the 
rules in defining authorized conduct, 
and the delegation of third parties to 
implement or interpret rules 
Contract (Matheson, 1987) Specified by an agreement (not a norm) 
in which power-holder and power-




Cognitive (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995) Cultural systems through values, 
beliefs, assumptions (fit within larger 
social system/ alternative will cause 
chaos) 
Pragmatic (Suchman, 1995) Whether activity benefits evaluator  
Social identity: identity (Jachtenfuchs et al., 
1998), sociological (Bernstein, 2004) 
 
Cultural connectedness 
Internal consent: internal (Boulding, 1967), 
participation (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998), 
expressed consent (Beetham, 1991, 2013) 
Sense of moral obligation leading to 
voluntary actions of participants 
communicating one’s commitment or 
acceptance 
External approval: external (Boulding, 1967), 
social (Arnull, 2002), identification (Beetham 
& Lord, 1998); popular approval (Matheson, 
1987) 
Extent authority generates common 
public acceptance 
Parliamentary (Lord & Magnette, 2004) Popular sovereignty through elected 
process 
Compliance (Føllesdal, 2005) Adherence to authority 
Individual-
based 
Personal qualities: personal (Easton, 1965; 
Suchman, 1995), personal qualities (Matheson, 
1987), charismatic (Weber, 1964) 
Characteristics of authorities 
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Grouping Legitimacy Type Definition 
Expertise (Matheson, 1987) Justification through the possession 
expertise and knowledge 
Extension: personal ties (Matheson, 1987), 
indirect (Lord & Magnette, 2004) 
Relationship that provides justification 
for power exchange or action 
 
 To help address this gap, scholars such as Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Fisher et al. (2016), 
Hybels (1995), Johnson et al. (2006), Pinkerton and John (2008), and Tilling (2004) provide 
frameworks that characterize the evolution of legitimacy over time in contexts other than 
collaboration. In this work, legitimacy is thought to progress through its own stages of 
development where it is established, extended, maintained, and defended (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990; Tilling, 2004). In these stages, legitimacy is established as acceptance within the socially 
constructed realities of relevant audiences, extended by demonstrating results and gaining local 
validity, maintained through reputation and routine maintenance that anticipates and prevents or 
forestalls potential challenges, and defended using various management techniques when an 
organization faces scrutiny to avoid resource loss. Speaking in more depth to the initial 
establishment and extension of legitimacy, Johnson et al. (2006) also add that legitimacy is 
forged first through innovation before becoming locally validated, diffused and then generally 
validated.  
Frameworks such as these suggest that legitimacy may develop in a similar manner to 
organizational bodies themselves. Empirical studies by authors such as Pinkerton and John (2008) 
and Fisher et al. (2016) also confirm the evolutionary nature of legitimacy in different contexts. 
Pinkerton and John (2008) shows how legitimacy for fisheries in western Canada is based first on 
scientific and regulatory legitimacy, second on political support, third, on moral validation, and 
fourth on the creation of new environmental values. Meanwhile, Fisher et al. (2016) explain how 
legitimacy of new technology ventures stems from conception, commercialization, and then 
growth. Overall, these studies suggest what the dominant legitimacy concerns may be as 
organizations evolve. Combining insights from these studies with the types of legitimacy relevant 
to CWG and the development stages in Figure 3.1 produces the conceptual framework shown in 
Table 3.2. This framework can be used to explore CWG legitimacy over time, and to reveal the 
types of legitimacy that matter more as collaborative bodies develop (Hanberger, 2003).  












• Liability of newness 
(body may lack support 
of traditions and 
norms); questioning 
what are they really 
saying and what will 
they really do? 




• Does the problem context 
indicate a sense of need for 
collaboration? 
• Do community members 
want to collaborate? 
• What conditions acted as 










Example concerns relevant to 
collaborative governance 
legitimacy 
• Community understands 
need for action on 
certain issues based on 
evidence (Pinkerton & 
John, 2008) 
• Characteristics of 
resource and 
community influence 
the support give to the 
creation of an entity 
(Pinkerton & John, 
2008) 
Growth Extension: 
• Proactive effort to show 
worth and gain support 
of constituents 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990; Tilling, 2004) 
• Establishing resource 
stability (Fisher et al., 
2016) 
• Locally validated 
(normatively and 
socially agreeable) 
process and structure 






• Are there adequate resources 
and government support? 
• Are roles and 
responsibilities for 
participants as well as the 
collaboration 
clear/respected? 
• Is the community generally 
aware or supportive of the 
collaboration or of taking 
action on the issue? 




• Is output regularly 
produced? 
Maturity Maintenance:  
• Ongoing routinized 
role; requires ongoing 
assurances of role and 
anticipation of 
challenges (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Tilling, 
2004) 
• Valued as a part of 
community (Pinkerton 
& John, 2008) 
• Independence from 
resource providers 
(Fisher et al., 2016) 








based, input, structural, 
systematic, substantive, 
consequential, formal 
• Is unity and cohesiveness 
evident within the 
collaboration? 
• Has substantive 
output/second or third-order 
results/outcomes been 
achieved? 
• Is there a sense of a well-
developed network within 
and with other (i.e., 
mentorship) 
watersheds/collaborations? 
• Is the collaboration self-
sustaining? 
• Does ongoing opposition 
towards the collaboration 
exist? 
Decline Defence: 
• Performance or value 
Internal/ participation, 
performance, moral, 










Example concerns relevant to 
collaborative governance 
legitimacy 
challenges that may 
impede output and 
stigmatize organization 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990) 
• Scrutinized externally 
(Tilling, 2004)  
cognitive,  challenges? 
• Can the collaboration take 
on new or different activities 
without criticism? 
• Do political debates 
challenge effectiveness? 






• Inability to react to 
challenges (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990) 
Extension: 
• Flexible reaction to 
legitimacy challenges 
(Tilling, 2004) 
• Exemplification and 
promotion of new 
desirable qualities 






• Is the collaboration able to 
adapt to changing social, 
political, or environmental 
challenges? 
• Have innovative processes 
been undertaken to extend 
or change the 
collaboration’s mandate? 
• Does the collaboration still 
remain relevant or favoured 
in the surrounding 
community? 
• Are there champions for the 
collaborative process that 
ensure the benefit of the 
collaboration still outweighs 
transaction costs of 
participating?  
2.3 Setting and Study Design  
2.3.1 Setting 
Since the 1990s, in the province of British Columbia, Canada there has been increasing use of 
collaborative models for watershed-based and local water decision-making (Brandes & 
O'Riordan, 2014; Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). Although the Government of BC still maintains 
constitutional authority to manage the province’s water resources, a desire by the Province to 
share water management responsibilities at the local level through collaborative models is 
reflected in BC’s new Water Sustainability Act (Province of British Columbia, 2014), which 
supports the use of alternative governance arrangements. Central to the emergence of CWG in 
Canada and BC are factors such as a public demand for drinking water protection, fish habitat 
protection, and water quantity and quality challenges, citizen desire to participate in public 
decision-making, conflict among water users, and limited government resources and silos 
(Nowlan & Bakker, 2010). In the BC context, these demands have led to the creation of many 
watershed or local CWG bodies that are all distinct because the province has adopted a one-size-
does-not-fit-all approach to watershed scale governance (British Columbia Ministry of 
Environment, 2010a). The reason for this approach is the significant environmental, cultural, 
social, and political diversity across the province. In particular, the diversity of First Nations 
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communities across the province, each with evolving water and watershed resource rights and 
differing opinions and involvement in the aboriginal treaty process, has made it difficult to 
prescribe one form of watershed governance (Brandes & O'Riordan, 2014). As a result of the one-
size-does-not-fit-all approach, BC’s CWG bodies have been established in different ways, at 
different times, and for different reasons, meaning that each body has faced different legitimacy-
related challenges and opportunities (Brandes & Curran, 2009).  
2.3.2 Study design 
2.3.2.1 Method: 
Guided by a constructivist paradigm (Creswell, 2009), a multi-case study design (Yin, 2009) was 
employed to examine legitimacy over the life of CWG bodies. The ability for case study methods 
to examine situated knowledge in areas requiring longitudinal assessment (Yin, 2009) and where 
exiting theory is inadequate (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 2006) justifies this approach as CWG 
legitimacy is context dependent and knowledge is lacking regarding its dynamic nature 
(Connelly, 2011; Johnson et al., 2006).  
2.3.2.2 Case Selection and Descriptions:  
Five CWG bodies operating at the watershed scale in the Canadian province of BC were selected 
as case-units for this study (see Table 3.3 for a summary). BC was an ideal setting for the 
exploration of CWG legitimacy because a range of collaborative governance models is used 
throughout the province in watersheds that are geographically diverse and face varying water 
problems (Brandes & O'Riordan, 2014). To select the cases, BC-based CWG bodies that are 
locally based and that self-identify as a multi-sector collaborative body were short-listed. From 
this list, cases were collectively selected to ensure representation geographically from across the 
province (see Figure 3.2) and to facilitate diversity among the ages and current development stage 
of the cases. The rational for this selection process relates to the popularity of CWG at the 
watershed or grassroots level (Leach, 2006) and variation among collaborative processes. 
Adhering to these criteria then allows general inferences to be drawn from the findings for locally 
or watershed-based CWG bodies.  
The following five CWG bodies were selected: the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the 
Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan 
Basin Water Board (OBWB), and the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap 
Watershed Council (SLIPP/SWC).  
• The CWB is a collaborative partnership between the Cowichan Valley Regional District and 
the Cowichan Tribes, which is supported by an inclusive stakeholder-based technical 
advisory committee. It aims to deliver a water management strategy dealing with water 
quality and quantity concerns and has done so thus far through action such as water quality 
monitoring, political advocacy and public educational efforts, and restoration initiatives. 
CWB represents a body still in the growth stage as it is still struggling to secure long-term 
funding and commitment by the provincial government for participation or action on water 
quantity issues.  
• The LWA is a voluntary citizen-led collaboration that was originally an environmental non-
governmental organization (ENGO) project. Their work includes monitoring water quality, 
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educating the public on water issues, conducting restoration, and advising local governments 
on the sustainability of development proposals. The LWA also is in the growth stage of its 
development as it is still depending on annual grants, struggling to maintain consistent 
participation, and continuing to build an identity separate from its parent ENGO, Wildsight.  
• The NWC represents a collaborative body that was open to all impacted actors effected by 
water flow diversions for an aluminum company (Alcan/RioTinto Alcan). Before the NWC 
dissolved in 2011, the group worked to address conflict among actor groups and make a 
recommendation about how to allocate funds to remediate water flow impacts. The body 
never matured before it started to decline and eventually dissolve due to challenges such as 
declining participation, stagnant leadership, and the failure of their recommendation for fund 
allocation to gain support for implementation by the BC Government.  
• The OBWB is the oldest collaboration in the province and represents a body that reached 
maturity, faced decline and was able to renew itself. It is the only CWG body legislated by 
the Province, which through supplementary letters patent binds together the three regional 
districts in the watershed to deliver water management responsibilities with taxation power. 
These responsibilities include sewage infrastructure granting and Eurasian Milfoil 
management along with a variety of public education, technical research-studies, and 
advocacy activities. The length of the OBWB (established 1968), the supportive 
institutional-setting and legal framework, and its general acceptance in the community all 
indicate the collaboration has matured. 
• SLIPP represented an interagency collaboration among governments that formed to 
coordinate agency responses to issues of water quality, recreational safety, and development 
impacts. After facing public controversy due to mandate misconception and funding 
challenges, SLIPP rebranded to the SWC in 2015 to continue addressing water quality and 
recreational safety concerns. Activities of SLIPP included water quality monitoring 
coordination among agencies, restoration and derelict dock removal, and public education. 
This body is now, after a period of decline, in the growth stage again and is continuing to 
work to prove its utility and calm public controversy. 
Together these bodies represent CWG that has formed and been structured in different ways and 
for various purposes at the local watershed level. Common characteristics among these bodies 
include their non-regulatory nature, their use of an inclusive structure and deliberation, and their 
focus on solving local common pool resource problems. Figure 3.3 depicts the development stage 
and experience of the five cases. Note that in Figure 3.3 the double lines for the OBWB and 
SLIPPSWC represent the notion that these cases have evolved and been renewed again after a 
period of decline. Also, because some cases (NWC and SLIPP/SWC) have skipped the maturity 
stage before entering the decline stage there is a line gap in the figure representing the stages they 
missed.  
 
Table 3.3: Case Description 
Trait CWB LWA NWC OBWB SLIPP/SWC 
Date Active 2010- 2009 -  1998-2011 1968- 2006- 
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Trait CWB LWA NWC OBWB SLIPP/SWC 
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Figure 3.3: Development Stage Progress of Each Case 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Data Collection:  
Data were generated from 99 semi-structured interviews and triangulated with a document review 
and personal observation from 2013 to 2015. To select interviewees, prior to and during the data 
collection process, relevant societal sectors were identified for each case and interviewees were 
sought from across each sector. The broad categories used to organize identified sectors included 
government (including First Nations government) and non-government interest groups that were 
either case participants (past or present) or non-participants familiar with the case (including 
collaborative managers and funders). Table 3.2 outlines the distribution of interviewees from 
across these sectors relative to each case. Interviewees that work across multiple cases are 
categorized in the BC-wide column of the table. Interviews were semi-structured, and focused on 
each case’s processes, results, legality, social acceptance, and the individuals involved. Interview 
questions focused on past, present, and future dynamics to conceptualize the evolution of each 
case’s legitimacy. The conceptual framework guided the design of the interview protocol. For 
example, regarding legitimacy at the establishment stage of a collaboration, interview questions 
focused on why and how the collaboration was formed and whether there were any barriers in its 
initiation. This allowed the antecedents affecting the initial legitimacy judgements towards each 
case to be identified. 
Interview selection was conducted using both purposeful and snowball protocol to include 
individuals from all relevant CWG sectors who were either knowledgeable about local water 
management or who were involved in CWG. Interview recruitment and delivery was conducted 
electronically, by phone, or in person by the first author. Interview data collection concluded 
when no new topics emerged or when all relevant actors were interviewed. All interviews were 
Stage: 
1 = Establishment 
2 = Growth 
3 = Maturity 
4 = Decline 
5 = Renewal 
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digitally recorded and then transcribed verbatim by either the first author or TranscribeMe, an 
internet-based transcription service. Member checking of transcripts provided verification of data 
(Carlson, 2010). 
To supplement the interviews, 656 documents were reviewed. These included newspaper 
articles, meeting minutes, government reports and letters, draft and finalized plans promotional 
material, emails, collaborative group websites and publications. Document identification occurred 
by word of mouth and internet searches. Online database or local community newspaper search 
engines were used to identify news articles that included the name of each collaboration. Finally, 
nine substantive personal observations took place at board and committee meetings and social 
events, BC-wide practitioner watershed conferences and public hearings. Observations also 
occurred during interviews and through watershed site-visits. Data collection concluded when 
subject saturation was established based on triangulation among interviews, document review, 
and personal observation (Charmaz, 2006). 
Table 3.4: Number of Interviewees by Role and Case 





Past or present participants 
(government, agriculture, 
environment, industry, 
academia, youth, property 
owners, local business) 
18 9 6 15 10  58 
Non-participant (same 
sectors as participants)  
3 3 3 1 11 3 24 
CWG managers (staff, 
facilitators, convenors) 
1 2 5 2 2  12 
Financial resource supporter 1 3 1    5 
Total 23 17 15 18 23 3 99 
2.3.2.4 Data Analysis: 
All data including reviewed documents, were coded using NVIVO 10. Qualitative analysis was 
primarily used to understand contextual meanings within the data. Coding was guided by the 
conceptual framework (Table 3.2) to identify patterns, themes, and relationships among the data 
both within and across cases. As a result, findings were initially deductive in nature; however, 
inductive insights from the data were also included to infer trends specifically about the nature of 
CWG legitimacy. Triangulation of sources and methods was used to validate findings that were 
discussed in the context of the same development stage within and across cases. Cross-case 
analysis was conducted on a case-by-case basis with consideration for longitudinal differences. 
For example, data pertaining to the establishment stage of each collaboration were compared 
together and contrasted to data pertaining to the other stages. Through this analysis some 
noteworthy differences were identified across the cases from times when cases were functioning 
within the same development stage. However, for the most part, legitimacy themes for each stage 
were relatively similar across the cases that had experienced that particular stage. Given this 
result, the development stages, instead of the individual cases, are used to present findings, noting 
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both case and cross-case themes when evident. Themes were identified by either the frequency or 
depth in which they appear in the data (Saldaña, 2009). Evidence (quotations and observation 
reflections) were then selected to illustrate the range of dominant themes. With the quotations, 
anonymity was preserved by withholding interviewee names and only sharing the sector and case 
with which each interviewee was associated if it would not identify the person. 
2.4 Results 
This paper uses the analytical paradigm of development stages to conceptualize where the 
establishment, maintenance, strengthening, or weakening of legitimacy takes place (and 
ultimately matters as an attribute) for CWG. To do so, dominant legitimacy sources and types at 
each development stage are presented by case (Tables 3.5-3.9) and selected themes are explored 
in more detail in the accompanying text. 
2.4.1 Stage 1: Establishment  
During Stage One of each case, the dominant legitimacy rhetoric stemmed from the willingness 
of community members to work together and the belief in CWG as a way to solve water 
problems. The most relevant audiences forming legitimacy judgements at this stage were often 
community members both involved with and external to the collaboration, collaborative 
conveners, and those providing resource support.  
Table 3.5: Stage 1: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence 




discourse: a water crisis 
creates a local sense of 




• CWB: critical river flow levels/drought 2008 
(Hunter et al., 2014) 
• LWA: public call for protection of Columbia 
River headwaters; perceived changes in 
aquatic plant growth and water quality 
(Leschied, 2011) 
• NWC: public concern about attempts for 
further industrial diversion of water by Alcan 
(i.e., Kemano I &II Projects) (Christensen, 
1996) 
• SLIPP: increased sewage discharge 
proposals, algae blooms, government agency 
silos, recreational boating accidents 
(Ecoscape Environmental Consultants, 2009) 
• OBWB: drought, presence of invasive 
species, inadequate sewage treatment  
Community readiness: 
willingness of 
community to work 
together; based on the 
benefit collaboration can 
provide for the greater 




• CWB: 2008 North American Indigenous 
Games create community unity  
• LWA: participation in LWA from diverse 
sectors (Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 
2010) 
• NWC: public rally against Alcan expansion 
and desire for forum to raise concerns 
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Sources of Legitimacy Relevant 
legitimacy types 
Evidence 
 (Christensen, 1996) 
• SLIPP: divers community participation in 
SLIPP public committees; media calls for 
action on development issues 
• OBWB: joint federal and provincial 
Okanagan Basin Study (Canada-British 
Columbia Consultative Board, 1974) calling 
for collaborative action by regional districts; 
history of collaboration in basin (e.g., 
regional library) 
 
Despite differences in the objectives of and community dynamics surrounding each case 
(Table 3.4 & 3.5), the perceived willingness of different sectors to work together served as the 
initial legitimating feature for all cases. Factors stimulating this willingness stemmed from the 
existence of prior cooperative or participatory work and a sense of need for collaboration. For 
example, in the Cowichan, drought in 2008 risked the ability of Catalyst Pulp and Paper (one of 
the region’s largest employers) to operate and detrimentally affected salmon fisheries, which 
particularly impacted the Cowichan Tribes. This challenge generated a sense of need, which was 
coupled with a positive experience of cooperation between the Cowichan Tribes and the CVRD 
to host the 2008 North American Indigenous Games: 
In the beginning, the dynamics in this community were set perfectly for it. In 2008, 
we had what were called the North American Indigenous Games just before the 
Watershed Board was formed. First Nations from all over North America came to the 
Cowichan Valley for competitions [and] the whole community participated. Cowichan 
Tribes were leading it, but there was a huge outpouring of volunteer help. There was a 
wonderful sense of unity built (Interview 69). 
The familiarity of community members with the benefits of multi-sector collaboration helped 
justify CWG as a viable option to address water problems.  
Both the potential for and actual crises played a particular role not just in creating policy 
windows to stimulate action, but also in emphasizing the sense of need for action to change the 
status quo. The following newspaper exerts emphasize this sense of collaborative need for the 
Shuswap and Lake Windermere: “Once again, we’re facing a large algal bloom that is like the 
canary in the coal mine… It points to serious problems in the Shuswap and Mara Lakes and the 
need for a Shuswap Watershed Council as recommended by SLIPP” (Brouwer, 2010 May 14) 
and “there was consensus (when the Lake Windermere project started) that if we were serious 
about protecting the health of our water, it needed to be a collaborative approach, not just 
something done by an environmental group” (Hubrecht, 2014 October 22). Policy windows such 
as these were seen in all the cases, in the form of environmental crises, concern for government 
silos, and conflicts among actor groups.  
Together this sense of need and the willingness to work together generated momentum at 
the beginning of each case. One particularly important action noted across all cases to help 
establish this readiness was the actual invitation and inclusion of relevant actors in initial 
planning discussions. This action was particularly important for gaining involvement and 
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legitimacy from First Nations and required upfront open communication and personal connection: 
“if you want to have First Nations involved, you have to have a conversation from the onset. You 
can't go halfway through and say, ‘Now, this is what we want to do. How would you like to be 
involved’” (Interview 24, CWB convenor)? For the CWB, First Nations engagement as a partner 
who assisted in structuring the initiative, helped ensure the Cowichan Tribes remained involved 
later on. Open and meaningful communication from the start is essential to establishing trust and 
building faith in a body.  
2.4.2 Stage 2: Growth 
Eventually, the initial sources that established a body’s legitimacy are no longer adequate and 
focus turns to the extension of legitimacy based on what collaborations actually do, how they do 
it, and the competency of leaders (Table 3.6). Such a focus is present in legitimacy judgements 
from a variety of audiences, including collaborative conveners, external community members, 
resource supporters, and participants at this stage.  
Table 3.6: Stage 2: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence 
Sources of Legitimacy Relevant 
legitimacy types 
Evidence 
Structure and process of 
collaboration: emphasis 
on thoughtful and clear 
procedures for collective 
learning, trust building, 
selection of participants, 
administrative practice 





contract, rule  
• Terms of reference or governance manuals of 
each body, meeting minutes, and observed 
behavior of board process at meetings  
Strong committed 
leaders that guide and 




• Interviewee comments across all cases positively 
identifying the program managers, staff, and 
chairs for their contribution to each body 
Established track record 
necessary to gain social 
acceptance among 
collaborative partners 
and within community; 
small-wins on non-
controversial science-








• CWB: eel grass removal, watershed tours 
• LWA: restoration at Kinsmen Beach 
• NWC: Science-based recommendation to NEEF 
to build water release facility at Kenney Dam 
• OBWB: milfoil management, Don’t Move a 
Mussel campaign, Water Wise program 
• SLIPP: derelict dock removal 
 
Focusing on process, inclusivity and slow deliberate practices that included learning about 
water issues and collaboration, trust-building, and the development of shared participant values 
were central to legitimacy judgements in each case. The following comments illustrate these 
legitimacy sources: “basically legitimacy stems from how we were set up” (Interview 14, CWB 
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participant); “they [OBWB] spent a lot of time doing that [i.e., educating participants] right 
upfront…it was kind of a lengthy process at the beginning, but it paid off in the long run” 
(Interview 85, provincial government employee); “there's a lot of relationship building at the start 
to get people to trust each other and work together…. [then] the really successful ones get things 
accomplished, people work together well, and they're committed to it” (Interview 5, provincial 
government employee, referring to CWG in general); and “we decided a long time ago that we 
need to keep reaching out and be open, transparent because it is also about building legitimacy 
and building good faith and not giving them [the public] the perception that there is anything 
threatening” (Interview 3, OWSC participant). Comments such as these speak to the normative 
development of structural, democratic, and non-democratic input legitimacy types.  
Interviewees in all cases often commented on the importance of strong leadership to help 
guide the collaborative organizations. Leaders most discussed in interviews were the 
collaborations’ chairs or program managers. Their charisma, relevant credentials, strong 
facilitation ability, or popularity due to their personal background all contributed positively to 
expanding the premise of a body’s legitimacy (i.e., via personal, charismatic, indirect legitimacy). 
For example, in the context of the OBWB, 11 of the 18 interviewees made comments such as 
“[He] was a very seasoned politician... he was certainly the person who put the Stewardship 
Council on the map, he was the person who helped create it and helped get it going” (Interview 
51, agriculture representative, OWSC). Similarly, such sentiment was also present in the context 
of SLIPP/SWC: “with… [their] energy behind it, we were able to initiate public meetings [and] 
grow some grassroots support for a more collaborative effort among the agencies, including non-
government organizations” (Interview 8, provincial government employee). Additionally, 
“having paid staff is also necessary to really get behind something and put in a comprehensive 
effort – volunteers can only do so much” (Interview 27, financial supporter, LWA). Paid staff can 
help get work done making the collaboration more stable and official. 
 Both participants and observers of each case also expected collaborative bodies to 
establish a track record through tangible and social output. Small projects such as SLIPP’s 
removal of derelict docks or the LWA’s restoration of a local beach were particularly commented 
on as ways to gain social acceptance and popular approval both with the general public and with 
supporters (funders) of collaborations. 
People will see the project as positive and that is the best bet for legitimacy. Avoid 
political issues for now. It is too new of a group and doesn't have the resources to take 
on the big political issues. Focus on what you can accomplish that is highly visible 
and build… over and over again until you can talk to the common person and they 
know exactly what you mean when you say "what do the Lake Windermere 
Ambassadors do?" Once you are at that point you get into the broader bigger 
discussions and tackle bigger issues (Interview 40, local business representative). 
Taking on small manageable projects allowed the case study organizations to prove their 
capacity to gain additional legitimating resources. For example, the Columbia Basin Trust, which 
supports the LWA through grants, evaluates grant applications on the ability of a body to produce 
tangible projects and the degree of community support. In addition, science-based output also 
acted as a source of legitimacy in each case through the objective credibility (e.g., technocratic 
legitimacy); examples include technical reports (e.g., 4Thought Solutions Inc., 2005; Canada-
British Columbia Consultative Board, 1974) and water quality monitoring reports (e.g., Ecoscape 
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Environmental Consultants, 2009; Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2015). Finally, social output 
such as relationship-building among participants and spin-off partnerships also reinforced 
legitimacy at this stage. For example, 
Networking, that is really what I got out of it... we have come up with research 
projects… and a lot of work around cattle and water quality working with the ranchers 
- that has all come through the OBWB. All those connections they are almost 
intangible, and they were expedited because of actually sitting there [at the OWSC] 
and hearing the concerns and saying "we impact that, or we can help there" (Interview 
44, industry representative, OWSC). 
Such social, technical, and project-based outputs were emphasized not only through interviews as 
a necessity for collaborative body acceptance, but also through regular documentation within 
meeting minutes, annual progress reports, and media releases.  
2.4.3 Stage 3: Maturity 
OBWB was the only organization to reach the maturity stage, which is demonstrated by the age 
of the collaboration (established in 1968) and its long track record of consistency in both its 
process and deliverables. This track record is recorded in four-decades worth of meeting minutes 
and progress reports, the resulting paper-based products act as evidence of the OBWB’s stability 
and consistency indicating maturity. Likewise, the institutional support of the OBWB through its 
legislated backing provides further evidence of maturity through the body’s sense of permanence 
that is generated from its long-term financial obligation to provide sewer infrastructure grants. 
From the OBWB’s experience, five key legitimizing features are apparent, which are represented 
by each row in Table 3.7. Relevant audiences making legitimacy judgements are primarily 
collaborative participants and their constituents.  
Table 3.7: Stage 3: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence 
Sources of Legitimacy Relevant 
legitimacy types 
Evidence (OBWB only) 
Consistent returns  Substantive output, 
results-based  
• OBWB milfoil management program and 
sewage infrastructure grants 
Expected process Non-democratic 
input 
• Meeting minutes, regular meetings, annual 
audits and reports 
Meaningful relationships Non-democratic 
input, throughput 
• Long-term partnerships, partnership programs 
(e.g., UBC-O research chair position, 
groundwater monitoring) 
Relevant in changing 





• Projects in response to relevant/popular issues, 
e.g., Don’t Move a Mussel Campaign, 
Waterwise program 






• Supplementary letters patent outlining OBWB 




From the track record of results, the actual consistent delivery of output is one of the 
foremost ways of maintaining legitimacy for the OBWB:  
In considering the work of the water board over the last 45 years, Sears noted it has 
much to celebrate. Its Sewage Facilities Assistance Grants to local governments in the 
valley, which began four decades ago, have greatly improved water quality (Kelowna 
Capital News, 2015). 
The ability of the OBWB to demonstrate change over time shows the impact of their work thus 
showing their effectiveness. Likewise, predictable process also helped build a sense of 
permanence for the OBWB: 
I think just that staying power is probably the thing that will give it the most 
legitimacy and recognition... We are always there, we are always working forward, we 
are always developing new initiatives, people know that we are working on things – 
they don't necessarily understand where it is and how it fits in, what we have done, 
and where we are going. It is the consistency – we meet month after month – if you 
miss a few meetings you know it is going to be there on the second Thursday of every 
month that it is going to be there (Interview 91, OBWB staff). 
In this sense, the OBW has built a sense of permanence through its process. This permanence is 
also reinforced by observed regularity and transparency of checks and balances such as annual 
auditing and reporting and meeting minutes. While some of these habits are already present in the 
cases not in this stage, they were central features instilling stability in the OBWB case.  
Next, the presence of meaningful relationships not only among the current individuals 
involved, but also as historically engrained organizational relationships have helped the OBWB 
ensure continuity. One way the OBWB does this is by establishing long-term partnerships with 
organizations like the University of British Columbia in the Okanagan (UBC-O) to continuously 
support local water research. As well, the ability of the OBWB to develop projects that have a 
direct impact on issues of popular concern such as invasive species control and water 
conservation, while also maintaining their other main programing helped keep the body from 
becoming stagnant. For example, “we all saw how bad the drought was… going forward the 
[OBWB] wants to ensure it plays a positive role, helping develop proper resources to assist 
Okanagan communities” (Morning Star Staff Reporter, 2015). Remaining relevant thus plays a 
role in legitimacy maintenance. 
Finally, the OBWB’s experience also emphasized the value of acting without regulatory 
authority to allow for friendly relationship-building across and with different sectors: 
I don't see what additional authority would do for us. I feel really strongly that we're a 
collaborative organization and it's very toxic to have regulatory responsibilities if 
you're trying to be a collaboration organization. If you're trying to get everybody 
together to work in the same way and figure out what your joint problems are and how 
we are all going to spend the money, then have that same board be the one saying, 
"You broke the rules; we're penalizing you," then you automatically set up internal 
conflicts within the collaboration. You can't be holding the carrot and the stick at the 
same time (Interview 90, OBWB staff). 
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This idea of CWG being non-regulatory was also supported by the majority of collaborative 
managers and government interviewees in the other four cases asserting that CWG bodies may be 
able to best achieve their goals through voluntary measures. 
2.4.4 Stage 4: Decline 
The belief of a body’s legitimacy by any audience may decline at any point during its 
development. In the data, a collaborative organization’s loss of legitimacy was directly tied to 
questions of its relevance. Internally, this questioning was linked to declining participation, and a 
loss of staff. Externally, open resistance within the community, the loss of funding or resources, 
and questions of stagnancy contributed to decline. 
Table 3.4: Stage 4: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence 
Sources of Legitimacy Relevant 
legitimacy types 
Evidence (NWC, OBWB, SLIPP) 
Relevance External approval, 
social identity, 
cognitive  
• NWC: Open opposition (e.g., NWC radio 
interview, letters of opposition), decline from 
20+ participants to six at the final meeting, loss 
of FBC as program manager 
• SLIPP: Open opposition in newspapers (e.g., 
Cunliffe (2014)) and by bodies such as the 
Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association 
• OBWB: Stagnant mandate focusing only on 
sewage infrastructure grants and milfoil 
management 
 
For the NWC, SLIPP, and the OBWB, mandate challenges questioning their relevancy 
manifested in different ways. For the NWC, its singular objective of making a recommendation 
for the allocation of NEEF money was achieved by 2001 with the recommendation that a water 
release facility at the Kenney Dam be built to address downstream issues (Nechako 
Environmental Enhancement Fund, 2001). However, after making this recommendation the NWC 
did not evolve or refocus its efforts. This led to challenges as described by a local government 
official: 
You have to be able to address the issues that are pertinent at that time... So, when the 
water release facility was determined as not what they [NEEF] wanted… you want to 
steer the ship in another direction when you have gone as far as you can with one 
issue… What happens is that if you go on one issue for too long, the people who 
initially championed it move on and then you have to get the buy-in of the new 
generation… the watershed council wasn’t able to do that (Interview 23). 
In a similar way, the OBWB’s narrow focus on milfoil management and sewage infrastructure in 
the early 2000s challenged its relevance in a positive way leading to its renewal. In contrast, 
SLIPP’s broad mandate initially allowed what some external and internal to the process framed as 
“agenda creep” or devolution of provincial government mandate leading to open resistance and 
negative press against the body. This negative perception was particularly held by the economic 
development sector and lakefront homeowners present within and outside of the collaboration: 
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“we are already paying for this provincially and federally and now they are asking the local 
taxpayer to pay on top of it... why are we funding this when it is a provincial and federal 
jurisdiction already (Interview 12, SLIPP/SWC, local business owner)?” These negative 
judgements were vocalized in local media resulting in the loss of social legitimacy and popular 
approval by some local audiences.  
 Also, connected to the relevance of mandate is the ability for a body to produce results 
and secure funding to do so. For the NWC, this dynamic created a challenge as the board aged 
and results were not achieved: “as the council moved forward and years passed and we really 
didn’t see any difference in the environment and the river never changed, then the awareness 
began to fade” (Interview 62, environmental sector representative, NWC). Similar concern has 
also been expressed for the SWC with a narrower mandate focused mainly on water quality 
monitoring, which may limit the body’s ability to produce tangible results. Both collaborations 
need to produce results relevant to the current context to be deemed worthy of their management 
costs. 
Decline was also mentioned in interviews as a possible future issue for the LWA and CWB 
in connection to funding. Both cases rely heavily on external grant funding, which may create 
stability challenges as grant agencies “are typically hesitant to fund projects by the same body of 
the same kind over and over again as this may be an indication that the project is not achieving its 
objectives” (Interview 81, LWA, financial resource supporter). Consequently, if a collaboration 
lacks funds, process and output may be challenged compromising the body’s legitimacy and its 
development.  
2.4.5 Stage 5: Dissolution or Renewal  
Three of the five cases experienced dissolution (NWC) or renewal (OBWB and SLIPP/SWC). 
Language used in interviews and newspaper articles across these cases that indicated this stage 
included words such as “demise,” “completion,” “transition,” “revival,” “successor,” or “re-
organization.” Dominant audiences included the general public and internal participants 
depending on the issue.  
Table 3.9: Stage 5: Legitimacy Factors and Evidence 
Sources of Legitimacy Relevant 
legitimacy types 
Evidence (SLIPP/SWC, OBWB, NWC) 
Refocusing or separating 




• NWC: failure to refocus mandate 
• OBWB: broadened mandate and creation of 
Okanagan Water Stewardship Council to 
advise board  
• SWC: narrowed goals (Shuswap Watershed 
Council, 2014) 
Communicated 




• OBWB: focusing event (Okanagan 2003 
drought and wildfires) and 2004 workshop 
Running on Empty calling for expanded 
OBWB mandate 
• SWC: Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning 
Process (2014) indicating water quality 
issues and public engagement meetings and 
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Sources of Legitimacy Relevant 
legitimacy types 
Evidence (SLIPP/SWC, OBWB, NWC) 
survey across Shuswap to identify continued 
water concerns (Shuswap Watershed 
Council, 2014) 
Capacity to take on new 
roles 
Performance  • OBWB: adjustment to supplementary letters 
patent; expansion of staff and development 
of the OWSC  
• SWC: Columbia Shuswap Regional District 
(2015) providing taxation authority 




• NWC: failure of NWC to change executive 
board membership  
• OBWB: new executive 
• SLIPP/SWC: shift to the FBC as program 
manager 
 
For the NWC, there was no consensus in the interviews regarding the single most cause of 
the body’s disbanding. Common reasons cited included (a) that its purpose of making a 
recommendation had been achieved, (b) that declined participation made it unrepresentative, (c) 
that stagnant mandate decreased its relevance, and d) that the unchanging membership of the 
executive board made it unaccountable. For example, “they felt that their job was done, their 
mandate had been finished” (Interview 63, resource supporter, NWC), compared to “it became a 
grinding machine that didn't have any traction… so it became kind of repetitive” (Interview 87, 
environmental sector representative, NWC) and “it was no longer broadly based on the 
community perspective because other communities were fleeing the process....when you see the 
process go from 20 odd members to six, that is a red flag (Interview 80, collaboration manager, 
NWC). It is therefore not clear which – a loss of legitimacy or effectiveness – preceded the other.  
In contrast, for SLIPP/SWC and OBWB, this stage was about making sweeping changes to 
the mandate or structure of the bodies. Commonalities across both cases that helped facilitate 
renewal included (a) having champions lead the change (b) having a contextually appropriate 
policy window to gain support (i.e., drought and forest fires in the Okanagan, and the end of the 
SLIPP pilot program), and (c) publicly assessing and communicating the need for change (i.e., 
public engagement meetings in both cases during transition). However, beyond these 
commonalities, the OBWB and SLIPP/SWC renewed their focus in different ways. SLIPP’s 
2014-2015 manifestation into the SWC, clearly distinguished the SWC as a new entity: “We're 
not going there again. We're moving forward with the program focused on water quality. We'll 
develop a new brand, try to keep positive in the media. I'm trying to be optimistic that we can get 
past it” (Interview 93, collaborative manager). This was done by narrowing SWC’s focus to 
predominantly water quality monitoring in an attempt to calm concerns about SLIPP acting as a 
regulatory enforcement body: “they appear to be listening and modifying SLIPP and the 
Watershed Council… to the point now that it is more palatable and acceptable” (Interview 48, 
local government official). Thus, the SWC was able to re-establish perceptions of legitimacy 
(internal/external legitimacy and cognitive through value alignment) by narrowing their mandate 
and separating from their past. Meanwhile, the OBWB’s renewal in 2006 was about mandate 
expansion to broader water issues after a period of stagnancy (decline) that was starting to lead to 
questions about organizational utility: 
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As time progressed into the '90s, it became apparent that there were more pressing 
issues with regards to water in the Okanagan than just the board funding 
improvements to sewage treatment and dealing with milfoil… so they looked for a 
new director and were also looking at an expanded role in water (Interview 19, local 
business representative). 
Through such efforts, both the OBWB and SLIPP/SWC were able to find renewed mandates. 
Although this renewal happened in opposite ways for these two cases, both were able to reassert 
their legitimacy. 
2.5 Discussion 
Findings identify specific CWG legitimacy dynamics and concerns relevant at different stages of 
a CWG body’s development. As CWG bodies develop, legitimacy is established, extended, 
maintained, defended, and possibly lost or re-extended using a variety of different sources to 
make legitimacy claims. These main sources are reiterated in Figure 3.4 using the five-stage 
model of organizational development stages (Figure 3.1) as a guide.  
Figure 3.4: Summary of Findings within each CWG Body Development Stage 
 
In the establishment stage of a body, community readiness to work together and the desire 
to solve local water issues dominated legitimacy judgements creating a sense of need for CWG. 
For example, drought and critical flow levels in the Cowichan River brought people together 
from across sectors because of their interdependence on the river; likewise, in the Nechako 
Watershed, the impact of the reservoir and industry flow control on multiple sectors brought a 
range of people to the NWC to look for a common solution. In this sense, following Johnson et 
al. (2006), the legitimacy of a CWG body at the start is about its innovation as a problem-solving 
method. Moreover, local validation (Johnson et al., 2006; Pinkerton & John, 2008) for CWG is 
shown by the willingness of the community to become involved and believe in the body’s 
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premise. Establishing a body using inclusive and democratic norms also helped ensure the initial 
validation of the cases turned into longer-term acceptance. 
Once the case study organizations were established, they were expected to demonstrate their 
worth predominantly by using valued processes and demonstrating results in the growth stage. 
Given that collaborative bodies spend most of their existence in this stage (Lester et al., 2003), it 
is not surprising that findings are input-output oriented and similar to those already present in the 
CWG literature (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Van Buuren et al., 2012). Inherent within the findings 
were democratic values, such as the importance of impartial, open, and transparent dialogue, 
which supported the deliberative democracy-based underpinnings of collaborative governance 
legitimacy (Parkinson, 2003). Also inherent was the importance of demonstrated results, even in 
the form of small projects, which aligns with the socially valued idea of results-based 
management (Pal, 2010). For the three cases (CWB, LWA, SLIPP/SWC) that were in the growth 
stage during data collection, deliberation about process and the demonstration of results was 
common as these bodies were working to prove themselves as normatively valuable collaborative 
processes that were capable of producing results. Figuring out who these bodies are accountable 
to and what measures of transparency and documentation are needed are still being learned by 
these collaborations. Likewise, while all of the cases demonstrated output during their growth 
stage, the extent bodies were able to see this output materialize into measurable outcomes was 
indicative of their ability to mature. Water quality improvements due to OBWB sewage treatment 
improvement program is evidence as a legitimacy source that helped the OBWB prove its worth 
and mature as an organization. This demonstrates how legitimacy links to effectiveness – when 
an entity proves its capacity, it furthers its legitimacy (Newig & Kvarda, 2012). Together, these 
input and substantive output oriented findings demonstrate how legitimacy extension must align 
with existing and generally accepted cultural beliefs and norms (Walker, 2004). However, what 
the literature on legitimacy’s evolution does not discuss is legitimacy for a body related to the 
individuals involved. Findings demonstrated that individuals helped enable each case’s processes 
and results and added credibility to the body itself through both their presence and charismatic 
leadership abilities, particularly during the growth and renewal stages. As such, the 
acknowledgement of leadership in the CWG literature as an important variable for effective 
management (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013), needs to be more clearly connected to its influence on 
legitimacy judgements at different development stages.  
Additionally, from the experience of the OBWB, findings also supported the idea of 
legitimacy maintenance through routinization once a body functions within the maturity stage. 
Notably, this maintenance was achieved for the OBWB by continuously demonstrating its 
relevance by producing results, documenting process and outputs, remaining non-authoritative 
and neutral in political debates, and maintaining relationships through ongoing partnerships. 
While it is not documented that the OBWB has been explicitly managing their legitimacy, such 
actions speak to organizational sustainability (Keast et al., 2004). Regardless of whether these 
efforts were intentionally undertaken to influence legitimacy, their benefit includes the 
maintenance and reinforcement of legitimacy helping ensure an organization does not become 
redundant or irrelevant as time passes and the context around issues change (Suchman, 1995). 
The maintenance of legitimacy by the OBWB through these action, particularly the ongoing 
production of output, also demonstrates that effectiveness does not just bred legitimacy, but that 
legitimacy also generates effectiveness. The view that the OBWB is an established and credible 
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(i.e., legitimate) organization means that resources and partnerships are likely to continue further 
enhancing the ability of the OBWB to provide sound water governance and management.  
If the relevance of a collaboration is challenged, the continuation of its legitimacy stems 
from a collaboration’s ability to re-communicate its worth, while also demonstrating both 
leadership and capacity. In the stages of decline and dissolution, legitimacy judgements towards 
the NWC, OBWB, and SLIPP/SWC shifted from a focus on the positive legitimating qualities of 
each case to those that were de-legitimating. For example, instead of results being valued as an 
indication of progress, they are critiqued for their limitations; as an illustration, OBWB’s long-
standing programing on sewage infrastructure and milfoil management shifted from being an 
acceptable output to being interpreted as an area of stagnancy where mandate extension could 
occur. The decision of the OBWB to reinvent itself and renew its focus, in comparison, for 
example, to the NWC where the mandate did not adapt to changing circumstances, demonstrated 
how strategic attention to de-legitimating sources in a stage of decline can presage a 
collaboration’s dissolution or renewal. Thus, de-legitimating sources indicate areas of change that 
require attention to ensure the continuation of a body’s legitimacy (Tost, 2011). In the decline 
stage, the experience of SLIPP and the NWC also point to interesting nuances around the 
relationship of legitimacy and effectiveness. In both cases, as legitimacy was challenged, the 
cases faced problems of being able to effectively deliver their mandate. For example, public 
opposition to restoration work by SLIPP halted future projects of a similar nature. However, at 
the same time for the NWC, the inability to have their recommendation implemented led to the 
delegitimization of the organization through the loss of participants and eventual dissolution. 
Given society’s contemporary emphasis on results-based management, the relationship between 
effectiveness and legitimacy not only as a positive relationship for successful governance, but 
also as a risk indicator for organizations should be particularly noted by collaborative managers.  
Together the legitimacy findings at each development stage indicate that multiple 
legitimacy sources and types matter in empirical assessments and vary in importance at different 
points as a collaboration evolves. Most importantly, legitimation occurred through alignment of 
each case’s norms and values with socially valued beliefs, the use of normatively appropriate 
processes, the production of results, and the presence and action of individuals who contributed to 
each case’s credibility.  
In addition to the above analysis, five insights can be drawn about CWG legitimacy’s 
temporal nature, which may help individual bodies more strategically manage legitimacy as a 
resource. First, although legitimacy sources differ as a collaboration develops, decisions and 
action during a collaboration’s initial stages may affect legitimacy later on. For example, effort to 
include First Nations by the CWB conveners in the structuring and development of the body 
before it even formed generated a sense of ownership by First Nations over the body later on 
ensuring their participation even when water was not a political focus. This dynamic speaks to the 
influence of path dependency (Kay, 2005) on temporal legitimacy judgements; a dynamic 
Johnston (2011) also identifies as relevant to collaborative governance in the context of how 
inclusivity and the development of trust determine the value of collaborative decisions. A 
collaboration’s development stages are not disconnected; in particular, decisions made in the 
establishment and growth stages of a collaboration may influence how a body’s legitimacy is 
subsequently judged.  
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Second, both CWG and its legitimacy take time to develop. While collaborative governance 
is often faulted for being a slow process (McClosky, 2000), this slowness can benefit legitimacy 
development. The time that is required to develop certain collaborative features such as trust and 
informed consensus-building (Johnston, 2011) can foster legitimacy not only through the inherent 
value of such features, but also by allowing time to develop more comprehensive projects and 
reputability within the community. This legitimacy can then be useful as a leveraging device to 
gain other sources of legitimacy. For example, the OBWB’s effort to educate and develop trust 
among participants allowed for the body’s objectives to be more strategically developed as 
partnerships furthering community support. Gaining such recognition is not a quick task (Pahl-
Wostl et al., 2007) and therefore the slow growth of a collaboration can help a body mature and 
institutionalize.  
Third, just because collaborations face different institutional pressures as they develop 
(Wood & Gray, 1991), does not mean that previously relevant legitimacy sources and types are 
no longer valid as a collaboration ages. For example, a sense of urgency to address a water crisis 
may be a dominant legitimating factor in the establishment of a collaboration; however, this does 
not mean that this source of legitimacy is irrelevant as a collaboration matures. To illustrate, 
when SLIPP came under scrutiny due to the implications of its associated restoration projects 
(output), it was able to reassert its relevance by using a sense of need for collaboration to address 
broader water issues. Thus, legitimacy sources can be stockpiled and in stages where legitimacy 
may be challenged, past legitimating sources may be utilized to weather difficult times (Fisher et 
al., 2016). As a result, although for analytical purposes this paper has distinguished between each 
stage’s legitimacy sources and types, in reality these lines are not as clear. 
Fourth, CWG legitimacy varies not only within the life of a collaboration, but also over a 
longer systemic timeframe. Community expectations are not static and any organizational body 
must be responsive to the surrounding context in which they operate (Deegan et al., 2002). 
Drivers that influence societal opinion are subject to change based on current socio-political or 
environmental priorities (Finch et al., 2014). Perhaps if the NWC had adapted to changing 
circumstances once their recommendation was not implemented they would have been able to 
renew their membership and focus. The sources of CWG legitimacy at any development stage of 
a body now may or may not be accepted as legitimate in the future. This is particularly important 
to consider for CWG, as changing circumstances such as climate change stresses could strain 
relationships among collaborative participants altering their judgements towards CWG (Pahl-
Wostl & Kranz, 2010). The achievement of legitimacy is therefore a moving target that needs 
continual reassessment by collaborations throughout their life. 
Fifth, whose acceptance of a collaboration matters for legitimacy varies at different stages 
as a body develops. For all cases, in the establishment stage the general community response 
granting or withholding external approval had a significant influence on legitimacy. To generate a 
sense of community need, the community has to first be aware of the initiative. For the NWC and 
SLIPP, public meetings helped generate such awareness and in all cases the media was a key tool 
for communication. The need for such approval continues into the growth stage with the 
additional relevance of other interests (e.g., participants, managers, resource supporters). Once 
community support is gained, collaborations need to focus on validation by those participating in 
and supporting the body. This was evidenced in all cases through legitimacy judgements focusing 
on input and output. However, when the body needs to prove its worth to mature and gain 
stability, to whom the body is most accountable to (e.g., government) has a larger say in judging 
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legitimacy. For this reason, the OBWB has stability measures in place, such as annual auditing 
and reporting to the regional governments to ensure accountability is maintained. Moreover, once 
a body begins to decline, the most relevant audience depends on the issue at hand. For SLIPP, 
addressing public concerns was essential to a renewed focus, but for the NWC failure to gain 
government support particularly led to dissolution. This progression roughly follows the 
legitimacy dynamics proposed by Johnson et al. (2006) where legitimacy must first be locally 
validated (by the community in the establishment stage), diffused (justified by multiple actors) 
and then generally validated (in the sense that legitimacy is gained through consistency and 
stability ultimately leading to institutionalization).  
Stemming from these five insights, this paper recommends that the strategic management of 
CWG account for legitimacy and its temporal nature. Specific deliberation about when to best 
form a body, who to seek acceptance from, how long to spend on a certain activity or process, 
and when to introduce changes such as a new project or reform, can impact acceptance and 
improve program outcomes (Ostrom, 1990). Likewise, collaborative participant and manager 
patience and awareness of strategic windows of opportunity for progress on certain goals can also 
help build legitimacy rhetoric. Such patience is about strategically deciding when and how to 
introduce change. For example, collaborations may choose to purposefully introduce a specific 
issue around the time of a political election in an attempt to gain favour or commitment from 
government. Similarly, letting time pass and not introducing controversial decisions during times 
when there is negative popular opinion towards a body, may be a tactic to allow opinions to 
dissipate or improve as community concerns evolve. Regardless, legitimacy, like a collaborative 
body’s development, takes time. Collaborations need to be diligent and patient in an effort to gain 
recognition and support from their surrounding community and those that fund and resource 
operations.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper posits that legitimacy evolves as CWG bodies develop, thus challenging existing 
CWG legitimacy assessments to re-examine the sources and types of legitimacy that matter at 
different stages of a collaboration’s existence. Legitimacy is not a static concept and should not 
be assumed that the legitimacy types and sources that helped legitimize a body at one stage will 
be as useful during other points in a collaboration’s existence to enhance, maintain, or defend its 
legitimacy. To strengthen a CWG body’s ability to achieve its goals, anticipating and adapting to 
changes in legitimacy judgements is vital. This requires awareness of the current development 
stage of a body and the common legitimacy challenges and opportunities at each stage, as well as 
collective decision-making and action to determine how to contextually mange CWG legitimacy. 
To deepen this knowledge, future research should examine what specific activities and processes 
might hold back or push a collaboration into different development stages further engraining or 
detracting legitimacy as well as how other governance attributes such as accountability and 
inclusivity are temporally influenced and related to legitimacy. Also, addressing an inherent 
weakness of this study, future research should also examine CWG legitimacy’s temporal 
dynamics in other contexts, particularly spaces where CWG is embedded systematically within 
legislated frameworks or exists at larger national or international scales. Accurate assessment of 
collaborative governance bodies requires not only consideration of a body’s evolving nature, but 
also differing interpretations of legitimacy.  
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3 Chapter 4 
 
Collaborative Water Governance: The Composition of Sector-
based Legitimacy Judgements 
3.1 Introduction 
Collaborative governance is an increasingly popular way to make decisions and take action for 
water (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). Although different forms of collaborative governance exist 
(Emerson et al., 2012), one general commonality is the involvement of interdependent actors 
from across different sectors of society to address problems that could not be solved individually 
(Ansell & Gash, 2007). This means that collaborative water governance (CWG) bodies – i.e., the 
organizations that use collaborative governance to make decisions for water – are comprised of 
multiple state and non-state actors, all having different sector-based interests, e.g. industry, 
agriculture, and environmental civil society (Bell & Park, 2006). These different interests can 
have an impact on how different individual actors judge the legitimacy of any organization 
(Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011), including collaborations. Since legitimacy is a crucial attribute of 
governance organizations as it helps ensure their stability, order and effectiveness (Beetham, 
2013), it is vital to know how actors from societal sectors that commonly have a stake in water 
issues judge a collaborative body’s legitimacy. Such identification is important because if a CWG 
body is found by actors within different sectors to be illegitimate, they may not be willing to 
comply with collaborative decisions or support or participate in the collaboration and its efforts. 
Thus, identifying the range of different legitimacy judgements towards CWG bodies may allow 
its practitioners to influence how it is viewed by different sectors of society. However, legitimacy 
is generally understudied at the level of individual judgements (Black, 2008; Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008; Finch et al., 2014; Tost, 2011).  
Legitimacy in this paper is interpreted as a judgement comprised of multiple sources that 
determine the empirical acceptance or justification of a certain entity (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011). 
This interpretation differs from common definitions of legitimacy in the context of governance 
that examine legitimacy as the normative justification of authority (Bodansky, 1999). As a 
judgement, legitimacy is a discursive product of a social system made up of individual members 
(Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011) whose beliefs, expectations, or interests validate a governance body 
(Black, 2008). The beliefs, expectations, and interests of individual actors are often connected to 
various subdivisions of society that relate to different socio-economic, political, or cultural 
boundaries. Understanding these beliefs, expectations, and interests is important because 
individuals form a collective that together affect the norms, law, and cognitive ideals of society 
and ultimately determine what is and is not legitimate (Finch et al., 2014). By applying this view 
to the study of CWG, it is possible to explore the acceptance of collaborative bodies by people 
from different sectors who have vested interests in the process, activities, or performance of a 
collaboration. CWG actors come from different sectors with various public, private, and non-
government-based interests in water. Hence, a range of legitimacy judgements about CWG bodies 
is expected to exist.  
This paper’s goal is to examine the composition of legitimacy judgements by common 
societal sectors involved in or directly affected by CWG bodies. This is accomplished using a 
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multi-case study design to investigate the perceptions of actors in relation to five collaborative 
bodies in British Columbia, Canada. The paper makes a contribution at the intersection of CWG 
and legitimacy literatures by empirically identifying the legitimacy sources and types that make 
up the judgments of actors from different societal sectors towards a CWG body. This contribution 
will be of value to researchers and practitioners by furthering understanding of the ways different 
actors judge the legitimacy of CWG bodies, which can be used as insight for strategic legitimacy 
management. 
3.2 CWG Sectors and Legitimacy 
Collaborative governance refers to “the processes and structures of public policy decision making 
and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of 
government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could 
not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). Bodies that utilize these 
processes and structures function at all levels. At the local level, they are increasingly utilized to 
connect actors from grassroots non-state sectors who use water (e.g., farmers, fishers, 
recreationalists, public utilities) with decision-makers (Lubell, 2004). At this level, collaborations 
involve these actors in the decision-making process to create tangible action on water issues (e.g., 
flooding, drought, pollution). Because water issues impact a range of sectors such as health, 
agriculture, energy, land-use and spatial planning, many believe collaboration is necessary to 
create effective, long-lasting, and coordinated solutions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2015). Common sectors found in CWG include (but are not limited to) all 
levels of government (national, provincial, local), title and rights holders (e.g., First Nations), and 
non-government interest groups such as agriculture, industry, businesses, environmental groups 
and property owners (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). Within 
this study, the sectors focused on include all four orders of government within Canada (federal, 
provincial, local, and First Nations) along with a mixture of commonly involved non-government 
actors – agriculture, industry, environmental groups, and local business and property owner 
associations. Although the interests of individual actors within a societal sector can differ 
particularly because their knowledge is situated (Connelly et al., 2006), each sector as a whole is 
commonly identifiable.  
Governments are the traditional decision-maker for water resources, and in Canada, federal, 
provincial, and local (regional districts and municipalities in BC) governments are primarily 
responsible for water governance. Responsibilities are shared across these governments and 
include enforcement, information and data gathering, strategic planning, and conflict resolution. 
The province holds the primary water quality and quantity management responsibilities for water 
protection, security, provision, and safety (Hurlbert, 2007). The federal government has 
jurisdiction related to fisheries, navigation, federal lands, and First Nations and international 
relations (Johns & Rasmussen, 2008). Local governments are primary responsible for drinking 
water delivery, wastewater management and land use planning; however increasingly are taking 
on devolved responsibilities from senior governments (Nowlan, 2004).  
Government responsibilities in a collaboration may range from actively participating and 
helping set agendas, framing debates and influencing outcomes; being passively engaged as just 
one of the many participants; and being a recipient of advice from a collaboration (Koontz & 
Johnson, 2004). The interest of governments in collaboration stems mainly from their 
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responsibilities to engage non-state actors in decision-making and from a belief that water 
management responsibilities may best be accomplished when all views are included within 
governance and policy processes (Kvarda & Nordbeck, 2012). However, as Milton and Lepage 
(2010) explain, there is also concern within government, particularly at the local level, about the 
challenges of financing collaborations, establishing accountability and legal structures, and the 
enforceability of collaborative work; these challenges can make government hesitant to engage 
and accept collaborations. From the perspective of the people engaged in collaboration, the same 
concerns can exist if governments fail to respect the outcomes of collaborative efforts (Roth & de 
Loë, 2017). The slow development of a legal framework to support CWG, also suggests that the 
state has been hesitant to fully accept CWG within existing institutional structures (Bingham, 
2009). These concerns may reflect in legitimacy judgements towards collaborative bodies.  
In addition to traditional government levels, in Canada, First Nations are now recognized as 
a form of government on a nation-to-nation level. As a government, First Nations have sole or 
shared responsibility for water management within reserves and often have active fisheries 
management rights and responsibilities as well (Phare, 2009). The specific rights of First Nations 
peoples in Canada are continually being defined, clarified, and solidified through a host of 
Supreme Court decisions such as the 2014 Tsilhqot'in decision that broadened land title of the 
Tsilhqot'in Nation. Cultural and spiritual understanding about water also make Indigenous 
peoples critical and unique actors in water decision-making in Canada, and around the world 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). However, challenges of 
reconciliation, historical exclusion in public decision-making as a minority, current capacity 
challenges as a form of government, and implications for title and rights when participating in 
collaborations with the state have limited how First Nations are choosing to engage in CWG 
bodies (von der Porten & de Loë, 2013b). For CWG, First Nations participation has come to be 
recognized as an important variable to gain legitimacy as there is increasing recognition by the 
state that environmental and resource decision-making requires local First Nation support (von 
der Porten & de Loë, 2014).  
The interests, needs, and perspectives of non-government actors in the water sector vary 
widely. Moody (2009) suggests that pragmatic reasoning is the primary motivation for their 
participation in collaborative governance. In this sense, collaboration is justified through the 
belief that it is the best way for a group to address a problem while ensuring its members get what 
they want out of a given process or policy. Research such as de Loë et al. (2015), de Loë et al. 
(2016), Brisbois (2015), Simpson (2014) and Milton and Lepage (2010) offer insights regarding 
different reasons non-state actors from agriculture, industry, the environmental sector, and local 
residents participate in CWG in different Canadian contexts. Motivations for collaborative 
participation by the agriculture sector are education- advocacy-, and capacity-based. Farmers 
want to teach other actors about farming practices to dispel negative perceptions about their 
sector, develop further insight on agriculture and environmental science, ensure the water and 
land needs of the farming community are protected and included in decision-making, and secure 
resources to mitigate future risks (de Loë et al., 2015; Simpson et al., 2015). Industry-based 
actors (e.g., forestry, mining, hydroelectric, oil and gas, companies) are driven largely by 
corporate social responsibility and social license to operate paradigms. Industry tends to value 
CWG for the opportunities it provides to inform community members about the work and 
environmental efforts of a company, to gain understanding of community beliefs, to build or 
improve relationships with other actor groups, and to assert a company’s needs (Brisbois, 2015; 
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de Loë et al., 2016). Environmentalists, in contrast, come to collaborations with the intention of 
promoting action that furthers the sustainability of water resources (Milton & Lepage, 2010). 
Residents, represented by organized associations, join to ensure representation of local values 
(Brisbois, 2015). The willingness of these non-government actors in general to participate in 
collaboration is indicative of their acceptance and justification of collaborative governance as a 
participatory way to make decisions (Gazley, 2008). Actors from some sectors, particularly 
industry, even view participation in collaboration as a way to enhance their own legitimacy (de 
Loë et al., 2016).  
Together, these actors from government and non-government sectors contribute different 
knowledge, resources, and perspectives to a collaboration (Plummer et al., 2006). For example, 
industry is commonly driven by market-based logic, which emphasizes practices of accumulation 
and ownership and prioritizes efficiency; meanwhile, bureaucratic state actors may be more 
concerned with the regulation of human activity and emphasize rules and operating procedures 
(Bryson et al., 2006). These different perspectives can influence a body’s behaviour by focusing 
attention on issues, outcomes, and sources of power related to one perspective rather than 
another. Perspectives compete “because actions, processes, norms, and structures that are seen as 
legitimate from one vantage point… may be seen as less legitimate or even illegitimate from the 
perspective of another” (Bryson et al., 2006, p. 50). This competition can limit the extent 
collaborations can agree on key organizational factors such as design, function, and goals (Bryson 
et al., 2006). Lack of agreement on these factors can hinder an organizational body’s ability to be 
validated within a social system (Black, 2008). For CWG, understanding the variety of interests 
relative to an individual collaborative body can help determine what commonalities and 
differences exist across legitimacy judgements.  
While there is considerable knowledge of the sector-based interests of different actors in 
water governance processes, there is much less information about how these interests translate 
into legitimacy judgements towards CWG bodies. Perhaps a contributing factor to this limitation 
is that legitimacy in the broader context of collaborative governance, water governance, and 
environmental governance predominantly has been interpreted as a normative attribute rather than 
as a sociological judgement or legal concept (Bernstein, 2005; Connelly et al., 2006; Hogl et al., 
2012). In this sense, studies of collaborative governance legitimacy have focused on determining 
ideal qualities or diagnostically evaluating how reality complies with these theoretical qualities 
(Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011). Commonly, these ideals are variations of democratic norms alone or in 
combination with substantive claims (Bernstein, 2014). For example, Van Buuren et al. (2012) 
uses Bekkers and Edwards’s (2007) input-throughput-output legitimacy typology and discusses 
accountability, voice, and due deliberation qualities as indicators of water governance legitimacy 
in the Netherlands. Baird et al. (2014) uses Trachtenberg and Focht’s (2005) procedural and 
substantive typology to investigate Canadian CWG legitimacy qualities of representation, welfare 
improvements, fair consideration, stakeholder rights, genuine consent, and distribution of welfare 
and costs. Similarly, Bäckstrand (2010) via Scharpf’s (1999)’s input-output typology establishes 
a framework for assessing environmental governance legitimacy broadly, which includes 
participation, accountability, and deliberative qualities combined with policy, institutional, and 
environmental effectiveness. Together these legitimacy studies suggest legitimacy sources and 
types that can provide normative criteria for empirical bodies as well as insight into the 
composition of legitimacy judgements by different actor groups (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011). 
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 Table 4.1 provides a broad synthesis of relevant legitimacy types from 18 different 
typologies identified in a literature review that are then connected to the different sector-based 
legitimacy sources in the results section of this paper. In this synthesis, legitimacy types from 
different typologies are broadly grouped together based on similar descriptions of the ways or 
sources of legitimacy. While there is some overlap in the groupings (e.g., legitimacy from social 
acceptance may draw on normative values related other groupings and different forms of rule 
legitimacy may be interpreted as part of the ideal practice of a governance body), this synthesis 
acts as a basic structure to help identify empirical CWG legitimacy sources. 
Table 4.1: Legitimacy Types 
Grouping Legitimacy Types Way Legitimacy is Created 
Ideal 
Practice 
Democratic or non-democratic input: input 
(Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; 
Scharpf, 1997; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), 
procedural (Etsy, 2006; Lord & Magnette, 
2004; Suchman, 1995), democratic (Beetham 
& Lord, 1998; Etsy, 2006), principled 
(Bernstein, 2004), normative (Scott, 1995); 
justifiability of rules (Beetham, 2013). 
traditional (Weber, 1964); convention 
(Matheson, 1987) 
Presence of specific practices that are 
morally- and ethically-based habits and 
norms that guide relationships; 
democratic - normalized protection of 
rights and recognition of people as an 
autonomous political authority  
Deliberative (Etsy, 2006) Use of interactive multi-person dialogue 
for decision-making 
Throughput (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007) Quality of procedures and rules 
Structural: structural (Easton, 1965; 
Suchman, 1995); systematic (Etsy, 2006) 
Use of certain categories and structural 
characteristics 
Universal: ideological (Easton, 1965); 
sacredness (Matheson, 1987), universal 
principles (Matheson, 1987) 
Widespread norms that command 




Problem solving (Føllesdal, 2005) Capacity to yield output or outcomes 
that remedy collective problems 
Substantive output: output (Bekkers & 
Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Jachtenfuchs 
et al., 1998; Scharpf, 1997); substantive 
(Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), consequential 
(Suchman, 1995), results-based (Etsy, 2006) 
Measurable results 
Performance (Beetham & Lord, 1998) Quality of output 
Technocratic (Lord & Magnette, 2004) The efficient and effective address of 




Rule: legal (Bernstein, 2004), rational-
legality (Weber, 1964), regulative (Scott, 
1995), and rule (Beetham, 1991, 2013), 
order-based (Etsy, 2006), formal (Arnull, 
2002) 
Existence of and extent that regulative 
rules or law impose obligation  
Contract (Matheson, 1987) Attained through agreement where 
power-holder and power-subject assume 
mutual rights and obligations 
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Grouping Legitimacy Types Way Legitimacy is Created 
Parliamentary (Lord & Magnette, 2004) Existence of popular sovereignty and 
elections 
Compliance (Føllesdal, 2005) Permissive adherence to rules 
Social 
Acceptance 
Cognitive (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995) Alignment of values, beliefs, 
assumptions within a larger social 
system 
Pragmatic (Suchman, 1995) Benefit to evaluator 
Social identity: identity (Jachtenfuchs et al., 
1998), sociological (Bernstein, 2004) 
 
Connection to local culture 
Internal consent: internal (Boulding, 1967), 
participation (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998), 
expressed consent (Beetham, 1991, 2013) 
Willingness to partake and identify as 
part of an organization  
External approval: external (Boulding, 1967), 
social (Arnull, 2002), identification 
(Beetham & Lord, 1998), popular approval 
(Matheson, 1987) 
Development of general acceptance by 
surrounding community  
Parliamentary (Lord & Magnette, 2004) Popular consent through election 
Compliance (Føllesdal, 2005) Submitting to authority 
Individual-
based 
Personal qualities: personal (Easton, 1965; 
Suchman, 1995), personal qualities 
(Matheson, 1987), charismatic (Weber, 1964) 
Characteristics of people generate 
support 
Expertise (Matheson, 1987) Expertise and knowledge possession 
generate support 
Extension: personal ties (Matheson, 1987); 
indirect (Lord & Magnette, 2004) 
Relationships generate willingness to 
comply  
 
In addition to literature that suggests or uses different legitimacy typologies, other 
environmental or water governance research place legitimacy as one of many desirable 
governance attributes (e.g., Armitage et al., 2012; Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Innes, 1999; 
Lockwood et al., 2010; Lundqvist, 2004; Moss & Newig, 2010; Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Pahl-
Wostl et al., 2013). These studies reinforce democratic and substantive norms as necessary for 
governance legitimacy and also discuss the challenges and interrelationships of legitimacy with 
other governance attributes (e.g., inclusivity, effectiveness and accountability). For example, 
Newig and Fritsch (2009) and Newig and Kvarda (2012) discuss the relationship between 
legitimacy and effectiveness of participatory governance (of which they characterize 
collaborative governance as one type) stressing the democratic dilemma of lost accountability due 
to the inclusion of multiple non-state actors that are needed to address collective problems. 
Overall, this research emphasizes legitimacy as one of many normative governance attributes that 
collectively challenge or support each other in the development of sustained democratic 
governance that can successfully achieve its goals. 
Distinct from this normative legitimacy research, a limited number of CWG studies analyze 
legitimacy empirically as a discursive attribute. Notable examples include Edwards (2016), Leino 
and Peltomaa (2012), and Sandstrom et al. (2014) who examine legitimacy judgements of the 
public towards select local water governance organizations in the US, Finland, and Sweden 
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respectively. Findings from these studies emphasize the situated nature of legitimacy and the 
inductive and descriptive nature of identifying empirical judgements. While these studies do not 
identify sector-based perspectives, one study that does is Orr (2015) who distinguishes between 
local level and policy level actors and adopts a diagnostic approach to assess their legitimacy 
judgments of CWG in Quebec, Canada using Beetham’s (2013) normative – rules, expressed 
consent and justifiability of rules – typology. Orr (2015) finds that assessing legitimacy 
judgements at different levels helps identify key challenges – e.g., the impact of different 
conceptualizations of inclusion – affecting the ways in which to gain or enhance legitimacy. Orr’s 
(2015) work suggests that further study into the legitimacy perspectives of other key actors (e.g., 
industry and First Nations), is necessary. This study supplements these works by analyzing 
legitimacy as a judgment that is comprised of multiple legitimacy sources and differs according to 
societal sector. Table 4.2 provides a conceptual framework as a guide to the expected legitimacy 
sources that comprise the CWG judgements of different sector-based actors. 
Table 4.2: Composition of CWG Legitimacy Judgements by Common Sector-based Actors 
Sector/Actor 
group 
Interests of common water governance sectors  Expected basis of 





Establish and reform water decision-making, service 
delivery, basin management and institutional structures; 
address public crises and conflict (Hooper, 2003; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2015); agenda setting; framing debates, 
influencing outcomes (Bell & Park, 2006); motivating civil 
and private sector behavioural change (Brisbois & de Loë, 
2016; Holley et al., 2012a) 
Ability of collaborations 
to provide a normatively 
appropriate venue to 
deliver government 





Advocacy of rights, respect for values and practices, equal 
inclusion in decision-making (Global Water Partnership 
Technical Advisory Committee, 2009; Memon & Weber, 
2010); promotion of self-determination; responsibility of 
decision-making on traditional homelands (von der Porten 
& de Loë, 2013b, 2014) 
Ability for collaboration 
to respect, advocate for, 
and contribute to First 
Nations rights and 
values within the 
collaborative process 
Agriculture  Protection of status quo water allocation (Memon & 
Weber, 2010) and land (de Loë et al., 2015); correct 
negative perceptions of sector; provide information and 
education on farming activities to other sectors (de Loë et 
al., 2015; Milton & Lepage, 2010); communicate, learn, 
and develop agriculture and environmental knowledge 
(Simpson, 2014); agri-environmental awareness and 
sharing; assistance adapting and mitigating climate change 
risks (Roy et al., 2009); building capacity of farmers to 
interact with decision-makers; securing resources (de Loë 
et al., 2015) 
Pragmatically based on 
ability of collaborative 





Sustainability objectives (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016); 
promotion of watershed integrity (Milton & Lepage, 2010) 
Pragmatic and moral 
benefit of effectively 
addressing 
environmental problems  
Industry  Further corporate social responsibility and social license to 
operate by helping develop better informed decisions; 
reduce conflict and improve relationships with 
Pragmatically based on 
ability of collaborative 




Interests of common water governance sectors  Expected basis of 
legitimacy judgements  
communities; improve environmental conditions (Brisbois, 
2015; de Loë et al., 2016); gain information; protect 
interests; correct misinformation (Brisbois & de Loë, 
2016); represent company’s positions and needs; 
communicate potential impacts of action; provide 
descriptions and justification of company’s water use; 
ensure others understand financial cost of mitigation; play 
a role in decision making that affects industry operations 
(Murray & de Loe, 2012b) 
company mandate; 
concern for practice 
based on ensuring 
opportunity to be an 






Protection of local interests and well-being (Brisbois & de 
Loë, 2016; Milton & Lepage, 2010) 
Cognitive sense of need; 
pragmatic benefit to 
community 
 
3.3 Research Method  
This research aimed to explore the sources of various sector-based legitimacy judgements of 
select CWG bodies. To do so, a qualitative data collection using a multi-case study approach was 
used to allow for exploratory analysis across contextually-dependant settings (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 
2009). This approach was deemed appropriate as legitimacy is a situated and subjective concept 
depending on perspective (Connelly, 2011; Johnson et al., 2006) and because legitimacy is in 
need of further exploratory analysis in the case of CWG (Baird et al., 2014; Orr, 2015). Cases 
were identified from a shortlist of CWG bodies in the Canadian province of BC that self-
identified as being cross-sector collaboratives functioning at the local level. BC was selected as 
the broader sampling frame because of the existence of many differently structured collaborative 
governance bodies addressing a variety of water issues within one socio-political context 
(Brandes & O'Riordan, 2014). The sub-unit of analysis (Yin, 2009) within each case were 
different sector-based actors that participate or are directly affected by each body. To allow for 
cross-case analysis, only actors from sectors that were present in multiple cases are reviewed 
within this paper.  
3.3.1 Case Descriptions 
Cases included the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA), 
the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB), the 
Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap Watershed Council (SLIPP/SWC).  
The CBW is a watershed-wide collaboration that is co-governed by local government and 
First Nations. The Board was born out of the Cowichan Basin Water Management Plan 
(Westland Resource Group Inc., 2007), which was a local government led public, private and 
First Nations endeavor. However, it was not established until 2010 after a drought that created 
challenges such as having to truck salmon populations upriver to their spawning grounds and the 
threat of operational shut-down for the main employer of the region (Catalyst Pulp and Paper). 
After this water scarcity situation, the board was convened and comprised of 12 elected official 
members from the Cowichan Valley Regional District and the Cowichan Tribe First Nation along 
with up to four public members and two senior level government members (Fraser Basin Council, 
2015a). The board is supported by a technical advisory committee of stakeholders. Funding is on 
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an annual-basis from both CVRD and First Nations gas taxes as well as grants. Legal mechanisms 
include registration as a charitable society, and formalized terms of reference. Eight tangible 
target areas were developed to guide the CWB’s work: riparian protection, water supply 
enhancement, watershed education, water use conservation, summer flow conservation, salmon 
sustainability, estuary health, and water quality improvements (Rutherford, 2011). A central 
concern is Cowichan River flows and the CWB is an active proponent for localizing and 
improving flow control via a weir at the mouth of Cowichan Lake (Hunter et al., 2014). This flow 
issues connects especially to fisheries, which are particularly important to the Cowichan Tribes as 
a partner in the collaboration with vested cultural and economic interests in the resource. Major 
activities include water quality monitoring and reporting, technical reports and presentations, 
restoration efforts, public education campaigns and advocacy work on flow and legislation 
development to senior government.  
The LWA focuses on Lake Windermere at the Columbia River headwaters. Initially, 
Wildsight, a local ENGO, initiated the Lake Windermere Project focused on stewardship, 
education, and water quality monitoring. To continue the work of the project, the LWA formed in 
2009 as an inclusive, consensus-based community stewardship group with an open fee-based 
membership. Since then, the LWA have also taken on an advisory role for local governments by 
acting as the Lake Windermere Management Committee (LWMC) and providing input on 
purposed development applications that may have implications for the health of the lake 
(Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008). Additionally, the LWA is leading efforts to establish 
a watershed-wide collaborative governance organization to oversee aspects of local water 
management (Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2010). The LWA is made up of a board of 
representatives from different community sectors including First Nations, local business owners, 
community associations, and environmentalists and also includes a general membership. LWA 
funding comes from a fee-for-service as the LWMC, external grants, and membership fees. The 
legal basis of the Ambassadors includes recognition in the Lake Windermere OCP Bylaw No. 
2061 Section A (10) as the LWMC (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008), charitable status, 
and documented terms of reference (Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2010; Regional District of 
East Kootenay et al., 2011). Major activities include ongoing water quality monitoring and 
reporting, public education, restoration initiatives and recommendations as the LWMC on 
development applications.  
NWC was established in 1996 (formalized in 1998) in response to social and ecological 
sustainability issues within the watershed. The most notable issue was the diversion of up to 70% 
of the Nechako River’s annual water flow through the construction of the Nechako Reservoir (via 
the Kenney Dam at the headwaters by Alcan (merged into RioTinto Alcan in 2007) in 1954 
(Wood, 2013). This development permanently altered the hydrology and ecology of the region 
leading to public controversy, which was exacerbated when Alcan proposed additional diversions 
in the 1980s and 90s. This controversy helped initiate the 1995 BC Utility Commission hearings 
and the 1997 BC-Alcan Settlement Agreement (Province of British Columbia, 1997). From these 
processes, the NWC was formed to address tensions and watershed problems. From the 1997 
Settlement Agreement, $50-$100 million was allocated for the Nechako Environmental 
Enhancement Fund (NEEF) to address downstream issues (Nechako Environmental Enhancement 
Fund, 2001), and the NWC took on building a consensus recommendation for how this fund 
could be best spent. Initially, the NWC brought together over 20 stakeholder groups and First 
Nations from across the watershed (Nechako Watershed Council, 2009) and by 2001 made the 
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recommendation that a water release facility at the Kenney Dam should be built (Nechako 
Watershed Council, 1998). The NWC received funding from NEEF for operations (4Thought 
Solutions Inc., 2005) and had established terms of reference and legal recognition within Section 
4 of the BC/Alcan 1997 Settlement Agreement. After providing recommendation to NEEF, the 
NWC faced challenges of declining participation and stagnant governance process as their 
recommendation was not followed through and no other significant issues were focused on. 
Eventually, the NWC dissolved in 2011. 
The OBWB was established in the 1970s as a partnership among the three regional 
governments that cover the watershed boundaries (Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, 
1974). For the first 30 years of the OBWB, its primary deliverables were the provision of sewer 
improvements and Eurasian Milfoil control. However, local drought and wildfires in 2003 
brought the communities of the Basin together to renew the OBWB’s mandate to be more 
encompassing of different water issues such as invasive species control and water scarcity 
concerns from increasing water demand (especially population growth and agriculture) (Jatel, 
2013). The mandate renewal included the creation of the Okanagan Water Stewardship Council 
(OWSC) as a technical advisory group to the board comprised of 30 plus stakeholders and First 
Nations (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2010b). The renewal also led the Okanagan Nation 
Alliance, the OWSC chair, and a member at large to be included on the board along with 
appointed politicians from the regional governments (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2010a). The 
funding and legal structure for the OBWB are established through BC’s Municipalities Enabling 
and Validating Act (Province of British Columbia, 2015) with letters patent creating a mill rate 
parcel tax across the three regional districts. Major activities of the OBWB include watermilfoil 
management, a grant program for sewage improvement (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2012), 
public education campaigns, advocacy work to senior government on various water issues 
(Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2014), the Okanagan Water Sustainability Plan (Okanagan Water 
Stewardship Council, 2008), watershed modeling and data collection (Okanagan Hydrometric 
Network Working Group, 2008), water conservation and quality improvement grant programs, 
the creation of the BC Water Use improvement Centre (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2014), 
establishment of a local university water research chair, and local government bylaw guide books 
(Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2011). The OBWB is the oldest and one of the most recognized 
CWG bodies in BC.  
SLIPP began as a Provincial Ministry of Environment (MOE) led multi-agency initiative to 
coordinate effort to address silos among water management agencies due to increased residential 
and marina development proposals, which included applications for treated sewage discharge into 
the watershed (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009). Collaboration began in 2006 
with public consultation working groups, leading in 2011 to a three-year pilot program on water 
quality, foreshore mapping, recreational management planning and ad hoc restoration and derelict 
dock removal. Management of SLIPP transferred in 2010 from MOE to a NGO (Fraser Basin 
Council). Funding of SLIPP was through local government gas tax within the Columbia Shuswap 
Regional District (CSRD) and the Regional District of the North Okanagan (RDNO), a parcel tax 
within the Thompson Nicola Regional District (TNRD), and in-kind support from provincial 
agencies. The board of SLIPP was comprised of representatives from the three regional districts, 
a First Nations representative, a member at large, and provincial agency representatives (Shuswap 
Watershed Council, 2014). Programing of SLIPP was contentious due to misconceptions of 
mandate by the public and provincial bylaw officers using the SLIPP name to take action on 
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foreshore violations (Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association, 2015). In connection to these 
issues, SLIPP members decided to rebrand at the end of the three-year pilot project (Fraser Basin 
Council, 2015a). Consequently, SLIPP became the SWC in 2015 and continued working on water 
quality and safety issues (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014). In particular, remediation of non-
point source pollution from agriculture has been identified as a necessary focus for the Council. 
The SWC maintained a similar governance structure, but established a more permanent funding 
and legal structure within the CSRD via Bylaw 5705 (Columbia Shuswap Regional District, 
2015). Major activities of SLIPP and the SWC include coordinated water quality monitoring and 
reporting (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2014), removal of derelict docks (Shuswap 
Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2014), foreshore inventory and mapping (Ecoscape 
Environmental Consultants, 2009), and a recreational management plan (Peak Planning 
Associates, 2013).  
Figure 4.1 outlines the watershed of each case within BC. Collectively, these cases 
represent CWG bodies that aim to include a range of sectors impacted by water resource issues in 
local watershed level decision-making and action using a deliberative format. These specific 
cases were chosen to ensure diversity across the cases in terms of geographic distribution in BC 
and in terms of each body’s age. 
Figure 4.1: Case Study Watershed Locations 
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3.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data were collected from 2013 to 2015 in the form of 99 semi-structured interviews, 
document review, and personal observation. Interviews were conducted with representatives from 
available societal sectors both internal (70 interviewees) or external (29 interviewees) to each 
case. Table 4.4 provides a matrix of sectors present in the cases and the corresponding number of 
interviews with actors from each. Prior to and throughout the data collection process, relevant 
sectors to each case study were identified and effort was made to include interviewees from all of 
these sectors who were participants, past-participants, or not involved but were familiar a case(s). 
However, not all cases included the same sectors. Sectors reported on in this paper each included 
five or more interviewees across all cases with the exception of interviewees from the Federal 
Government; federal interviewees connected to the CWB spoke both specifically to the CWB and 
to CWG throughout the province. In Table 4.4, the ‘other’ category of interviewees included 
sectors where inadequate data were available; however, insight from these interviewees toward 
the sectors reviewed were included when relevant. Also, several interviewees represented 
multiple sectors. In these interviews, the interviewees’ primary role as a professional was 
identified (according to the interviewee) and then focused on in the interview. For example, if an 
interviewee was a politician and a member of a local property owner association, clarification 
was sought to confirm the capacity in which they would be interviewing and then interview 
questions were tailored to inquire about that specific perspective. However, for government staff 
working with specific sectors (e.g., Ministry of Agriculture employees), interviewees were treated 
as government representatives. Interviews discussed each case’s process, results, legal status, 
social acceptance and its personal dynamics, specially asking follow-up questions to tease out 
sector-based perspectives using prompts stemming from the conceptual framework (Table 4.2). 
Purposeful and snowball interview selection was used in an attempt to have diverse 
representation from all societal sectors. Interviews were held in-person, by phone, or 
electronically and were electronically recorded. The first author or an internet-based service 
(TranscribeMe Inc.) transcribed the interviews verbatim. Member checking of transcripts verified 
the data (Carlson, 2010). Interview anonymity was protected throughout the research process as 
well as in the writing of this paper by only conveying the associated case or sector with 
interviewee quotations when it would not disclose identity. 
Data were also collected from a review of 656 documents including meeting minutes, 
newspaper articles, reports and letters, promotional material, plans, interpersonal 
communications, emails, collaborative body publications and websites. These documents were 
identified via internet searches or word of mouth. Newspaper articles were identified via keyword 
searches for the name of each case using Factiva or local community newspaper databases. 
Observations of board and committee meetings and fieldtrips, public hearings, local practitioner 
conferences, watershed site-visits and interviews were also utilized. Notably, these two data 
sources act as secondary support in this paper as the interview data provided in-depth narratives 
of sector-based perspectives that are not always apparent in documents or observable as an 
external researcher. 
Interviews and observation notes were transcribed and all data including reviewed 
documents and observation notes were coded using NVIVO 10 software. Qualitative analysis was 
used to explore and understand the depth and context of sector-based judgements. Open and axial 
coding identified patterns, themes and relationships (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) of common sector-
based legitimacy perspectives across each case. While, no sector had unified water governance 
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concerns, the concerns each sector faced were common across the cases. For this reason, while 
case-by-case analysis was conducted to compare sectors common across the cases, the results are 
presented by sector, only making cross-case comparisons when there are notable differences. 
Triangulation of data sources from across two or more cases confirmed the credibility of the 
themes. Both data collection and analysis were deductive and inductive in nature continuing until 
conceptual saturation was reached across cases and common sectors. Evidence was selected for 
reporting based on its ability to clearly illustrate and highlight the themes present within each 
sector. Care was taken to ensure anonymity when using interview quotations as evidence by 
withholding the case if it was an identifying characteristic.  
Table 4.4: Interviewee Sectors Per Case 
Case→ 
Societal Sector ↓ 





Federal 3 - - - - 3 
Provincial 2 - 2 5 3 12 
Local (regional districts & municipalities) 7 4 3 6 9 29 
First Nations 3 1 2 1 2 9 
Agriculture - 1 - 3 1 5 
Industry  2 - 2 1 - 5 
Environment 2 2 2 - 2 8 
Local business and property owner 
associations 
1 4 1 2 4 12 
Other (watershed managers, funders, 
academics, youth) 
3 5 3 3 2 16 
Total Interviewees  23 17 15 21 23 =99 
 
3.4 Results 
The different sources of legitimacy that are primarily discussed by actors representing different 
sectors of society are presented as the findings of this research. Table 4.5 synthesizes these 




Table 4.5: Actor Group Legitimacy Judgements 
Actor Group Empirically Identified Sources of Legitimacy Type of Legitimacy 





Community readiness to work together External approval 
Involvement of other levels of government Extension, external 
approval 
Alignment of body’s goals with government mandate Social identity 
Track record of results Substantive output 
Governance stability; inclusive, unbiased process Structural, throughput 
Value of water to community well-being (local) Pragmatic  
Supported institutional framework (local) Rule 
Politician/senior level bureaucrat interest (province) Extension, personal 
qualities 
First Nations involvement (national) Extension 
First Nations 
Government 
Recognition and respect for capacity limitations Non-democratic input 
Prioritization of interests Democratic input, 
pragmatic  
Aligned political representation on collaboration/respect for 
title and rights 
Structural 
Treatment as equal partner throughout process Democratic input 
Sense of representation on board Democratic input 
Agriculture Protection of agricultural water allocation  Pragmatic  
Address of water issues that affect agriculture (e.g., drought, 
flood preparedness) 
Pragmatic  





Ability to address environmental issues Cognitive, pragmatic, 
substantive output, 
problem solving 
Industry Benefit to public communications mandate, fulfillment of 
water management responsibilities, protection of water 
licence, strengthening of social licence to operate through 
environmental protection 
Pragmatic 







Respect for community well-being Pragmatic, cognitive 
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4.4.1 Government  
3.4.1.1 The State 
Across all levels of government, community readiness, support of other government agencies, 
alignment of goals and results, a proven track record, and democratic processes acted as 
legitimacy sources. These sources influenced not only the various governments’ judgements of a 
collaboration, but also their willingness to participate, partner or contribute resources.  
A community’s readiness to work together across sectors and the prioritization of 
inclusivity within each case indicated to government actors well rounded local support that 
increased the likelihood that a collaboration would achieve its goals. This sentiment is illustrated 
by the views of a retired senior-level provincial employee familiar with all five cases: 
There is nothing more powerful to government decision-makers than a group of 
citizens with First Nations and industry onside saying "we want a change and this is 
what we want and we all agree." All government is going to say is "great, how do we 
make this work" (Interview 32). 
For each of the cases, the initial participation of any level of government, even those that acted as 
convenors of the collaboration, required the willingness of a range of sectors to be involved. 
Additionally, the support or participation of other government agencies (i.e., different 
jurisdictional levels, geographically neighbouring jurisdictions, or different departments within 
the same government) acted as an indication for four of the five cases (excluding the LWA) that a 
body was a credible organization. In this sense, each government looks at the interaction others 
have with a collaborative body as a legitimacy source. As an example, for the NWC, provincial 
and federal government participation was contingent on each other participating. The following 
comment in the Prince George Citizen demonstrates this point: “the B.C. government agreed to 
participate in the board’s initiative, provided there was also participation by the federal 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Citizen Staff, 1996). Similar sentiment was also iterated by 
Fisheries and Oceans in a private letter to NWC staff. Recognition of each other’s management 
roles in the Nechako Watershed meant that one agency did not want to participate if the other was 
not willing. 
Government agencies at all levels, also look at how a body’s goals and results align with 
their own department’s mandate. Collaborations must provide value via a service provided that 
aligns with the priorities of the government in power, the budget year, and long-term ministry 
plans. A provincial employee familiar with all five cases expressed this sense of need as a 
balancing of resources with the extent a collaboration benefits the government’s pragmatic 
interests: “the more that they are trying to advance something that is where government has 
decided they want to go, the more likely we are to get more directly involved in there” (Interview 
8). Thus, the extent a collaboration’s goals align with government mandate can dictate the amount 
of support or involvement from a government. In the context of the CWB, the close alignment of 
the body’s goals with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)’s mandate led to 
partnerships projects (e.g., bathymetric mapping of Cowichan Lake) and was observed to 
influence DFO’s prioritization of senior-level employee representation at meetings, the transfer of 
representation from the retiring employee to their successors without change in prioritization, and 
willingness to represent the CWB at public events. “[The CWB] has to have a clear linkage to the 
mandate of protecting fish and fish habitat, which is what we do… [this justifies] the time and 
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expense of participating (Interview 84, federal employee).” Thus, in some circumstance it can 
make sense for government to initially take a leadership role (e.g., SLIPP was initially led by 
provincial staff). If government can help shape the scope of a collaboration, then the body’s 
mandate may naturally align with the priorities of a ministry or department.  
A track record of measurable output was also required to gain government support or 
participation in a collaboration. This sentiment was expressed by a federal employee speaking 
about collaborations in general as legitimacy being “a board doing things and in a measurable 
way… all the boards do stuff, but it's to really have a focused place that they're going to that we 
value” (Interview 2, federal employee). Measurable results can indicate stability of the 
governance process fostering perceptions of trust that a collaboration is a low-risk option in 
which to invest time and resources. As result of this view, every case produced at least annual 
reports that highlight and summarize the main activities and their impacts. 
 Collaborative governance process norms also factored into perspectives at each 
government level; the most commonly valued norms were impartiality and long-term 
accountability to constituents. Impartiality was identified as particularly important for elected 
local officials across all cases in connection to their responsibilities to act in their constituents’ 
best interests, justify tax fund allocations, and provide equal benefit across the community. 
Concern for impartiality was particularly observed during SLIPP/SWC and OBWB meetings 
regarding projects like SLIPP’s derelict dock removal program and the OBWB’s community 
grant program, where board members went into detail to deliberate and ensure project benefits 
were geographically distributed before offering support. Next to impartiality, governments were 
also concerned about ensuring the cases were representative and accountable as a long-term 
governance form. A provincial employee reflecting on concerns of all government levels 
commented on this connection:  
A group needs to have the ongoing responsibility for their decision… You have to 
look at that and say, “are they going to be around for a while once they make a 
decision? Why would this group be wanting this right now? Can they be seen as 
impartial or are they trying to achieve a very specific outcome that may not be 
supported by the broader community?” … They’ve got to participate as a partner with 
some accountability to community (Interview 85). 
In this sense, accountability is a key source that normatively justifies a collaboration. Issues of 
accountability were observed and expressed in interviews towards SLIPP, LWA, CWB. For 
SLIPP it was not clear who would be responsible for implementing the collaboration’s 
recommended actions or plans. For the LWA, the voluntary nature of the body raised questions 
about sustained involvement. Meanwhile, for the CWB, accountability was debated at the 
provincial level with regards to whether the CWB’s desire to structurally alter the weir at the 
mouth of the Cowichan River and locally control river flows could be enforced legally. A clear 
accountability path was thus particularly necessary for government actors to view collaborations 
as more than a voluntary organization.  
Specific legitimacy sources were also noted for each government level. For local 
governments across all cases, a key legitimacy source was the alignment of the body’s mandate 
with community well-being. For example, a municipal public servant reflecting on the LWA 
explained: 
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This Council… has always indicated that this Lake is very important to the 
community… damage to it and not understanding the science behind it could lose our 
advantage in all sorts of different things, be it in the community, loss of jobs, all those 
types of things. Consequently, we have tried to support them [LWA] both in kind, in 
free space, and a $10,000 fee for service (Interview 11). 
Even though the LWA is not government led, there is recognition of its contribution to the vitality 
of the community. Also, noted in local government judgements towards CWB, LWA and SLIPP 
was the positive judgement of a legal and financial structure similar to the OBWB’s letters patent 
through provincial legislation. For example, “the nice thing about the Okanagan Board's model is 
that they are legislated with a set mandate and their territory is defined and they have some power 
associated with it. That is what we are missing as a council” (Interview 59, local government 
politician, SWC). This sentiment reflects the desire for a sense of stability and the resource 
support that is provided through a supportive institutional-setting; a norm that has not yet been 
fully developed at the senior government level for the other cases. 
At the province level, the opinion of ministry senior staff or politicians influenced agency 
support for a body through personal or indirect legitimacy. For example, for SLIPP, personal 
political endorsement influenced provincial support: “one of the keys to this is MLA George 
Abbott. If he continues to support SLIPP, future funding from the province will be committed” 
(Brouwer, 2010). Although the MLA’s continued perspective is unknown, it is interesting to note 
that as public controversy for SLIPP began to emerge, the withdraw of provincial staff leadership 
also changed leading to the transfer of management for the organization. 
Finally, only at the federal level did particular concern emerge for First Nations engagement 
in a collaboration as a legitimacy source. “I would be very hesitant as a federal representative to 
participate in any table that didn't have First Nations participation…because you're just going to 
run into conflict the minute you leave that table” (Interview 14, federal employee, CWB). Other 
federal interviewees expressed similar sentiment, emphasizing an awareness of the need to 
consider First Nations in resource management decisions. 
3.4.1.2 First Nations Government 
First Nations participated in each of the case studies through representation at the tribal council 
(NWC), nation (OBWB & SLIPP/SWC), or band (LWA, CWB) level. The type of 
representatives from these levels differed in each case as either band or tribal council chiefs 
(CWB, NWC), band or nation-level staff (LWA, OBWB), or volunteer nation representatives 
(SLIPP/SWC). In all cases, except the NWC, only one representative was present to represent 
First Nations interests even if multiple Bands existed within the watershed. In the OBWB and 
CWB, technical representation on sub-committees also existed. First Nations interests in each 
case included a range of topics such as bringing cultural and spiritual values, traditional 
knowledge, water, fisheries, and land rights and current projects to the collaborative table. 
However, First Nations representation differed in terms of the depth of engagement and the 
frequency of interaction in each case (e.g., from the CWB being co-managed and regularly led by 
a member of the Cowichan Tribes’ Chief and Council to the limited attendance of the Okanagan 
Nation Alliance (ONA) at OBWB board meetings (according to board meeting minutes from 
2013-2015). Despite these differences, five main legitimacy sources were identified in First 
Nations’ CWG judgements.  
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First, two interconnected sources of legitimacy that influence First Nations judgements 
include recognition and respect for limited First Nations capacity and the prioritization of their 
interests. Within the CWB case, Cowichan Tribes has a role as a leader of the organization and 
has thus been able to help shape the body to align with the priorities of the Tribe so that their 
capacity can be extended by the work of the CWB. “They [CWB] recognize a lack of capacity. 
They come and they help us. They talk to us. They don't demand, but they want us there. And 
every time they do anything, First Nations are always recognized” (Interview 28, Cowichan 
Tribes staff). As a result, with the CWB, Cowichan Tribes’ concerns around fisheries and water 
quality are prioritised within the case, enhancing their desire to be involved. “They're well 
recognized, they're well supported… and as a result of this they become willing to be a part of the 
process with NGO and industry people – even though they don’t have to go there” (Interview 86, 
provincial employee, BC-wide). This example is in contrast to sentiment within the OBWB 
where the ONA added to the board as a seat when the collaboration renewed its focus after over 
forty years in existence: 
A lot of the things that we work on are really quite mundane. So, if you're a chief and 
you have a choice of either be working on some very serious land rights negotiation or 
coming down and talking about communications. What would you choose to work 
on? (Interview 90). 
If a collaboration is not relevant to a First Nation, then their capacity limits will likely influence 
their judgement towards a collaboration in a negative way. In the OBWB, this limitation was 
observed as occasional ONA staff participation rather than Chief and Council at board meetings 
and ONA interns as representatives on the OWSC. As a result, OBWB First Nations engagement 
was limited to technical, rather than political discussion based on the involved individuals’ 
portfolios. This recognition and respect of capacity limitations also connects to the prioritization 
of interests. If First Nations participation does not provide tangible value back to the Band or 
Nation, questions also arise about whether a collaboration is worthy of their time. For 
SLIPP/SWC and the OBWB, because First Nations do not contribute to the tax base that funds 
both bodies, they are not eligible to vote on financial decisions, and in the case of the OBWB, the 
ONA is not eligible to receive OBWB grants. This led to a sense of disadvantage for example, 
“we would be involved, but it takes a little bit out of you when you go to meetings and you are 
the only one not contributing funding or making decisions” (Interview 72, First Nations 
representative, SLIPP/SWC).  
Third, political tension between the Canadian state and First Nations also influences how 
First Nations judge a collaboration to determine whether or not they would participate. The risk 
of impact on title and rights claims and whether interaction with First Nations was technician-to-
technician or politician-to-politician influenced how a body was perceived. “Generally, 
stakeholder groups including government are a no-no because everything becomes on the record 
in conversation... as [we] do not want to be seen in negotiation” (Interview 33, First Nations 
representative, OBWB). If First Nations are seen to be collaborating it may jeopardize their 
autonomy claims.  
Similarly, as a fourth source of legitimacy, collaborations are judged for who is involved 
and whether they are technical or political personnel. 
We would look at a board…as being a collection of the stakeholders; they are not 
sitting at the table as a representative of the province… [they are] only bringing the 
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technical expertise of the province to the table. They are not there to make 
adjudications for the province, but when a chief is sitting at the table he has that 
responsibility (Interview 74, First Nations representative, SLIPP/SWC). 
Because of the requirement to build Nation-to-Nation relationships in Canada, First Nations must 
be met with equal commitment and participation of political leaders to gain their support. For 
example, with the NWC “they [Carrier Sekani Tribal Council] didn’t feel properly identified as a 
nation to take part in a group of small governments and chambers of commerce and 
environmental groups… they wanted to speak government to government” (Interview 54, First 
Nations representative). This sentiment was also reflected by First Nations in all of the other 
cases. If First Nations elected officials are going to put aside title and rights issues to work at a 
collaborative table then they want to be met as elected officials by elected officials. The equal 
partnership between elected First Nations and regional district officials in the CWB is evidence of 
how this relationship can work and generate acceptance for the body.  
Finally, positive legitimacy judgement, particularly in the form of dedicated political 
involvement, required the time to build meaningful relationships. For the CWG, building 
meaningful relationships meant treating the Cowichan Tribes as a nation and equal government 
partner at a collaboration’s establishment and throughout its existence. Strategic decision by the 
CWB’s initial convenors to not involve Cowichan Tribes as just a member, but as a leader in a 
First Nations government-to-regional government relationship is cited as the first step in gaining 
the Cowichan Tribes support.  
[Cowichan Tribes] have a very strong, legitimate stake as a government in the 
watershed. If this was going to be a local initiative from the very beginning… then 
how could you not have a partnership between the two local [government] bodies that 
depend upon this watershed and that have legitimate authority (Interview 69, CWB). 
This sentiment has also been continued as the CWB has developed. Cowichan Tribes contribute 
financially to the CWB and the CWB continuously makes an effort to engage with the Cowichan 
people: “the Watershed Board has been the most inclusive group for First Nations that I've ever 
seen. They always talk about including First Nations in everything and they're always saying, ‘I 
wish we had more First Nations [involvement]’” (Interview 28, First Nations representative). 
Also, important to this relationship is the building of trust among participants “We really want to 
trust the people we’re sitting down with. We want to know those people; who they are and that 
they're not just, ‘okay, here is somebody just showing up and they are going to be replaced by 
somebody else down the road’” (Interview 82, First Nations representative). Personal 
relationships can thus lead to positive legitimacy judgements.  
Important to note in consideration of these five sources of legitimacy is the influence of 
context in terms of how First Nations use these sources in judgements. Particular contextual 
factors included band-to-band and band-to-tribal council relationships as well as differing 
political agendas among First Nations leaders. In each case, bands were excluded from the 
collaboration because the participating First Nations entity in each collaboration did not represent 
them. The Little Shuswap Indian Band was not part of SLIPP because they are not a part of the 
Shuswap Nation Tribal Council (SNTC) that participated in the collaboration. The Shuswap Band 
is not but the Akisqnuk Band is represented in the LWA. The Splatsin First Nations are not 
represented in the OBWB as they are not a part of the ONA. The Cowichan Lake Band is not part 
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of the Cowichan Tribes and is not part of the CWB as a result and in the context of the NWC, 
multiple First Nation Bands were not included depending primarily on their relationship with the 
Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council. This exclusion has raised concerns about the quality of CWG First 
Nations representation; for example, “they [the Cowichan Lake Band] may still feel somewhat 
slighted about the fact that tribes downstream have a more pivotal decision-making role on the 
board” (Interview 35, finical resource contributor, CWB). Similarly, “if we were honestly 
represented by SNTC that could be a seat, but if we deem we are not, do they offer us a seat?... I 
think every individual band should have the opportunity to sit at that table… [at least then they 
would] be entitled to receiving minutes” (Interview 74, First Nations representative). For First 
Nations, one voice does not represent every Band. Voice may also differ across the mindset of the 
First Nations government in question. For example, personal mindset may play a role: “do you 
have a forward-thinking person at the table or do you have someone who is entrenched in past 
traditions more? That makes a big difference about who you are speaking with and how you will 
get things to happen” (Interview 47, SLIPP, First Nations). The personal beliefs of First Nation 
government leaders in power can influence how their government engages with and judges a 
collaboration.  
3.4.2 Non-government  
3.4.2.1 Agriculture  
Pragmatic legitimacy judgements were common across the agriculture sector, regardless of 
farming type (e.g., arable, pastoral, mixed) in all cases. These include judgements about the effect 
of a case’s work on water allocation licenses and the benefit collaboration can provide to farming, 
such as protection from encroaching development and climate change (e.g., more extreme or 
frequent drought and flooding). These concerns were particularly emphasized in the Okanagan 
where there is a large agriculture demand for water and drought is a major concern: “I think the 
real purpose of the OBWB for me – is drought – when times of drought come we want to be able 
to have a system which is already set up where allocations can be reduced” (Interview 51, 
farmer). Likewise, “it is a big issue for farming; we don't want to see our allocation dropped to 
allow for more people to come in [i.e., move to the Okanagan region] - that is major… the whole 
board might be against me on that - but I just think that is the way it is” (Interview 25, farmer). 
These comments emphasize the value of considering agricultural needs to gain support from the 
sector.  
Nutrient loading from agricultural run-off was identified in the Okanagan, Cowichan, and 
Shuswap as focal issues for each case, leading some agricultural representatives to express feeling 
a sense of opposition separating them from other collaborative participants. 
They [OBWB] have made some mistakes in the past about doing certain things and 
agriculture moving ahead and stuff - I think it was actually a water rates study or 
something and they didn't consult with the farmers - they got lambasted for that. We 
actually told them "how could you do this?" And it was "oh ya we can do that." They 
learned very quickly that you need everybody on side before you go down this path 
(Interview 78, agricultural representative, provincial employee). 
In the Cowichan, a Ministry of Agriculture representative expressed similar concern: 
 121 
I think the Cowichan Watershed Board has got significant priorities identified that 
need work and I think agriculture has got to develop some goodwill at the board table. 
There's concern obviously about this water quality issue. As a result of that, the 
goodwill that agriculture has is limited at the board table. That's going to be a 
challenge to overcome I believe (Interview 86). 
This sense of opposition towards agriculture by collaborative bodies risks animosity towards a 
collaboration from farmers, and impedes positive legitimacy judgements. However, this is not the 
case for all within the sector.  
The majority of agricultural people are the best stewards of the land, not only because 
they care, but because that is their livelihood - and that is why it is not so difficult to 
get the majority of them on side with things like water quality (Interview 34, SWC, 
farmer). 
For SLIPP/SWC, the decision to include agricultural representatives on the board was 
intentional to try and displace animosity, rather than provoke it. For SWC working to build better 
relationships with the agriculture community is particularly important since water quality 
monitoring during SLIPP has indicated that non-point source pollution stemming from areas of 
the watershed that have high agricultural activity have significant nutrient loading issues. Such 
relationship building was noted as an important aspect for how the CWB and the OBWB 
approach water quality issues as well. Similarly, cases that were able to frame environmental 
protection as a benefit to the agriculture sector because of their dependence on the land, were able 
to garner more support for the body. This was evident in projects of the OBWB, CWB, and SWC 
that work with farmers (e.g., CWB’s agriculture conservation workshops for water purveyors and 
farmers (Hunter et al., 2014)). For all these cases, the goal has been to find ways not to blame the 
agriculture sector for water challenges, but instead to help enable the sector to strengthen its 
relationship with the environment in ways that produce both livelihood and ecological benefits. In 
sum, collaborations may be positively judged for the extent that they are able to protect 
agriculture water needs while also sensitively helping the sector embrace environment 
responsibility.  
3.4.2.2 Environment 
Water conservation or stewardship groups are present in the watersheds of each case, although 
their relationships to a collaboration varies. Their relationships ranged from being a participant 
within the collaborative bodies (e.g., Salmon River Watershed Roundtable in the SWC), a 
supportive partner and advocate for the collaboration (e.g., Cowichan Stewardship Roundtable), a 
parallel organization with a limit relationship (e.g., Nechako Environmental Enhancement 
Society), or a non-participating interest group that opposes a collaboration’s work (e.g., Nechako 
River Alliance). Environmental protection is the primary concern for these groups:  
As long as the watershed board stays focused on environmental protection and 
sustainability – so we're here for the fish, we're here for the people that depend on the 
fish and the ecosystems that they support and that support them, then I'm all in 
(Interview 16, CWB, civil society). 
Similar sentiment was apparent across all cases emphasizing the moral and pragmatic basis 
of legitimacy judgements from this sector. This sentiment also emphasizes the strong discourse 
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surrounding these collaborations as entities focused on environmental conservation. For this 
reason, the pragmatic interests of actors working in this sector to address or represent 
environmental needs factors into judgments toward a collaboration. Those representing 
environmental needs want to be assured that a collaboration benefits the environment, typically 
through the production of output that leads to environmental change. Challenges to the belief that 
a collaboration is not capable of producing environmental output is exemplified in the context of 
the NWC, as the Nechako River Alliance (representing eight environmental groups and First 
Nations Bands) withdrew support and participation from the NWC in 1998 (Citizen Staff, 1998). 
The Alliance felt that power imbalance between industry and the others involved would result in 
minimal environmental change in the watershed and did not want to compromise their values 
through consensus. In this sense, the inclusive and consensus-based nature of collaboration 
negatively influenced the legitimacy judgements from within the environmental sector. 
3.4.2.3 Industry 
Three of the five cases included participation from large shareholder-based natural resource 
industry. These industries include Catalyst Pulp and Paper and Timberwest Forestry in the 
Cowichan Watershed, Alcan (now RioTinto Alcan) in the Nechako Watershed, and Gorman 
Bros. Lumber in the Okanagan. The involvement of industry related predominantly to the 
pragmatic benefit participation provides to a company, which included improving community 
relations and social license to operate, meeting public communications and water management 
responsibilities, and protecting water licenses (where appropriate). To illustrate are two 
comments from industry personnel in the Nechako and Okanagan.  
All of this [NWC participation] was intended to protect our water license ultimately, 
and we believe we have to be active in leading the way in terms of sustainability to be 
able to do that (Interview 61, NWC, Alcan representative). 
Most of my role at the Stewardship Council was to make them aware of what 
management forestry does in the watershed… a lot of my role there was to download 
and educate the other members around the table and to stay current on what policies 
were coming up (Interview 44, OBWB, forestry representative). 
These quotations emphasize why industry participates in collaborations, which is also publicly 
exemplified in corporate promotional material (e.g., Alcan, 2006) and shareholder reports (e.g., 
Catalyst Paper Corporation, 2012). However, there were limits to the extent industry engaged in 
each of the three cases. Comments such as “a lot of the agricultural stuff I didn't spend a lot of 
time on” (Interview 44, OBWB, forestry representative) and “Catalyst isn't actively engaged in 
the many aspects of the Cowichan Watershed Board that are not linked directly to the mill 
operations” (Interview 9, industry representative) demonstrate this limit and the importance of 
direct relevance as a condition of industry’s involvement. These expressions were expressed 
consistently across all three cases with industry representatives emphasizing the need for 
collaborations to appeal to industry’s sense of corporate social and environmental responsibility 
so far as it is germane to their work and their shareholders.  
Additionally, expressed in the judgement of a collaboration’s legitimacy and as a factor for 
industry participation was the assurance of a collaboration being impartial and forthcoming: 
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If it is a group of honest, interested stakeholders who meet in good faith, TimberWest 
will reciprocate, and attend, and participate… Legitimacy is having the full - or the 
broadest possible - spectrum of interested stakeholders at the forum. If that's the case, 
pertinent agencies, relevant neighbors, stakeholder groups, and an unbiased and a full 
appreciation of science, in any device, then it is legitimate to us (Interview 18, CWB, 
industry representative).  
In the context of TimberWest, this emphasis on process connects to past community opposition 
towards historic local forestry management, which often included clear-cutting that was visible to 
communities. For TimberWest, overcoming historically-based perceptions as the company has 
sought to embed social and ecological sustainability in their practices requires public spaces 
where representatives are not treated as the enemy. Collaborations can assist in providing this 
space so long as there is a neutral table and the sector is treated fairly and equally.  
3.4.2.4 Local Business and Property Owner Associations 
Local business and property owner associations acted as case participants (LWA, NWC) or 
represented the public through media and at public and board meetings. In general, their support 
exists as awareness of the collaboration and as judgement that the cases respect local interests.  
General awareness of the collaborative bodies was interpreted by interviewees across all 
cases as an indication of community support. Public awareness was conveyed through newspaper 
articles, letters of support for a case, public turnout at a collaboration’s meetings or events, and 
the number of views on a webpage or social media platform. As a result, each case worked to 
develop media and communications strategies to publicly connect. For example, the LWA 
program manager has a standing column in the local newspaper, the Valley Echo, the OBWB’s 
executive director has a social media presence, and the NWC produced media releases after 
council meetings. In this sense, the media was viewed as a way to gain and maintain public 
awareness about the bodies. This awareness then allowed the cases to demonstrate their goals and 
show their role within the community. Nevertheless, across all cases there was concern about 
limited public knowledge of each body. For example, “[the LWA] needs public support…people 
will lose interest if they don't understand it” (Interview 40, local business representative). 
Additionally, similar to local government judgements, whether a collaboration respects local 
citizen interests was also important for public support. For local business owners with vested 
interests in local economic well-being, judgment stemmed from whether the case provided 
pragmatic economic benefit: “this lake is the centre economic piece of our valley and somebody 
is actually paying attention to it – that I can support” (Interview 58, LWA, local business 
representative). However, local business may view a collaboration negatively if it limits 
economic opportunities by promoting environmental conservation. This concern was present for 
the OBWB, LWA, and SLIPP/SWC; to illustrate: 
Sometimes the perceptions around SLIPP are that it's environmental-type people that 
just want to shut things down…. that's a good and a bad thing. They can certainly get 
lots of people active… but sometimes they're perceived as having special interests 
(Interview 13, local business). 
Property owners across the cases also expressed similar concern. Sentiment towards the 
LWA acts as illustration: “the greatest challenge is to not undermine economic viability of the 
Lake. If it gets to the point where they are limiting activity on the Lake that will be viewed 
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negatively and publicly people will turn on them” (Interview 60, property owner association 
representative). For the LWA, SLIPP, and NWC, perceptions that the collaborations would 
prioritize environmental conservation over socio-economic needs was a main factor in how those 
with vested economic interests in the respective watersheds would judge a collaboration. Social 
acceptance for local business and property owner associations thus requires respect for 
livelihoods.  
3.5 Discussion 
Based on the sector-based judgements within the watersheds of each case, basic observations can 
be made about some of the prominent sector-based legitimacy perspectives towards each 
collaboration. Notably, for the CWB gaining provincial government support for the organization 
remains key for the body to move forward with some of its goals (especially concerning water 
quantity/flow control). Establishing clear pathways of accountability, impartiality, and 
demonstrating effectiveness will be particularly important for gaining such support. In contrast, 
for the LWA, local government as well as local business and community owner associations 
perspectives are paramount. The LWA needs to be perceived as neutral to provide unbiased 
advice to local government and demonstrate to the community that water governance for the 
entire watershed will provide both socio-ecological as well as socio-economic benefits. For the 
NWC, even though the body disbanded, legitimacy was strongly tied in the end to the provincial 
government’s failure to allocate funds for the NWC’s recommendation, which then created a 
sense of failure that disengaged participants. Meanwhile, for the OBWB, while a strong 
institutional-setting has allowed government actors to positively perceive the organization’s 
legitimacy, perspectives of legitimacy by First Nations still need to be improved – particularly by 
finding ways to make the organization relevant to the ONA. Finally, for SWC, past public 
controversy, particularly by local business and property owner associations, raised concerns about 
the community benefit of SLIPP as well as the utility of the organization leading to questions by 
government actors as well. The institutionalization of the SWC within a local government bylaw 
and the achievement of environmental improvements will continue to enhance the SWC’s 
legitimacy. 
In reflection of these perspectives, this study’s results indicated that while a variety of 
legitimacy sources influence judgements toward CWG bodies, a strong emphasis on 
pragmatically-based judgements existed across all sectors in all cases. Although CWG brings a 
diverse group of sectors together attempting to find common values towards water, the interests 
of the different sectors are often forefront in legitimacy judgements (Moody, 2009). As a result, 
the interests and motivations different sector-based actors have towards collaborations can be 
indicative of their legitimacy judgements. Consequently, research by other authors (e.g., Brisbois, 
2015; de Loë et al., 2015; de Loë et al., 2016; von der Porten & de Loë, 2013a) that has looked 
in-depth at select sector-based beliefs toward CWG align with the findings of this paper. For 
example, this paper identified agricultural judgements to be based on the ability for CWG bodies 
to help protect agricultural water allocation licenses, address water issues that affect farmers and 
improve agricultural-environmental sustainability. de Loë et al. (2015), Murray and de Loe 
(2012a) and Simpson et al. (2015) studying the perspectives of farmers towards CWG identify 
these same variables (e.g., addressing flood and drought issues that affect farming) along with 
others as CWG benefits to the agriculture sector. Similarly, some of the motives for industry 
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participation in CWG (e.g., strengthening of social license) identified by (de Loë et al., 2016) and 
Brisbois (2015) are also included within the legitimacy judgements identified within this paper.  
This study also furthers Moody’s (2009) observation of the primarily pragmatic nature of 
non-government actor judgements towards a collaboration by also including government actors. 
For example, the state’s concern for community readiness and governance stability may be driven 
by a desire to limit resource expenditures, a known concern for many Western governments 
(Lockwood et al., 2009). Likewise, government concern for the involvement of other agencies in 
a collaboration may tie to concerns about overstepping or maintaining jurisdictional divisions of 
power (de Loë & Kreutzwiser, 2007). For First Nations governments, the pragmatic interests of 
ensuring their right to self-determination and being recognized as a nation-based government 
partner (von der Porten et al., 2015) particularly acted as themes within their legitimacy 
judgements. Importantly, the First Nations legitimacy judgements were perhaps the most cynical 
of CWG compared to the others and their pragmatic interests should be noted as an area to 
address when looking for ways to enhance CWG legitimacy. von der Porten et al. (2015), through 
research on the BC CWG context (including the OBWB specifically), confirm this negative view, 
claiming that within BC CWG there is poor understanding and treatment of First Nations as a 
self-determining, politically autonomous nation. von der Porten et al. (2015) also make practical 
recommendations to address this inadequacy suggesting action such as correcting resource and 
capacity differences between First Nations and other collaborative actors and ensuring processes 
and goals are developed with First Nations involvement. This action, in turn, could also improve 
legitimacy judgements.  
Discussion of the sector-based pragmatic interests of actors involved in a collaboration is 
not surprising as collaborative governance aims to incorporate diverse interests (Emerson et al., 
2009) using interest-based negotiation (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009) and consensus building 
(Ansell & Gash, 2007). However, even as mutual benefits and interests are identified, the 
pragmatic interests of a sector still present as the primary sources of a legitimacy judgement. 
Recognition and occasional reassessment of theses interests may thus help a collaboration better 
establish, maintain, or defend its legitimacy to various sectors. At the core of such an examination 
of the different interests is the question: whose legitimacy matters? Ultimately, an answer to this 
question is context specific depending on the issue being considered and the role different sectors 
play in contributing to and solving the problem at hand. To illustrate, consider SWC and the 
science-based confirmation that non-point source agriculture run-off is a water quality issue that 
needs to be addressed. In considering how to approach remediation, it can be worthwhile to 
consider how the SWC is viewed by the agriculture sector, as well as possibly government (i.e., 
Ministry of Agriculture) if they are needed to provide support or regulatory enforcement. 
Knowing and respecting the pragmatic interests of the agriculture sector can help build support 
for the approaches taken to address the pollution issues; in turn, this may also strengthen 
legitimacy judgements towards a collaboration. Also, relevant in the assessment of different 
legitimacy judgements, is considering how these perspectives evolve over time. It can be 
expected that as actors become more familiar with the norms of collaboration and as a 
collaboration becomes further institutionalized within society, that their interests may be 
influenced with the values of the collaborative process itself (Box, 2002). Such consideration may 
already be evident within government sector legitimacy judgements that were influenced by a 
community willingness to work together and the involvement of other government agencies.  
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Findings from this study also revealed that all legitimacy judgements drew from each 
grouping of legitimacy types presented in Table 4.1. However, no one typology alone adequately 
covered an entire sector’s judgements, let alone the entire social system. This inadequacy of 
typologies is supported by Black (2008) who asserts that different judgments of legitimacy may 
not even be based on the same evaluations. Legitimacy research that diagnostically uses one 
typology for analysis (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Hogl et al., 2012; Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Orr, 
2015; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005) is therefore at risk of missing crucial sources of legitimacy 
that matter empirically. When the intention is to draw on or apply legitimacy theory to empirical 
settings, utilizing a variety of legitimacy typologies, as in Table 4.1, can produce a more robust 
understanding of legitimacy sources.  
How different legitimacy judgements relate across sectors was also discernible from the 
findings. There are both overlapping and adversarial legitimacy judgements. For example, local 
business and property owners’ associations and local government both factor impact on local 
community well-being into their judgements. Conversely, for example, the environmental 
sector’s judgements concern the ability of a collaboration to produce environmental outcomes 
regardless of inclusivity compared to the state’s concerns for inclusivity or procedural justice, 
which may hinder environmental output by slowing decision-making. Although collaborative 
governance is known for bringing multiple interests together (Ansell & Gash, 2007), conflicting 
interests may require a collaboration to prioritize the legitimacy concerns of one over another, 
ultimately decreasing legitimacy judgements by the non-prioritized group (Tregidga et al., 2007). 
The findings show how this challenge manifests in all of the cases; for example, for the NWC, 
involvement of (RioTinto) Alcan in the collaboration, while increasing support of the NWC by 
industry led to environmental civil society withdrawing support. Awareness of, justification for, 
balance between, and management of these trade-offs may help garner support from a broader 
range of society. Likewise, observing where there is overlap of sector judgements (i.e., sources 
and types of legitimacy of similar nature used across multiple legitimacy judgments) may indicate 
focus areas where attention could strengthen support and counteract challenges in other areas.  
The findings also emphasized the differences in considering legitimacy as a social judgment 
versus a normative attribute. Pragmatic legitimacy concerns rarely show up in normative 
legitimacy interpretations (Black, 2008); however, there is a relationship between the two. 
Pragmatic judgements provide a foundation that socially justify the function of CWG bodies 
within their social system. Normative legitimacy theories identify ideals and act as assessment 
frameworks to evaluate empirical settings. Moreover, parts of normative theories (i.e., legitimacy 
types) appear within social judgments of legitimacy. Understanding what legitimacy types are 
valued within different settings and by different sectors can indicate the practicality of different 
normative theories to collaboration. In the context of CWG, particularly at the local watershed 
level, the premise of a body is often to create practical change on a given issue; thus, having 
normative theories that are not lofty unachievable goals empirically can help provide accurate 
assessment of different bodies.  
Together these observations make a case for collaborations to strategically manage 
legitimacy by openly monitoring their environment (Patel et al.) and considering both collectively 
and individually the legitimacy judgments of all actors regardless of sector (Black, 2008). To help 
with this process, researchers, practitioners and policy makers when assessing CWG legitimacy 
should ensure conceptual clarity about the form of legitimacy (judgement, normative or process 
based) in question and when considering judgement-based legitimacy make clear whose 
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perspective is of concern. From a practical standpoint, not providing clarity risks excluding 
perspectives and not gaining legitimacy from select social sectors. Strategic management of a 
body’s legitimacy can benefit from a polycentric framework to provide awareness of all different 
perspectives and to efficiently manage resources when attempting to gain support from different 
groups. By identifying each sector’s interests and legitimacy judgments, collaborations can 
become more relatable to a diversity of sectors.  
3.6 Conclusion 
CWG bodies are an important part of efforts to address various water issues. The legitimacy of 
these bodies is pivotal to their ability to function and produce results. Knowing the common 
legitimacy sources different sector-based actors use to empirically judge CWG bodies should be a 
part of efforts to strategically manage legitimacy. This requires a pluralistic understanding of 
legitimacy judgements. There are a variety of different sector-based actors in CWG with varying 
interests and motivations pertaining to CWG, which can influence what sources are drawn on to 
make legitimacy judgments. The pragmatically-oriented nature of legitimacy judgements 
(Moody, 2009) means that knowledge of the different sector-based interests and motivations of 
CWG actors can help in understanding the composition of their legitimacy judgements. While 
some research on the interests of different sectors exist (e.g., Brisbois, 2015; de Loë et al., 2015; 
de Loë et al., 2016; Milton & Lepage, 2010), this work is not connected to legitimacy 
perspectives. This paper represents an effort to empirically make these connections through an 
understanding of the composition of common legitimacy judgements.  
By working to further knowledge on the composition of sector-based legitimacy 
judgements, management efforts can then be tailored to not only recruit and retain participants 
from different sectors, but can also gain their resource support and willing compliance to 
collaborative decisions. Caution of management efforts is necessary though; while some 
judgements may complement each other, others may be in conflict with each other. Addressing 
concerns of one sector, may negatively influence the judgements stemming from another. 
Identifying the perspectives and openly discussing ways to mitigate differences can help 
collaborations effectively manage their legitimacy.  
To help with these management efforts, future research studying the interests and 
motivations of various sectors should connect to discussion on legitimacy judgements. 
Furthermore, future study of how different actor groups’ judgements evolve, how different 
perspectives interrelate and are impacted by management decisions, what the interests and 
connected judgements are of other sectors (e.g., youth, financial institutions, women), and how 
the normative nature of collaboration itself can modify interests will compliment this study’s 
initial assessment. For any of these efforts, CWG legitimacy researchers must also clearly 
acknowledge that their interpretation of legitimacy as a social judgement (in contrast to it being a 
normative value or process (Suddaby et al., 2016)). This can help to build conceptual clarity for 
legitimacy both by researchers and practitioners. By identifying legitimacy as a sector-based 
judgement, collaborations can better understand how to gain support and credibility for its 
operations as legitimacy means different things to different people.  
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4 Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
Collaborative governance has become a favoured approach to make decisions and take action for 
different resources, particularly water. Legitimacy is essential to ensure this approach can 
produce order, stability and effectiveness. This dissertation has addressed knowledge gaps 
concerning specific nuances of legitimacy in the context of collaborative water governance 
(CWG). The following reviews these efforts offering summary observations on CWG legitimacy. 
This is accomplished by synthesising the principle findings and identifying their significant and 
original contribution to knowledge. To do so, the research’s purposes and objectives, major 
findings, academic and practical contributions, limitations, and areas deserving of further study 
are discussed. Finally, a personal reflection on the research process concludes this work.  
4.1 Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this research was to provide conceptual clarity about the multi-faceted and 
dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy. This was accomplished by drawing on collaborative 
governance and legitimacy literatures from across multiple disciplines and empirically assessing 
the legitimacy of five CWG bodies in accordance with the following objectives: 
1) To synthesise existing legitimacy typologies and build a robust conceptual framework of 
legitimacy types that can be used for the integrated assessment of CWG legitimacy; 
2) To examine how CWG legitimacy evolves as a collaborative body develops; 
3) To determine variations in the composition of CWG legitimacy judgements by sector; and 
4) To provide insight into ways collaborative practitioners can influence legitimacy to enhance 
the effectiveness and stability of CWG according to various perspectives. 
4.2 Major Findings 
To achieve these objectives, the research was presented as three interrelated manuscripts that 
individually addressed objectives one, two and three and collectively addressed objective four. 
Chapter Two presented a synthesized framework of legitimacy types relevant to CWG and 
demonstrated the framework’s empirical relevance. Chapters Three and Four used Chapter Two’s 
synthesised framework to examine temporal changes to legitimacy and variations in sector-based 
legitimacy perspectives. Each chapter's findings were drawn from the empirical study of five 
watershed- or local-level CWG bodies. Following is a synthesis of the chapters’ major findings. 
Chapter Two findings were a product of reviewing CWG legitimacy using a conceptual 
framework of legitimacy types from 18 different typologies. Typologies that were used to form 
the conceptual framework stem from different interpretations that exist across multiple disciplines 
such as political science (e.g., Arnull, 2002; Beetham, 2013; Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Easton, 
1965; Føllesdal, 2005; Scharpf, 1997), organisational sociology (e.g., Matheson, 1987; Scott, 
1995; Suchman, 1995), international affairs (e.g., Bernstein, 2004; Etsy, 2006), and 
environmental governance (e.g., Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005). The goal of this work was to 
identify relevant CWG legitimacy types and their empirical sources. Such work was deemed 
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important because legitimacy is essential to effective collaborative governance (Baird et al., 
2014; Connelly et al., 2006; Orr, 2015), but multiple legitimacy typologies create uncertainty 
about how it is attained and maintained. From these typologies, legitimacy stems from the 
normative appropriateness of processes (e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Levi et al., 2009), the 
achievement or appropriateness of results (e.g., Rothestein, 2009), legality or legal correctness 
(e.g., Craik, 2007), institutionalism (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Johnson et al., 2006), a 
social belief or interaction signifying compliancy or desirable action (e.g., Walker, 2004), or 
those involved (e.g., De Cremer, 2002; Matheson, 1987). As such, legitimacy types relate to 
practice, results, institutional-setting, social acceptance, and individuals.  
Findings from the application of the 18 typologies to CWG revealed 22 legitimacy types 
relevant to the study of CWG. This led to the claim that empirical legitimacy of CWG bodies 
cannot be fully assessed using only one legitimacy typology. For example, using one legitimacy 
typology such as Scharph’s (1999) input-output framework may miss other sources that validate a 
collaboration related to the legal, social, or people-based types of legitimacy. Thus, a synthesis of 
legitimacy types is needed to understand the many different interpretations of legitimacy and the 
contextually-based sources of legitimacy related to each type. Accepting such a synthesised 
understanding of legitimacy is significant for the study of CWG as it furthers claims that 
legitimacy is a hybrid governance attribute. Authors that acknowledge the hybrid nature of 
collaborative governance legitimacy (e.g., Hogl et al., 2012; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van 
Buuren et al., 2012; Wallington et al., 2008) have done so only by recognising the different basis 
of legitimacy types within one typology. This study goes further by recognising that a wide range 
of legitimacy types from multiple typologies are relevant to CWG and that the range of 
interpretations of legitimacy guiding these typologies is also relevant to the study of CWG 
legitimacy.  
Nevertheless, having a comprehensive understanding of legitimacy in terms of awareness of 
different interpretations and related legitimacy sources and types can enhance the strategic 
management of CWG legitimacy. Chapter Two thus establishes a conceptual guide to empirically 
identify the different legitimacy sources and types according to theory. This effort reflects calls to 
know more about the components of collaborative governance (e.g., Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; 
O'Leary & Bingham, 2009). By knowing more about the many different sources and types of 
CWG legitimacy, an effort can be made to strategically manage collaborative bodies’ legitimacy 
to help stabilize and build the effectiveness of individual groups. Thus, while many collaborative 
scholars (e.g., Gunningham, 2009; Koontz & Thomas, 2006; McClosky, 2000) have questioned 
the ability of collaborative governance to actually produce environmental change, this dissertation 
instead focuses on strategic legitimacy management as a way to help build the success of 
collaborations. Utilising Chapter Two’s synthesis of legitimacy types, Chapter Three and Four 
explore the temporal and perception-based differences of CWG legitimacy types. 
Chapter Three empirically assessed the temporal nature of CWG legitimacy with the goal of 
understanding how legitimacy evolves as CWG bodies develop. This work acts as a response to a 
call by Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) to know more about how collaborative governance 
elements evolve over time. Findings indicated that as CWG develops organizationally through 
stages of establishment, growth, maturity, decline and either renewal or dissolution, dominant 
legitimacy concerns evolve as well. At each stage, the most prevalent legitimacy concerns shift 
from initially being focused on a sense of need for the body, to the management of process and 
production of results, to developing a sense of permanence and then to defending the relevance 
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and utility of the body with the guidance of a champion. In this sense, during the evolution of a 
collaborative body, legitimacy priorities shift from being about its establishment, to its 
enhancement, maintenance and defence.  
Where Chapter Three’s findings focused on how legitimacy differs over the course of a 
CWG body's organisational development, Chapter Four shifted the focus to examining variations 
in legitimacy judgements based on the range of common societal sectors involved in or impacted 
by CWG. As such, Chapter Four's goal involved identifying the dominant sources and types of 
legitimacy influencing the judgements of different sector-based actor groups towards the five 
empirical case studies. 
Key findings from Chapter Four show that because CWG brings a diversity of sectors into 
the governance process, judgements about a collaborative body’s legitimacy are inevitably as 
diverse as well. Government, First Nations, agriculture, environmental civil society, industry, and 
local property owner associations and businesses all use differing norms and values, many of 
which pragmatically align with the agenda and concerns of each individual sector, to inform 
actor’s judgements towards CWG bodies. For example, government actors commonly look for 
the involvement of other government actors as an indication of legitimacy, while industry 
representatives commonly look at the CWG body’s ability to further the corporate social 
responsibility mandate of their company as a positive legitimacy value. This finding adds depth to 
interpretations of CWG legitimacy by other scholars (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Trachtenberg & 
Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2012) who consider societal judgements only as a collective 
rather than in a sectoral or individual manner. 
The analysis in Chapter Four also makes a case for an empirical polycentric lens to study 
legitimacy given its intersubjective and context-specific nature (Connelly et al., 2006). Normative 
(e.g., Beetham, 2013; Føllesdal, 2005; Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998) and power or rule-based (e.g., 
Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2009; Weber, 1964) interpretations of legitimacy only provide one view on 
legitimacy that may not actually matter in individual empirical judgements. Given that CWG 
body decisions can have a direct impact on water resource sustainability, considering the actual 
perceptions of legitimacy in given contexts regardless of normative or rule-based ideals may be 
more important to ensuring CWG bodies can successfully achieve their goals related to local 
water sustainability. 
Finally, acknowledging the variation of different actor’s legitimacy judgements be sector 
means that considering how to strategically manage legitimacy requires a tailored approach not 
just through the temporal development stages of a collaboration, but also based on whose 
perspective is being valued. Such a finding directly responds to objective four by further 
suggesting how to strategically manage legitimacy for CWG bodies. Variation in legitimacy 
judgements by sector means that action establishing, enhancing, maintaining, and defending 
legitimacy must respond to the different interests and values held by actors within these sectors. 
This requires finding ways to manage the trade-offs between contradicting legitimacy values – 
e.g., producing quick environmental change versus satisfying time-intensive process requirements 
like inclusivity.  
 131 
4.3 Contributions 
4.3.1 Academic Contributions 
This research was guided by insights from two broad literary fields: collaborative governance and 
legitimacy. The literature on collaborative governance (e.g., Bingham, 2010; Emerson & 
Nabatchi, 2015; O'Leary & Bingham, 2009; Thomson & Perry, 2006), collaborative 
environmental governance (e.g., Holley et al., 2012b; Innes & Booher, 2003; Koontz, 2006; 
Margerum, 2008; Newig & Kvarda, 2012), and collaborative water governance (e.g., Leach, 
2006; Lubell, 2004; Memon & Weber, 2010; Sabatier, Focht, et al., 2005a) provided insight on 
the mode of governance being studied. Literature on political legitimacy (e.g., Beetham, 2013; 
Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Etsy, 2006; Føllesdal, 2005; Lord & Magnette, 2004; Scharpf, 1997; 
Weber, 1964), organizational and institutional legitimacy (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; 
Easton, 1965; Johnson et al., 2006; Matheson, 1987; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011); collaborative 
environmental governance legitimacy (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2010; Connelly, 2011; Hogl et al., 2012; 
Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Wallington et al., 2008), and collaborative water governance legitimacy 
(e.g., Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom et al., 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van 
Buuren et al., 2012) provided insight on legitimacy's many interpretations and differing 
dynamics. Findings from this research are most directly applicable to literature on collaborative 
water governance and its legitimacy; however, scholars of the other aforementioned fields may 
also draw insights from the findings.  
Broadly, this research contributes to existing scholarship that is addressing a knowledge gap 
surrounding legitimacy dynamics of alternative governance models that exist outside of 
traditional state-based decision-making structures (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2006; Baird et al., 2014; 
Connelly, 2011; Edwards, 2016; Hogl et al., 2012; Orr, 2015; Sabatier, Focht, et al., 2005a; 
Sandstrom et al., 2014). The four objectives of this study directly contribute a theoretical 
synthesis of legitimacy typologies relevant to empirical assessments of legitimacy in the context 
of CWG as a specific type of alternative governance. By doing so, this study also contributes to 
discussions criticizing the complexities and challenges of collaborative governance in terms of 
process management (e.g., Kallis et al., 2009; Margerum & Robinson, 2015; McClosky, 2000) 
and in the context of environment and water governance, its ability to produce expected 
ecological outcomes (e.g., Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Newig & Kvarda, 2012). Furthering CWG 
legitimacy knowledge and arguing for CWG legitimacy’s strategic management provides 
additional information about CWG challenges and, rather than provide further criticism, suggests 
techniques to help make collaborations more effective despite legitimacy complexities. As a 
result, the research findings make four main contributions to the academic. These contributions 
concern (a) the conceptual nature of legitimacy for CWG, (b) methodological insights for 
studying CWG legitimacy, (c) the value of legitimacy analysis for collaborative governance, and 
(d) strategic legitimacy management for CWG. 
 First, the nature of legitimacy as a hybrid, pluralistic, and dynamic governance attribute 
was confirmed and expanded through the collective findings of Chapters Two, Three, and Four. 
Although, scholars of collaborative governance commonly acknowledge that legitimacy is a 
hybrid attribute (Bäckstrand, 2010; Baird et al., 2014; Hogl et al., 2012; Van Buuren et al., 2012; 
Wallington et al., 2008), this research extends this claim by both theoretically and empirically 
outlining the myriad of relevant legitimacy types and their empirical relevance for CWG bodies. 
Theoretically, legitimacy types are practice-, results-, institutional setting-, social-, and 
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individually-based, yet no one typology of legitimacy alone provides a comprehensive 
framework. This dissertation empirically demonstrates that CWG legitimacy is constituted from a 
range of sources related to these different legitimacy types. Understanding the differences of 
these legitimacy sources and types – such as when and why they are used and by whom – can 
help understand how legitimacy sources lead to different claims about a body’s legitimacy or 
illegitimacy (Tost, 2011). As a result, Chapters Three and Four sought to explain how legitimacy 
sources manifest over time and how they are used by common sector-based groups to judge 
CWG. The temporal analysis of Chapter Three showed that CWG legitimacy manifests 
differently over the evolution of a collaborative body and its management challenges change from 
establishment, to extension, to maintenance, and to defence. This finding extends claims made by 
others (e.g., Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Fisher et al., 2016; Sonpar et al., 2009; Suchman, 1995) 
concerned with other organisational contexts about how legitimacy changes over time to CWG 
and show the prioritization of unique legitimacy sources and types at different development 
stages for CWG. Legitimacy management approaches can thus be adopted to prioritise these 
different sources as a collaboration develops. Furthering Chapter Two and Three's findings, 
Chapter Four highlighted the need to consider society’s judgements on a sectoral basis, 
particularly as collaborative bodies seek to bring a diversity of cross-sector actors to the table. 
Exploring legitimacy judgements on an individual level by sector exemplified the pluralistic 
nature of CWG legitimacy. Individuals judgements towards a collaboration are made up of 
multiple legitimacy types and sources, some of which are more prominent than others based on 
sector. Individual sector-based behaviours are one of the key variables influencing collaborative 
governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Therefore, gaining insight into their values and perspectives 
can be useful to strategically help make decisions to gain support from different sectors and to 
know when CWG is a suitable form of governance for a given situation.  
Second, in addition to making a conceptual contribution about the characterization of CWG 
legitimacy, this dissertation provides methodological insight into the empirical study of CWG 
legitimacy. Findings demonstrate the hybrid nature of CWG legitimacy, which was a direct result 
of identifying a range of legitimacy typologies from across academic disciplines. This hybridity 
creates a rationale for a cross-disciplinary approach to studying CWG legitimacy. The primary 
reasoning for this need is that unlike governance bodies that exist within or through the direction 
of the state, CWG at the watershed level tends to exists as a public interest entity whereby both 
organisational and political theory have application. As a result, theories, typologies, and 
interpretations of legitimacy stemming from research on governmental (e.g., Beetham, 2013; 
Bekkers et al., 2007; Bernstein, 2004; Etsy, 2006) and organisational (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006; 
Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995) bodies are relevant. CWG legitimacy analysists must clearly 
distinguish and defend the type of legitimacy (and its disciplinary background) or analyse CWG 
legitimacy from a holistic framework such as the one presented in Table 2.2. In addition, this 
dissertation as a whole makes a contribution to the way legitimacy is studied. This is done by 
demonstrating the value of adopting a cross-disciplinary empirical method that transcends 
normative and positive interpretations of legitimacy to assess the ideal practice, results, 
institutional-setting, social acceptance, and individual bases of CWG legitimacy. Consideration of 
all these bases is useful for longitudinal and perspective-based studies.  
Third, complementing this contribution, a case is also made to incorporate legitimacy more 
directly into collaborative governance literature about the management of collaborative processes. 
While legitimacy is commonly recognized as a core governance attribute, many general reviews 
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of collaborative governance (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson & 
Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2010; O'Leary & Bingham, 2009; Thomson & Perry, 2006) 
give limited consideration to the many dimensions of CWG legitimacy. While this paper 
acknowledges that legitimacy is not the only attribute that matters for the management and output 
of collaborative governance, findings show the range of perspectives on legitimacy as well as the 
challenges and opportunities these perspectives can present for effective decision-making. Giving 
well-rounded consideration to legitimacy can enhance the robustness of collaborative governance 
analysis. 
Finally, this research has also provided explicit consideration about the strategic 
management of CWG legitimacy. The premise that legitimacy can be strategically managed 
stems from the organisational sociology literature (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Brinkerhoff, 
2005; Sonpar et al., 2009; Suchman, 1995), which posits that organisational bodies can 
instrumentally control how they are socially perceived. Suggestions from this research, which are 
described in the next section, broadly concern forming a localised common understanding of 
CWG legitimacy, identifying and addressing different legitimacy perceptions held within 
different sectors of society while also managing trade-off effects on other sector's beliefs, and 
adopting management approaches over time as collaborative bodies evolve. By making these 
practical recommendations, this work contributes knowledge about how to make collaborative 
bodies function more effectively to achieve their goals. Given debates in the literature about the 
manageability and utility of collaborative governance as a way to effectively achieve 
environmental outcomes in particular (Koontz & Thomas, 2006), this knowledge can then be 
used to argue that the possibility of managing legitimacy challenges can improve CWG’s ability 
to be a suitable model of governance for water resources. A fuller understanding of CWG 
legitimacy’s hybrid, dynamic, and polycentric nature may help both academics and practitioners 
alike better understand how to manage legitimacy so that judgements for whether or not and 
when collaboration should, should not, or should no longer be used as a model of water 
governance can be contextually determined.  
CWG is not the only, or necessarily the best approach, to sustainably manage water 
resources in all cases. CWG qualities such as participant diversity and inclusion, accountability 
and transparency, effective leadership, and popular approval are all desired; however, attaining 
these values is not easy (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). This challenge is what can create 
legitimacy deficits regardless of legitimacy’s interpretation for any CWG body. Nevertheless, if 
collaboration is being used then working to improve its design and management should be a 
priority. Actions to help improve collaborative design and management may include conducting 
situation assessments to decide if the antecedents of collaboration exist in a given location, 
building participant and manager understanding of collaboration dynamics and a shared theory of 
change (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), cultivating leadership and effectively 
valuating productivity and performance (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; O'Leary & Vij, 2012). 
4.3.2 Recommendations for Practice  
Scholars seek to understand collaborative governance, while practitioners work to improve their 
collaborative efforts. Practical contributions from the empirical findings of this dissertation are 
geared towards those managing, convening, facilitating, leading, or participating in collaborative 
water governance bodies. In particular, local and regionally based CWG bodies in BC and in 
other parts of the world can benefit from considering these contributions. Examples of such 
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bodies in BC (in addition to the case studies) include the Shawnigan Watershed Roundtable, the 
Coquitlam River Watershed Roundtable, the Nechako Watershed Alliance and the Nicola 
Watershed Community Roundtable. Elsewhere in Canada, such bodies may include Alberta’s 
Water Protection Advisory Councils and Saskatchewan’s different watershed associations. 
Internationally, examples include the San Francisco Estuary Partnership and Skagit Watershed 
Council in the United States, the United Kingdom’s Regional Water Authorities in Europe and 
the Murry Darling Basin Authority in Australia. Additionally, those contemplating convening a 
CWG body in any context may also find value in considering the following recommendations as 
a part of an effort to build acceptance for the body. The following six considerations represent 
processes or discussions that should occur when determining what the best management 
approaches for legitimacy are in a specific context. 
 
1) When thinking about and assessing legitimacy, clarify how legitimacy is defined 
Legitimacy is a concept that is commonly discussed by practitioners and scholars at a general 
level as an essential attribute, but there is limited critical discussion of the many types or 
interpretations of legitimacy (Hogl et al., 2012). Having a clear understanding of what types of 
legitimacy are relevant in a given context and establishing a clear consensual understanding of 
legitimacy's meaning among collaborative actors may help collaborative bodies strategically 
manage their own form of legitimacy. To help guide these discussions, the conceptual framework 
developed in Chapter Two (Table 2.2) provides a starting point from which to consider the 
multiple ways legitimacy may be conceptualised and sourced for a collaborative body. Awareness 
of the range of legitimacy types and the contextually-based sources is thus the first step in more 
clearly defining the meaning and significance of legitimacy for CWG. Statements describing 
legitimacy of a CWG body should then detail the type(s) of legitimacy being assessed with an 
accompanying rationale.  
 
2) Deliberate about and assess legitimacy strategically and openly as a collaborative body 
In determining what types of legitimacy matter to a specific collaborative body, collaborative 
managers should utilize the inclusive and deliberative nature of CWG to collectively discuss 
different perceptions about a collaborative body’s legitimacy and how to strategically manage 
different legitimacy sources. A starting point may include identifying what legitimacy means to 
different collaborative actors, analysing media and public perceptions towards a collaborative 
body to identify what legitimacy types are used by varying actors to support or challenge a 
collaboration, and collectively making a context specific assessment framework of the actions 
that may support or limit a group’s legitimacy. Such deliberative action may help groups identify 
a common vision of legitimacy and identify potential challenge areas for specific CWG bodies. 
However, care should be given not to inflate legitimacy as the only necessary governance 
attribute; effective governance relies on multiple values such as the presence of resources and 





3) Be aware of different audience discourses and underlying assertions towards a CWG body 
at different times and contexts 
Part of strategically and openly discussing legitimacy as a collaborative body involves 
recognizing the different views of actors involved in or impacted by a collaborative body (the 
polycentrism of legitimacy) as well as how perceptions change over time (the dynamic nature of 
legitimacy). Determining which legitimacy sources are relevant to impacted actors and how the 
related types of legitimacy can be achieved (Edwards, 2016) therefore can help build effective 
decision-making. In the context of CWG, the involvement of different sectors of society means 
that there is no single way to achieve legitimacy. Regardless of whether multiple sectors classify 
a collaborative body as legitimate or illegitimate, the underlying attitude of what constitutes 
legitimacy may differ. Chapter Four provides insight into the different legitimacy sources and 
related types used within the perceptions of different sector-based actors. A multipronged 
approach that carefully considers these different attitudes and how legitimating actions for one 
audience may be interpreted by others is necessary to appropriately manage trade-offs and to 
balance perceptions, particularly if CWG is to be an impartial governance body that is of interest 
to multiple sectors. Moreover, identification and management of different legitimacy sources 
must be reassessed as a CWG body evolves. As Chapter Three highlights, different types of 
legitimacy are more or less relevant at different stages of a collaboration’s development. This 
means that even though different actors may base their legitimacy judgements on different water 
interests, different features of a collaboration may be focused on within these judgements as a 
collaboration evolves. Reassessment of legitimacy perceptions as collaborations develop and as 
environmental and social contexts change are thus necessary for ongoing legitimacy management.  
 
4) Pay attention to areas of illegitimacy and proceed cautiously  
Areas of illegitimacy represent places that can be worked on to improve legitimacy (Tost, 2011). 
Following this logic, identifying delegitimizing sources are equally as important for strategic 
management as legitimizing sources. Common sources of illegitimacy discussed in the empirical 
cases of this dissertation included feelings that the process was unrepresentative, unaccountable, 
or not capable of producing meaningful outcomes. Addressing such challenges through inclusion 
processes, transparency actions, or changed output may help build the legitimacy of 
collaborations. Literature geared towards the management of collaborations (e.g., Bingham et al., 
2008; O'Leary & Bingham Blomgren, 2007; O'Leary & Bingham, 2009) can provide guidance to 
help deal with common collaborative problems. However, action to strategically manage 
legitimacy must be cautiously adopted (Sonpar et al., 2009) to ensure management action in one 
area does not negatively impact other governance attributes or the support given from other 
interest groups (O'Kane, 1993).  
 
5) Be patient and deal with challenges if a collaborative body is to successfully achieve its 
goals 
No governance system is without challenges. Findings in all of the five case studies highlighted 
different legitimacy challenges CWG bodies face, including disfavour or poor management of the 
collaborative process, a lack of output or outcomes, weak formal institutional or legal status, poor 
community support, and unsupportive participants. However, findings also illustrated that the 
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cases that endured through these challenges continued to evolve. For example, SLIPP faced 
challenges overcoming vocal opposition from a select civil society groups; however, renewal 
through modification to its process and focus over time has helped calm these concerns. This 
renewal required time and effort. Collaborative managers and participants should not expect that 
the process and achievement of environmental and social outcomes will be easy (Emerson & 
Nabatchi, 2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Along with building collaborative participant 
understanding of the challenges facing CWG, awareness of the long-term nature of collaboration 
(Nkhata et al., 2008) and of the longer timespan needed for environmental improvements (Biddle 
& Koontz, 2014; Kenney, 2005) can help generate community patience and willingness to 
commit to collaborating. 
 
6) Accept that collaboration may not be able to establish or maintain legitimacy in all con-
texts; the dissolution of a collaborative body does not mean collaboration will never work  
Although this dissertation prioritizes strategic management strategies for legitimacy, there may be 
situations where collaboration is not the best governance model to effectively address certain 
issues despite management attempts. Essentially, not all communities may be ready to collaborate 
even if effort is made to establish a collaborative body (Innes & Booher, 2010). Moreover, 
changing circumstances or problematic actions of a collaboration may lead to insurmountable 
legitimacy challenges. This may include situations where quick action is needed (Nkhata et al., 
2008), where there is an unwillingness to work together (Watson, 2007), where output does not 
lead to intended outcomes (Newig & Fritsch, 2008), or where decision-making creates a 
disproportionate impact on a given sector (Moody, 2009). Collaborative governance is only one 
of multiple governance models that may help address various water resource challenges. 
Legitimacy challenges that cannot be strategically managed may just indicate that collaboration is 
not an appropriate tool at a given time. However, if collaboration is desired but not legitimised 
locally, work must first be done to build the antecedent conditions for collaboration before 
reassessing the possibility for acceptance and the suitability of collaboration at a later time. 
4.4 Study Limitations and Ideas for Future Research 
4.4.1 Methodological Insights 
The conceptual and analytical parameters set around this study mean that other important areas of 
inquiry for CWG legitimacy as well as other interpretations of legitimacy were excluded from 
analysis. Notably, from an epistemological-methodological standpoint, this study examined CWG 
legitimacy using mainly a descriptive approach (compared to normative or diagnostic) that 
examines how legitimacy was granted through the environment and actions of relevant actors in 
the real-world (Hogl et al., 2012; Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004; Suchman, 1995). In this 
sense, this study reviewed how CWG legitimacy was constructed empirically for the real-world 
case studies. In contrast, normative and diagnostic approaches respectively determine ideal 
legitimacy qualities from an objective and prescriptive perspective or evaluate the normative 
acceptability of empirical cases (Hogl et al., 2012; Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004). 
Examination of legitimacy using these other epistemological-methodological standpoints may 
provide further insight into CWG legitimacy’s nature such as quantifying what models of CWG 
are more or less legitimate according to normative legitimacy values.  
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From an ontological perspective, this paper broadly interpreted legitimacy as the 
acceptability of governance (Bodansky, 1999; Hogl et al., 2012), which means that other 
interpretations of legitimacy were either embodied within or excluded from this analysis. For 
example, interpretations that treat legitimacy solely as the extent authoritative power is justifiable 
(e.g., Weber, 1964), or as the conformity to rules or laws (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000) will likely 
yield different insights. Likewise, this study also focused on CWG bodies as case-units, meaning 
that specific aspects of CWG such as certain processes and decisions, as well as CWG 
systematically as a model of governing, were not directly examined. Re-examining CWG 
legitimacy from different interpretations and with different focus points may reveal additional 
insights not uncovered in this dissertation.  
Data collection and analysis considerations also set further parameters around this study. 
Notably, the decision to use semi-structured key informant interviews potentially created bias 
when conceptualising legitimacy in each case. In particular, the identification of relevant 
legitimacy types as empirical findings for Chapter Two, Three, and Four was limited by the 
extent interviewees were able to speak to their respective case’s dynamics. Other data collection 
methods such as surveys or focus groups may have highlighted different dynamics in more or less 
depth or frequency. Likewise, this study inherently favoured the perspectives of those who were 
currently involved in the cases or residing in the respective watersheds during the data collection 
period. Since legitimacy is an empirically evolving concept (Suchman, 1995), perspectives of 
participants who have left the collaborative process may have provided additional insight, 
particularly around temporal changes to each case's legitimacy. Although an attempt was made to 
include past perspectives in each case, difficulty locating as well as receiving a response to 
interview requests was much more frequent compared to current participants and residents. 
Future studies systematically comparing and contrasting perspectives of past and present CWG 
actors may help identify temporal shifts in legitimacy perceptions, which can help identify the 
institutionalisation of collaboration as a model of governing. Furthering the validity of findings, 
the objectives of this dissertation could also be explored through quantitative means – similar to 
CWG legitimacy enquiries by Sabatier, Focht, et al. (2005b) and Edwards (2016) – to examine 
the extent different legitimacy types matter at different points in a collaborative's development 
and according to different perspectives. Finally, the study could also be replicated in different 
contexts outside of BC, at different governance levels (e.g., as national or international bodies), 
and for different forms of collaborative governance, e.g., action versus organizational versus 
policy collaboratives (Margerum, 2008). This would facilitate comparing and contrasting the 
generalizability of findings for CWG at a systematic level and suggest in what contexts CWG 
may be most effective as a governance tool. 
4.4.2 Conceptual Insights 
Four main areas of inquiry were made apparent during the study process that extended beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. First, while this dissertation focused on CWG legitimacy, it is also 
worthwhile to consider CWG illegitimacy as a focal point for research. Illegitimacy is a driver for 
pursuing organisational change (Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Studying the challenging beliefs, 
convictions, or practices that stand in the way of efforts to effectively make decisions and take 
action for the sustainability of water resources is essential to determining ways to help address 
CWG issues. Sources of delegitimization commonly were noted in key informant interviews as a 
critique of CWG bodies. These sources were either the opposites of legitimating sources (e.g., the 
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process was inclusive or not inclusive) or a direct source of illegitimacy (e.g., inclusivity was 
viewed as either contributing to either the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the process). Considering 
what legitimacy sources and types are viewed negatively and the reasons for illegitimacy may 
indicate where and what type of change can be made to either enhance CWG legitimacy or 
suggest that another model of governance may be more suited for a given situation. Likewise, 
exploring what strategic legitimacy management tools are most effective – such as working to 
alter perceptions to align with the current body or altering qualities of the body to align with 
commonly held perceptions (Brinkerhoff, 2005) – can also provide useful insights for CWG 
legitimacy management.  
Second, the ability for governance policy to help formalise CWG also frequently arose in 
interviews across all cases as an important variable that helps establish, maintain, or enhance 
multiple legitimacy types. Calls notably for a provincial policy that provides more coordination, 
government support, and unity to CWG initiatives at the watershed level across BC were 
expressed. Exploring different policy frameworks that can help formalise or legislate CWG, the 
implications of embedding CWG jurisdictionally (i.e., impacts on other legitimacy sources) and 
barriers to such establishment should be further explored.  
Third, consideration for legitimacy in the context of the political ecology of specific CWG 
bodies is also an interesting area deserving further consideration. Since legitimacy is a situated 
social construct (Connelly et al., 2006), it follows that how the ecology of the watersheds are 
experienced by actors involved in or impacted by a collaboration could influence how the 
legitimacy of a collaborative body is judged. Although the intention of this dissertation was not to 
directly explore the political ecology of CWG legitimacy, adopting a social-ecological systems 
view (e.g., Berkes et al., 2003) to more descriptively explore local environmental narratives on 
CWG legitimacy could help further understand the nuances of legitimacy for CWG bodies in 
specific contexts. Such understanding of legitimacy has been sought for other environmental 
contexts such as wildlife conservation (e.g., Bixler, 2013) and ecotourism (e.g., Lawrence & 
Wickins, 1997) and could provide insight for water governance given the changing nature of 
water due both to climate change (e.g., water quantity and quality changes) and the natural 
fluidity of the resource. Particularly interesting questions include how the biophysical nature of 
water as well as historical social processes and interactions with water in specific contexts shape 
the judgements of actors towards CWG. 
Finally, this dissertation examined CWG on the assumption that collaboration is a desirable 
entity and its legitimacy should be strategically managed. Future research may choose to look 
comparatively at CWG compared to state-run initiatives with varying degrees of non-government 
sector participation to explore what governance models may be the most socially accepted in 
different contexts based on legitimacy assessments. Such insight may particularly contribute to 
ongoing work that seeks to evaluate collaborative governance for its effectiveness (e.g., Koontz & 
Johnson, 2004; McClosky, 2000; Newig & Kvarda, 2012). 
4.5 Research Reflections 
4.5.1 Case Reflections 
Given that legitimacy has been interpreted in this dissertation as a perspective-based construct 
that varies according to whose view is prioritized, it is impossible to make substantive claims 
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about whether a collaborative body is or is not legitimate unless a specific audience is prioritized 
(Baird et al., 2014). Therefore, the intention of this research was not to identify whether the cases 
studied were or were not legitimate. Nevertheless, it is possible to reflect on common nuances 
learned about the cases from the research process. Major themes from each case are reflected on 
and three main legitimacy nuances identified from across the cases are shared. 
Cowichan Watershed Board 
The most commonly recognized legitimacy sources of the CWB included the prioritization of co-
governance between the regional district and Cowichan Tribes, the use of action-based 
objectives/targets, the involvement of Federal agencies, a well networked and knowledgeable 
collaborative manager, and the inclusive nature of the technical advisory committee. However, as 
much as these sources were viewed by the researcher to legitimize the CWB, delegitimizing 
sources were apparent as well. Notable concerns included ensuring that First Nations interests do 
not supersede all other water interests, securing stable funding, and making headway on the 
objectives of the organization. Continuing to make headway towards the achievement of the 
CWB objectives through tangible output and securing stable funding will be key in determining 
whether the CWB can mature as an organization.  
Lake Windermere Ambassadors 
The LWA represents an ENGO project that gained broad-based community support to carry on as 
a citizen-led collaboration focused on water stewardship that also acts as an advisory body 
(LWMC) to judge the ecological impact of development proposals for the local governments. The 
most noted legitimacy opportunities and challenges for the LWA from across varying 
perspectives stem from its origin story and its citizen-led nature. As a body that spawned from a 
ENGO (Wildsight) that is known for its conservation rhetoric and opposition to multiple 
development proposals, the LWA began with both a basis of outspoken support and opposition 
from those who either agree with or are against Wildsight. This origin created an opportunity for 
legitimacy as it allowed for supporters of Wildsight to automatically see the LWA as legitimate 
by extension of Wildsight’s initial involvement. It also provided ideal process legitimacy as 
Wildsight provided resources as well as guidance to help develop both structure and process. 
However, the involvement of Wildsight along with the citizen-led nature of the LWA also has 
created skepticism in the community about the neutrality of the LWA’s agenda and missing 
accountability measures should the LWA take on more of a governance role. To overcome these 
challenges, particularly if the LWA is to take on more of a governance role, strategic 
consideration should be given towards process-based accountability measures along with the 
continued promotion of the LWA as an organization separate from Wildsight. 
Nechako Watershed Council 
The NWC was formed in the midst of ongoing conflict about the control of water flows by a large 
industry (Alcan). The collaboration was established to bring together the different sectors to deal 
with opposing opinions and come up with a strategy to mediate the impacts of water diversions. 
Although the NWC was able to bring together a diversity of sectors and build relationships that 
led to a consensus-based proposal for a cold-water release facility to address impacts, both 
political circumstances and organizational dynamics delegitimized the collaboration. Questions 
about the feasibility of the proposal, the lack of senior government support to follow through on 
implementing the release facility, and then the failure of the NWC to evolve and adapt to 
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changing circumstances after the proposal was rejected were main contributors to the 
collaboration losing participants and eventually disbanding. Continuing to work on their 
recommendation, while also broadening their focus to remain current and changing leadership 
within the body may have helped the NWC regain their legitimacy.  
Okanagan Basin Water Board 
The OBWB is the most mature and institutionally established CWG body not only among the 
cases but also within the province. The legitimacy of the OBWB is closely tied to its institutional 
history, its organizational structure established through provincial legislation that binds all three 
regional districts in the watershed together under letters patent and providing tax authority, its 
staff, and its output track record. However, it also faces challenges in gaining meaningful First 
Nations participation, managing a large inclusivity-based technical advisory committee, and 
ensuring that the organization does not become stagnant in delivering its management plans. 
Questioning the type of engagement from the ONA required, TAC power and group dynamics, 
and how to make progress on existing plans are points of consideration for further legitimacy 
maintenance.  
Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/ Shuswap Watershed Council 
SLIPP was initiated to address government silos that most directly were connected to growing 
concerns for water quality issues in the Shuswap Watershed. However, miscommunication and 
the association of SLIPP with regulatory enforcement for foreshore rehabilitation and a dock and 
buoy bylaw by the regional district initially created outspoken public disapproval of collaborative 
efforts. This association forged strong illegitimacy arguments for SLIPP creating additional 
challenges in terms of managing group process and the achievement of results. However, public 
relations efforts to overcome misconceptions, the ongoing sense of need to address water quality 
challenges, the leadership of the chairs and collaborative managers, and the eventual 
establishment of the SWC through a regional district bylaw helped justify the body’s 
continuation. The achievement of results that impact water quality will likely be the biggest 
legitimacy challenge for the SWC in the future.  
Case Comparison 
Cross case reflection of the experiences of these cases also show three nuances about CWG 
legitimacy specific to the cases and provincial context. 
1) How a collaboration is established can have lasting legitimacy affects. Wildsight’s initiation 
of the LWA, the co-management framework of the CWB, public miscommunication of 
SLIPP at the beginning all had a lasting influence on the challenges or opportunities facing 
legitimacy. Strategic legitimacy management is necessary from the initial planning stages of 
an organization and throughout its existence. 
2) Sources of illegitimacy are normal and can be overcome. Legitimacy was not considered to 
be perfect in any of the cases. All faced challenges as noted above; however, these challeng-
es are not static. For example, SLIPP calmed negative public opinion by refocusing their 
mandate and the LWA is continuing to distance itself from Wildsight. Time and strategic 
management of legitimacy can help shift negative legitimacy perspectives. 
3) To advance CWG in BC, a supportive institutional setting is necessary. Other than the 
OBWB, all cases in their evolution faced resource challenges and questions of stability, ac-
countability, and purpose. Having provincial support, for example through partnership, re-
sourcing, or legislation can enhance the effectiveness of collaborations. While a unitary insti-
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tutional framework for all CWG bodies may not be appropriate for BC given regional differ-
ences, this is not an excuse to forgo partnerships and support for CWG bodies.  
4.5.2 Transdisciplinary Reflections  
The transdisciplinary underpinnings of this research include the study of a real-world problem, 
the consideration of multiple disciplinary and practical knowledge forms, and the aim of 
producing a useful significant and original academic and practical contribution to knowledge 
(Bergmann et al., 2005). Interrelated transdisciplinary challenges of (a) defining transdisciplinary 
research, (b) balancing practical and theoretical knowledge contributions and (c) integrating 
multiple forms of knowledge (Tress et al., 2009), all had an impact on this research process. 
First, as a result of transdisciplinary definition differences, I have questioned whether this 
research can actually be defined in this way. A notable definition difference that has caused 
confusion concerns whether transdisciplinary research requires an academic and practitioner 
partnership for development (Bergmann et al., 2005; Hirsch Hadorn et al., 2006; Lang et al., 
2012). This research did not form from a partnership, but rather from many informal 
conversations and observations about collaborative governance challenges with practitioners. 
Consequently, I have questioned how the research process might have differed if a partnership 
had been formed with select collaborative bodies to collaboratively develop the research goals. 
This debate led me to realize the importance of having a clear definition of not only concepts in 
research, but of the research process itself. Tress et al. (2009) even explain that such uncertainty 
can create operational challenges for transdisciplinary research such as ensuring research is 
valued both practically and academically.  
Second, in my own research, questions arose such as who the main audiences should be for 
research dissemination, what constitutes a contribution to knowledge, and what forms of 
knowledge should be prioritised. In particular, identifying ways to operationalize legitimacy 
knowledge into useable practitioner-based knowledge was difficult given its theoretical nature. If 
a narrower definition of transdisciplinarity had been stipulated and a partnership with select 
collaborative bodies had been used, such questions and issues may have been more directly 
tailored to the needs of the partner groups. In the case of water governance, the benefits of having 
research be directly useful to practitioners is especially relevant, given that deeper understanding 
of effective governance may help address the social and ecological effects of water issues 
(Renner et al., 2013). 
Finally, I began my graduate studies thinking about the challenges of popular acceptance 
and the validity of SLIPP, which exists in my hometown. This beginning was grounded in a 
desire to help make a practical contribution to water sustainability by understanding strategic 
ways to help body’s like SLIPP achieve their goals. However, throughout the research process, I 
was continually confronted with broader questions about whether collaborative governance was 
even an appropriate form of governing in certain circumstances. Such questioning required 
conceptual thinking about how CWG is understood. Thus, while my focus on legitimacy as a 
research topic was motivated by wanting to help certain bodies with strategic management 
decisions, the transdisciplinary influence of the program also led me to see how such a 
contribution can be furthered by critical analytic work as well. Practitioners have to decide 
whether collaboration is a worthwhile mode of governance for water resources in their own 
setting. Knowledge on the legitimacy challenges and dynamics of collaborative governance may 
help indicate whether or not and when to start a collaboration, how to work to overcome or 
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manage opposition or deficits for any given body, or when to end a collaboration. In this sense, 
distinguishing what is a practical contribution versus an academic contribution to CWG 
legitimacy blurs. Making a practical contribution of this nature is not possible without theoretical 
reflection. Likewise, making an academic contribution to knowledge has little value in the field of 
environmental studies if it is not useable.  
4.5.3 Personal Reflections 
Next to learning about transdisciplinary research, I have also learned about my own development 
as a researcher. The importance of (a) learning by doing, (b) having a community of support, and 
(c) clearly defining project boundaries for proper time management were main takeaways I 
gained about the research process.  
Through this research, the value of experiential learning was personally reinforced as a way 
to acquire skills and knowledge. Not only gaining an understanding of the social, cultural and 
personal aspects or conducting research, but also observing, experiencing, and actively engaging 
with practitioners together have allowed me to learn how to research and produce knowledge in 
the field of environment and resource studies. Both empirical exploration and literary insight are 
necessary to ensure research is evidence-based and empirically appropriate. The experience of 
researching CWG legitimacy showed me the unique challenges of producing such research – 
critically analysing and interpreting theoretical and practical knowledge, flexibly working within 
different contexts (i.e., within academic and practical spaces), professional adapting interpersonal 
skills (e.g., respectfulness, humility, friendliness) all matter to the research process. Knowledge 
development, particularly from empirical work, requires personal skills that extend beyond basic 
analytic thinking.  
Also crucial is having a community or network of support. Throughout this PhD, the 
support of others was vital in helping me learn to develop and carry out the project, think about 
the conceptual and methodological challenges facing the research process, and maintain my 
mental health as I faced challenging life circumstances. This community exists as a network of 
academics, practitioners, and personal relations, which taught me that the PhD research process is 
more than just an academic undertaking. Throughout the research process, developing, nurturing, 
and giving back to my network helped me further conceptual thinking on CWG legitimacy as 
well as my capacity to do the work. For future research endeavours continuing to strengthen my 
network, especially through actions such as participating in professional associations, attending 
conferences, networking, and building relationships with peers will help further the reach of my 
research contributions.  
However, in conjunction with developing this network, I have also realised in hindsight the 
importance of putting conceptual boundaries around what is and is not part of the research 
process to better manage the time frame and prioritisation of producing a dissertation. In 
developing my network and community of support, I often chose to participate in tangential 
research and practitioner-based opportunities to contribute to different projects or processes in 
both an academic and practical capacity. I often justified these activities, based on their ability to 
further my knowledge and experience working within the field of sustainability or water 
management. However, in reflection of the extended period of time completing this PhD has 
taken, a large lesson learned for me is about the value of distinguishing frugally between 
opportunities that will add value directly to a research project versus distractions that may aid 
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personal development but limit the time available to focus on PhD tasks. Budgeting time for any 
given project should be realistic and prioritised. This is especially important moving forward to 
ensure that time is not a negative influence on the output of any endeavour – particularly those 
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SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Can you describe the current and past interaction you personally and the group, organization, or 
interest you represent have had with the collaboration? 
Follow up: Does this differ from other participating groups? How? 
Follow up: Why did you or your organization decide to participate? 
What role have you or your organization provided to the collaboration? How would you 
characterize the collaborative process? 
Follow up: Did everyone participate and were they treated equally? 
Follow up: Were decisions transparent and followed through with? 
Follow up: Was any sector missing from the collaboration? 
Follow up: Were decisions deliberated on fairly and consistently? 
Follow up: Where there any specific problems at different points in time that hindered the 
process? 
Follow up: Where there any aspects of the process that helped the collaboration function 
or achieve its goals? 
What role do you see the collaboration playing locally? 
Follow up: What are their strengths and weaknesses in this role? 
Follow up: Do they need/ should they have authority to carry out this role?  
What role does the provincial government or legislation or policy play for the collaboration? 
Follow up: How does this role affect the collaboration? 
What has been the general community to response to the collaboration? 
Follow up: Have there been times of notable resistance or support? 
Follow up: What actions of the collaboration have helped or hindered this response? 
Follow up: To what extend does the community response affect the collaboration? 
What actions or process have been most important for the organization? 
What kind of influence or impact has resulted from the collaboration? 
Follow-up: Has this changed over time? 
Follow-up: Has it been adequate? 
Do the origins have an impact how the collaboration has been perceived? 
What do you anticipate of the future of the collaboration? 
Do you think your opinions of the collaboration differ from other organizations? In what ways? 
What does the concept of legitimacy in the context of the collaboration mean to you? 
Given the study objectives, is there anything I haven’t asked that you think I should know? 








Source Name Year 
Cowichan Watershed Board 
1 Website CWB CWB Website - 
2  Policy Westland Resource 
Group Inc. 
Cowichan Basin Water 
Management Plan 
2007 
3 Policy CWB Cowichan Watershed Board 
Governance Manual 
2010 
4  CWB Technical Advisory Committee – 
Terms of Reference 
2010 
5 Policy Cowichan Valley 
Regional District  
Constitution and Bylaws for the 




CWB Various 2011-2015  
53 Report Hunter, R., 
Brandes, O. M., 
Moore, M. L., 
Brandes, L. 
The Cowichan Watershed Board: 
An Evolution of Collaborative 
Watershed Governance 
2014 
54-58 Newspaper Cowichan News 
Leader Pictorial 
Various 2009, 2014 
59-64 Newspaper Lake Cowichan 
Gazette 
Various 2014-2015 
65 Newspaper Parksville 
Qualicum Beach 
News 
Society wants to provide input to 
regional water governance plans 
2015 
66 Newspaper Ladysmith 
Chronicle 
Water restrictions eased 2015 
67-68 Newspaper Postmedia Breaking 
News 
Various 2015 
69-71 Newspaper Victoria Times 
Colonist 
Various 2014-2015 
72-73 Newspaper Globe and Mail Various 2014, 2015 
74 Report Hunter, R. Collaborative Watershed 
Governance Workshop 
2011 
75 Report Rutherford, T. Cowichan Watershed Board 
Targets 
2011 
76 Report Hutchins, R.  The Cowichan Watershed Board 
Story  
2012 
77 Letter CWB Water Sustainability Act – 
Comments of the CWB 
2013 
Lake Windermere Ambassadors 






Source Name Year 
79 Policy LWA Terms of Reference 2010 
80 Policy LWA Lake Management Committee 
Terms of Reference 
2011 
81 Policy RDEK & DOI Lake Windermere Management 
Pan 
2011 
82 Policy RDEK Lake Windermere Official 
Community Plan Bylaw No. 2061 
2008 





LWA Various 2011-2014 
103 Report LWA Lake Windermere 2011 Water 
Quality Monitoring Results 
2011 
104 Report LWA Lake Windermere 2012 Water 




LWA Lake Windermere Ambassadors 
Brochure  
N/A 
106-129 Newspaper Columbia Valley 
Pioneer 
Various 2011-2015 
130-140 Newspaper Invermere Valley 
Echo 
Various 2011-2015 
141 Newspaper Free Press Celebrating water and a local 
water hero 
2015 




144 Report POLIS Summary: Watershed Governance 
Institutional Mentorship Webinar 
2012 
145 Report Harma, K., 
Gardener, J., 
Knight, D. & 
Melnychuk, N. 
 
Working for the Watershed: 
Establishing an Upper Columbia 
Watershed Governance Body at 
the Headwaters of the Columbia 
River, British Columbia 
2013 
146 Report LWA Water Governance at the 
Headwaters of the Columbia 
River 
2013 
147 Letter LWA “This is Our Watershed” ~ A 
Community Conversation 
 
148 Policy Elk River Alliance Elk River Watershed Council: 
Terms of Reference 
2012 
149 Report LWA Kinsmen Breach Restoration 
Project: Final Summary Report 
2012 










Source Name Year 
Okanagan Basin Water Board 
151 Website OBWB OBWB Website - 
152 Policy Province of BC OBWB Supplementary Letters 
Patent 
1964 
153-159 Report OBWB OBWB Annual Report 2009-2015 
160 Report OBWB Governance Manual 2010 





OBWB Meeting Minutes 2009- 2015 
220-260 Meeting 
Minutes 
OBWB Meeting Minute Summaries 1968-2008 
261 Plan OBWB OBWB Strategic Plan 2014-2019 2014 
262 Briefing Note OBWB Letter to Honourable Steve 
Thomson Re: Improving water 
management in British Columbia: 
Proposal for a new water 
commission 
2014 
263 Report Jacqueline Belzile Water Use Reporting Case Studies 2014 
264-277 Newspaper Vernon Morning 
Star 
Various 2014-2015 
278-294 Newspaper Kelowna Capital 
News 
Various 2014-2015 
295-299 Newspaper Penticton Western 
News 
Various 2014-2015  
300 Newspaper Keremeos Review Don’t be a drain on the water 
supply 
2015 
301-303 Newspaper Summerland 
Review 
Various 2014-2015 
304-306 Newspaper Lake Country 
Calendar 
Various 2015 
307-309 Newspaper Canadian Press Various 2001, 
2009, 2015 
310-311 Newspaper Topnews.in Various 2013, 2015 
312-314 Newspaper Postmedia News Various 2010-2011 
315 Newspaper Salmon Arm 
Observer 
Region asked about water funds 2015 
316 Newspaper Invermere Valley 
Echo 
Beneath the Surface: Mussels on 
the Move 
2015 
317-319 Newspaper Vancouver Sun Various 2012-2013 
320 Newspaper Edmonton Journal Controversy brewing in B.C. 
water deal 
2011 
321-323 Newspaper M2 Press wire Various 2006, 
2008, 2010 
324 Newspaper Canadian Business 
News Network 






Source Name Year 
(eSource) Okanagan water study 
325 Newspaper Canada Newswire Okanagan Basin Water Study: 
One of Nine Community Projects 
to Receive Over $1.9 Million in 
Federal Gas Tax Funding 
2007 
Nechako Watershed Council 
326 Policy NWC Terms of Reference 1998 
327 Policy NWC Role and Responsibilities: 
Coordinating Committee 
1999 
328 Policy Government of 
British Columbia 
BC-Alcan 1997 Agreement 1997 
329-386 Meeting 
Minutes 
NWC Various 1997-2010 
387-455 Newspaper Prince George 
Citizen 
Various 1995-2012 
388-462 Newspaper The Prince George 
Free Press 
Various 1995-1998 
463-469 Newspaper Prince George This 
Week 
Various 1995-1996 
470-478 Newspaper The Vancouver Sun Various 1996-1997 
479-480 Newspaper Globe and Mail Various 1996, 2011 
481-484 Newspaper Omineca Express Various 1997-2000 
485 Newspaper  Associated Press 
Newswires 
Water release plan for B.C. 
salmon launched 
2002 
486-487 Newspaper The Canadian Press Various 2001, 2002 
488 Newspaper M2 Presswire BC Ministry of Environment, 
Lands and Parks: Nechako River  
water licence applications to be 
reviewed 
1999 
489 Newspaper Industrial Energy 
Bulletin 
Alcan strikes deal with BC 
Government ending litigation over 
Kemano Project  
1997 
490-491 Newspaper Eco-log Week Various 1997 
492 Newspaper Canada NewsWire B.C.-Alcan Agreement Sets Stage 
For Job Creation, Environmental  
Enhancement In Province's North 
1997 
493 Briefing Note NWC Future Roles for the Nechako 
Watershed Council 
2004 








Fraser Basin Contributes to 
Improving Status of Three of 











Source Name Year 
501 Promotional 
Material  
NWC Nechako Watershed Council 1 
502 Promotional 
Material 
Alcan Working with water 1996 
503-505 Radio 
Transcript 





Promoting aboriginal territoriality 
through interethnic alliances: The 
case of the Cheslatta T'en in 
northern British Colum 
2003 
507 Report NWC A Progress Report 1999 
508 Report NWC Issue identification and Optional 
Solutions Scoping Matrix 
2000 
509 Report Cornerstone 
Planning Group 
Summary Workshop on Issues 1999 
510 Report NEEF NEEF Multi-Interest Involvement 
Process Workshop Report 
1999 
511 Report NWC Training in Consensus Decision 
Making for the NWC session 
Notes 
1999 
512 Report Fraser Basin 
Management 
Program (FBMP) 
Nechako Watershed Management 
Initiative June 15, 1996 
Exploratory Workshop: 
Background Paper, Proposal, 
Results Paper  
1996 
513 Report NEEF NEEF Summary Report 2001 




515 Report NWC How we got to here from there: A 
Chronology of Events Leading to 
the Proposed Nechako Watershed 
Council 
1997 
516 Report FBC Water Management Planning 
Process for the Nechako: A 
Proposal 
1998 
517 Letter FBC Letter to Chief Thomas of Saik’uz 
First Nation Re: Workshop 
1998 
518 Letter FBC Letters to FBC Operations 
Committee Re: NWC resignation 
1998 
519 Letter Rivers Defence 
Coalition 
Letters to FBC resigning from 
NWC 
1998 
520 Letter FBC Letter in response to resignation 
of River Defence Coalition 
1998 
521 Letter Northwest 
Communities 
Coalition 
Letter in response to resignation 
of River Defence Coalition 
1998 






Source Name Year 
Commerce of River Defence Coalition 
523 Letter FBC Letter to Alcan Re: Nechako 
River Issues 
1997 
524 Letter Alcan Letter Response Re: Nechako 
River Issues 
1998 
525 Letter BC Minister of 
Education: Paul 
Ramsey 
Letter response Re: Participation 
in NWC 
1998 
526 Letter FBMB Letter of invitation to Minister of 
Fisheries and Oceans to Nechako 
Watershed Workshop 
1996 
527 Letter Minister of 
Fisheries and 
Oceans 
Response to Letter of Invitation 1996 
Shuswap Watershed Council/Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process 
528 Website Fraser Basin 
Council 
Shuswap Watershed Council 
Website 
- 
529 Policy Fraser Basin 
Council 
Terms of Reference for Water 
Quality Program 
2014 
530 Policy Columbia Shuswap 
Regional District 
Bylaw 5705 - A bylaw to establish 







Summary of SWC Meeting 2014 
533-535 Meeting 
Minutes 
SLIPP Summary of SLIPP minutes 2012-2013 
536 Plan SLIPP Strategic Plan for Shuswap and 
Mara Lakes 
2008 
537 Plan Fraser Basin 
Council 
Water Quality Monitoring Plan 
2011-2014 
2011 
538 Report Fraser Basin 
Council 
Shuswap Watershed Water 
Quality Program (SWWQP) 
Summary of Results Public 
Engagement: Phase 1 
2014 
539 Report Fraser Basin 
Council 
Summary: 2011-2012 Water 
Quality Monitoring Results for 
Shuswap and Mara Lakes 
2013 
540 Report Leftside Partners 
Inc. 
SWWQP Feasibility Study 2014 
541 Report Northwest 
Hydraulic 
Consultants 
Integrated Water Quality 
Monitoring Plan for the Shuswap 
Lakes, BC 
2010 
542  Promotional 
material 







SLIPP: Working together to 
sustain our watershed 
N/A 






Source Name Year 
Kicker 
579- 611 Newspaper Shuswap Market Various 2005-2014 
612-616 Newspaper Lakeshore News Lake safety not assured 2014 
617-638 Newspaper Salmon Arm 
Observer 
Various 2010-2015 
639 Newspaper Eagle Valley News Various 2015 
640-646 Newspaper Vernon Morning 
Star 
Various 2015 
647-649 Newspaper Vancouver Sun Various 
 
2008, 2010 
650-652 Newspaper Canadian Press Massive algae blooms on 
Shuswap Lake spur action by area 
municipalities 
2010 
653 Newspaper Canwest News 
Service 
Mara Lake development 
moratorium sought 
2010 
654 Newspaper M2Presswire Awards Honour Interior Public 
Service Employees 
2010 
655 Letter Ministry of Forests, 
Lands and Natural 
Resources 
SLIPP agency interest in private 
property 
2011 




Site visit trip report – SLIPP 
Foreshore Restoration Project 
2011 
 
